Ratio Anselmi Revisited

The proof of God’s existence, known as Ratio Anselmi, is being analyzed. Four first-order theories are constructed to mirror versions of Anselm’s reasoning. God’s existence is shown to be provable in all of them. A traditional objection to the employment of a concept of God is overruled. And yet, Anselm’s proof is eventually found to be incorrect. The error attributed to Anselm consists in an illegitimate use of the words “greater‘ and “conceivable‘, and is identified as quaternio terminorum or petitio principii, depending on circumstances. It is claimed that there is no direct way to improve the argument

The Case of Dialetheism

The concept of dialetheia and the claim of dialetheism has been examined and compared to such related concept as contradiction, antinomy, consistency and paraconsistency. Dialetheia is a true contradiction and dialetheism is the claim that there exists at least one dialetheia. It has been observed that dialetheism is equivalent to the negation of the traditional principle of contradiction. Hence, dialetheism itself is no new idea in whatsoever. The novelty of dialetheism consists in the arguments delivered for its case. Key justification the partisans deliver for dialetheism has been examined and evaluated: antinomies, an alleged Gödel’s paradox, and existence of limits of thought. The structure of those arguments has been analyzed. It has been claimed that they share one and the same simple structure which may be called reverse paradox. The vital content dialetheists add to the traditional paradoxes is only the thesis of reliability of the vernacular prima facie knowledge. Three objections have been raised against the justification of dialetheism: firstly, it has been claimed that exactly the same argument supports principle of contradiction, secondly, it has been questioned whether the arguments preserve their value when logic is subject to revision, and thirdly, it has been claimed that the underlying logic of dialetheism is classical

On axiomatization of Łukasiewicz's four-valued modal logic

Formal aspects of various ways of description of Jan Łukasiewicz’s four-valued modal logic £ are discussed. The original Łukasiewicz’s description by means of the accepted and rejected theorems, together with the four-valued matrix, is presented. Then the improved E.J. Lemmon’s description based upon three specific axioms, together with the relational semantics, is presented as well. It is proved that Lemmon’s axiomatic is not independent: one axiom is derivable on the base of the remanent two. Several axiomatizations, based on three, two or one single axiom are provided and discussed, including S. Kripke’s axiomatics. It is claimed that (a) all substitutions of classical theorems, (b) the rule of modus ponens, (c) the definition of “◊” and (d) the single specific axiom schema: ⬜A ∧ B → A ∧ ⬜B, called the jumping necessity axiom, constitute an elegant axiomatics of the system £

Is the ontological proof for God’s existence an ontological proof for God’s existence?

Two questions concerning Anselm of Canterbury’s theistic argument provided in Proslogion Ch. 2 are asked and answered: is the argument valid? under what conditions could it be sound? In order to answer the questions the argument is formalized as a first-order theory called AP2. The argument turns out to be valid, although it contains a hidden premise. The argument is also claimed not to be ontological one, but rather an a posteriori argument. One of the premises is found to be false, so the argument is claimed not to be sound and to fail to prove its conclusion

A spurious confusion in temporal logic

R.L. Epstein and E. Buitrago-Díaz aspire to present a vitally new approach to temporal logic, an approach based on the idea of absolute truth-values. They claim the existing approaches are confused and incoherent, and contain a significant number of nonsenses. The alleged problems are generated by truth-values being relativized to positions in time. The fundamental incoherence consists in some confusion between propositions and their schemata. Epstein and Buitrago-Díaz have formulas be simply true or false and describe fixed areas of time. I endeavour to show that all objections Epstein and Buitrago-Díaz raise to existing temporal logic are misunderstandings. The calculus they present is easily reconstructable in existing calculi, so there is no new approach here. However, the calculus is correct and may be of some interest in logic

Negation in weak positional calculi

Four weak positional calculi are constructed and examined. They refer to the use of the connective of negation within the scope of the positional connective “R” of realization. The connective of negation may be fully classical, partially analogical or independent from the classical, truth-functional negation. It has been also proved that the strongest system, containing fully classical connective of negation, is deductively equivalent to the system MR from Jarmużek and Pietruszczak

A formal theory of physical necessity

A system HW of normal modal logic, developed by R. Bigelow & R. Pargetter is presented. Some formal issues concerning the system are examined, such as completeness, number of distinct modalities and relations to other systems. Some philosophical topics are also discussed. The Authors interpret the system HW as the system of physical (nomic) modalities. It is questioned, whether or not the system HW is justified to be claimed to be the logic of physical necessity. The answer seems to may be negative

Robert Trueman’s Defence of Higher-Order Logic

The paper contains a review and a discussion of Robert Trueman's book Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic, Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. xii + 227. ISBN 978-1-108-81410-2. The discussion is focused on the consistency of Truema's language-based ontology and on its value in defending higher-order logic

Jerzy Łoś Positional Calculus and the Origin of Temporal Logic

Most accounts, including leading textbooks, credit Arthur Norman Prior with the invention of temporal (tense logic). However, (i) Jerzy Łoś delivered his version of temporal logic in 1947, several years before Prior; (ii) Henrk Hiż’s review of Łoś’s system in Journal of Symbolic Logic was published as early as 1951; (iii) there is evidence to the effect that, when constructing his tense calculi, Prior was aware of Łoś’s system. Therefore, although Prior is certainly a key figure in the history tense logic, as well as modal logic in general, it should be accepted both in the literature that temporal logic was invented by Jerzy Łoś