Informed Consent Without Autonomy

This Essay explains why and how the Roman Catholic basis for informed consent is different from the secular basis. It argues that the Catholic basis, which is rooted in natural law, is the better model for society to adopt. The author explains that the secular view is rooted in the belief that patient autonomy must never be violated but the Catholic view is based on human dignity, which simply requires doctors to allow patients to exercise their free will within moral limits. This view allows doctors to override patients\u27 decisions if those decisions are morally wrong or irrational

Informed Consent Without Autonomy

This Essay explains why and how the Roman Catholic basis for informed consent is different from the secular basis. It argues that the Catholic basis, which is rooted in natural law, is the better model for society to adopt. The author explains that the secular view is rooted in the belief that patient autonomy must never be violated but the Catholic view is based on human dignity, which simply requires doctors to allow patients to exercise their free will within moral limits. This view allows doctors to override patients\u27 decisions if those decisions are morally wrong or irrational

What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word 'conscience.' This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one's ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed

Within You / Without You: Biotechnology, Ontology, and Ethics

As Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) have become more common, ethical issues have arisen regarding the deactivation of these devices. Goldstein et al., have shown that both patients and cardiologists consider ICD deactivation to be different from the discontinuation of other life-sustaining treatments. It cannot be argued ethically that ICDs raise new questions about the distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment, and neither the fact that they are used intermittently, nor the duration of therapy, nor the mere fact that they are located inside the body can be considered unique to these devices and morally decisive. However, frequent allusions to the fact that they are located inside the body might provide a clue about what bothers patients and physicians. As technology progresses, some interventions seem to become a part of the patient as a unified whole person, completely replacing body parts and lost physiological functions rather than merely substituting for impaired structure and function. If a life-sustaining intervention can be considered a “replacement”—a part of the patient as a unified whole person—then it seems that deactivation is better classified as a case of killing rather than a case of forgoing a life-sustaining treatment. ICDs are not a “replacement” therapy in this sense. The deactivation of an ICD is best classified, under the proper conditions, as the forgoing of an extraordinary means of care. As technology becomes more sophisticated, however, and new interventions come to be best classified as “replacements” (a heart transplant would be a good example), “discontinuing” these interventions should be much more morally troubling for those clinicians who oppose euthanasia and assisted suicide

Lifespan extension and the doctrine of double effect

Recent developments in biogerontology—the study of the biology of ageing—suggest that it may eventually be possible to intervene in the human ageing process. This, in turn, offers the prospect of significantly postponing the onset of age-related diseases. The biogerontological project, however, has met with strong resistance, especially by deontologists. They consider the act of intervening in the ageing process impermissible on the grounds that it would (most probably) bring about an extended maximum lifespan—a state of affairs that they deem intrinsically bad. In a bid to convince their deontological opponents of the permissibility of this act, proponents of biogerontology invoke an argument which is grounded in the doctrine of double effect. Surprisingly, their argument, which we refer to as the ‘double effect argument’, has gone unnoticed. This article exposes and critically evaluates this ‘double effect argument’. To this end, we first review a series of excerpts from the ethical debate on biogerontology in order to substantiate the presence of double effect reasoning. Next, we attempt to determine the role that the ‘double effect argument’ is meant to fulfil within this debate. Finally, we assess whether the act of intervening in ageing actually can be justified using double effect reasoning

Improving the Quality of Spiritual Care as a Dimension of Palliative Care: The Report of the Consensus Conference

A Consensus Conference sponsored by the Archstone Foundation of Long Beach, California, was held February 17–18, 2009, in Pasadena, California. The Conference was based on the belief that spiritual care is a fundamental component of quality palliative care. This document and the conference recommendations it includes builds upon prior literature, the National Consensus Project Guidelines, and the National Quality Forum Preferred Practices and Conference proceedings

Physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia: Emerging issues from a global perspective

Medical professional societies have traditionally opposed physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia (PAS-E), but this opposition may be shifting. We present 5 reasons why physicians shouldn’t be involved in PAS-E. 1. Slippery slopes: There is evidence that safeguards in the Netherlands and Belgium are ineffective and violated, including administering lethal drugs without patient consent, absence of terminal illness, untreated psychiatric diagnoses, and nonreporting; 2. Lack of self-determination: Psychological and social motives characterize requests for PAS-E more than physical symptoms or rational choices; many requests disappear with improved symptom control and psychological support; 3. Inadequate palliative care: Better palliative care makes most patients physically comfortable. Many individuals requesting PAS-E don’t want to die but to escape their suffering. Adequate treatment for depression and pain decreases the desire for death; 4. Medical professionalism: PAS-E transgresses the inviolable rule that physicians heal and palliate suffering but never intentionally inflict death; 5. Differences between means and ends: Proeuthanasia advocates look to the ends (the patient’s death) and say the ends justify the means; opponents disagree and believe that killing patients to relieve suffering is different from allowing natural death and is not acceptable. Conclusions: Physicians have a duty to eliminate pain and suffering, not the person with the pain and suffering. Solutions for suffering lie in improving palliative care and social conditions and addressing the reasons for PAS-E requests. They should not include changing medical practice to allow PAS-E

Ethical Issues in the Design and Implementation of Population Health Programs

Spurred on by recent health care reforms and the Triple Aim’s goals of improving population health outcomes, reducing health care costs, and improving the patient experience of care, emphasis on population health is increasing throughout medicine. Population health has the potential to improve patient care and health outcomes for individual patients. However, specific population health activities may not be in every patient’s best interest in every circumstance, which can create ethical tensions for individual physicians and other health care professionals. Because individual medical professionals remain committed primarily to the best interests of individual patients, physicians have a unique role to play in ensuring population health supports this ethical obligation. Using widely recognized principles of medical ethics—nonmaleficence/beneficence, respect for persons, and justice—this article describes the ethical issues that may arise in contemporary population health programs and how to manage them. Attending to these principles will improve the design and implementation of population health programs and help maintain trust in the medical profession