Limitations of the Swedish network coordination of oil spill preparedness

The management of extreme crisis situations in Sweden has shown delays in decisive actions at higher levels during emergencies, such as oil spills. This has been blamed on unclear responsibilities that undermine the decision-making process. Confusing, conflicting, or delayed orders impede response effectiveness. This article uses network analysis and survey responses to examine the Swedish oil spill crisis management network and show the Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and Oil Spill Advisory Service as central organizations. However, the roles of these organizations need to be clarified and communicated better to other organizations. In order to improve coordination of Swedish oil spill preparedness, it is suggested to formalize and strengthen the roles of these central organizations. Weak connections between municipalities in different counties were also observed. This weakness could be overcome by more frequent exercises across counties to improve familiarity

How the German crisis of 1931 swept across Europe: a comparative view from Stockholm

According to conventional wisdom, the fall of the Swedish currency in September 1931 was caused by the sterling crisis. This article shows that the road towards devaluation began earlier and that financial linkages with Germany proved to be more important than Sweden's economic and monetary relations with Great Britain. It all started in late 1929 when the Swedish financier Ivar Kreuger gave a loan to the German government in exchange for the match monopoly, thus tying his business ventures to Germany's solvency. In addition, a part of this loan was financed by large US dollar credits from the two largest Swedish banks that, in turn, accumulated a sizeable foreign short-term deficit. When in June 1931 the German fiscal crisis began to escalate, international investors ceased to consider Sweden a safe haven because they knew about the linkages between the German government, Kreuger, and the Swedish banking system. This downgrading, in combination with the foreign short-term deficit of the banking sector, proved lethal for the reserve position of the Swedish central bank, once the international liquidity crisis in mid-July 1931 erupted. The sterling crisis only put the final nail in the coffin