20 research outputs found
Counting Possibilia
Timothy Williamson supports the thesis that every possible entity necessarily exists and so he needs to explain how a possible son of Wittgenstein’s, for example, exists in our world: he exists as a merely possible object (MPO), a pure locus of potential. Williamson presents a short argument for the existence of MPOs: how many knives can be made by fitting together two blades and two handles? Four: two, at the most, are concrete objects, the others being merely possible knives and merely possible objects. This paper defends the idea that one can avoid reference and ontological commitment to MPOs. My proposal is that MPOs
can be dispensed with by using the notion of ‘rule of an art’. I first present a solution according to which
we count instructions describing physical combinations between components. This account, however, is not completely satisfactory and I claim that one can find a better one: in answering Williamson’s question, we count classes of possible worlds in which the same instance of a general rule is applied
Sense and Subjectivity. A Very short - and Partial - History of the Loss and Recovery of the Bodily Self
Empirically minded and naturalistically inclined post-Cartesian philosophers have refused to accept the idea that we human persons are immaterial, senseless souls. This rejection has led to a fragmentation of the self and eventually to its theoretical disappearence. A way to resist this eliminativist trend is to see the self as an embodied entity, a promising thesis which has assumed prominence in contemporary debates. The paper is a (fairly partisan) reconstruction of this post-Cartesian scenario
Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should not be our Default Position in Consciousness Studies
Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think (1) that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and (2) that there is a very strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness. In a previous article of mine I have already discussed the first point; the present paper is devoted to elaborating the second, presenting a common-sense-based argument against physicalism
Metafisica della persona umana
What is a human person? The paper presents some main responses contemporary analytic philosophers have given to this question. In particular, the following theories are examined: a human person is an immaterial soul, an organism belonging to the species Home Sapiens, an entity constituted by – and yet distinct from – a human organism, a bundle of mental states, a specific four-dimensional worm. These theories are briefly outlined, along with the arguments offered in their favour and the objections they have to meet.Cos’è una persona umana? L’articolo presenta alcune delle principali risposte che i filosofi analitici contemporanei hanno dato a questa domanda. In particolare sono esaminate le seguenti teorie: la persona umana è un’anima immateriale, è un organismo appartenente alla specie Homo Sapiens, è un ente costituito ma distinto da un organismo umano, è un fascio di stati mentali, è un particolare oggetto quadri-dimensionale. Sono presentate brevemente le caratteristiche di fondo di queste posizioni, gli argomenti portati a loro favore e le difficoltà a cui vanno incontro