Sulmasy, Brother Daniel P., O.F.M.

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St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Review Volume 75 Number 2 Volume 75, Spring 2001, Number 2 Article 16 March 2012 Four Basic Notions of the Common Good Brother Daniel P. Sulmasy O.F.M. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Sulmasy, Brother Daniel P. O.F.M. (2001) "Four Basic Notions of the Common Good," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 75 : No. 2 , Article 16. Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol75/iss2/16 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. FOUR BASIC NOTIONS OF THE COMMONGOODBROTHER DANIEL P. SULMASY, O.F.M.tINTRODUCTIONI am delighted to be here among lawyers-it is a rareopportunity for a physician. I am very grateful to JohnCoughlin, my brother, for asking me to think about the commongood. I told him that I never think about the common good andin trying to get me to be a better Franciscan he asked me to doso. I think it flows well from what Professor Harper just spoketo us about.I am going to talk about different ways of thinking aboutthis term common good. The term is frequently tossed aboutthese days, both inside and outside Catholic circles. The term"common good" has a lot of different kinds of meanings and theyare not always clearly distinguished. I would like to try to bringa little more conceptual clarity by describing four basic notions ofthe common good. Each is going to have two subtypes; thismakes it a little complex. Then I am going to say what part orparts I believe the Catholic notion of the common good to be.Finally, I am going to test my account of the common good byanalyzing the case of assisted suicide to see if what I have comeup with supports the traditional Aristotelian argument that onereason that suicide is wrong is that it is a sin against thecommon good.I use the terms the aggregative common good, the commoncommon good, the supersessive common good, and the integralcommon good to describe four different ways I think the word orphrase "common good" is used.t Ph.D., Georgetown University; M.D., A.B., Cornell University. Professor ofMedicine and Director of the Bioethics Institute of New York Medical College.ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEWI. THE AGGREGATIVE COMMON GOODThe aggregative common good is the common good that isthe aggregate sum of all the goods of all the individuals in thesocial unit. There are two versions of this. There is asentimentalist version and a utilitarian version. Thesentimentalist version describes the early moral sentimenttheorists such as Francis Hutcheson. He coined the phrase, "thegreatest good for the greatest number."' It is aggregativebecause it sums up the individual goods, but it has some rathersignificant conceptual and moral problems. It makes noreference to the distribution of the bad. That is one of theproblems in saying "the greatest good for the greatest number."Utilitarians had a different way of talking about theaggregative common good in a radically egalitarian notion.Bentham points out the good of each count for one and none formore than one.2 For Mills, the Greatest Happiness Principletakes the happiness and unhappiness and sums it over the socialunit.3 Again, there is aggregation because there is a balancing ofthe good and the bad.As Professor Harper also pointed out, the aggregative senseof the common good is a popular way to think about it in ourwestern world today, especially among economists and policyexperts who are steeped in cost-effective analysis. As MacIntyrepointed out, this has the "argumentative form of utilitarianism."4A lot of people think about the aggregate effect of good and badin a unit.II. THE COMMON COMMON GOODNext, we sometimes hear or read about the common good asthe common common good. Scholars sometimes use the phrase,cccommon good," to refer to goods we hold in common. There aretwo subtypes to the common common good: the possessive1 See MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM MONTAIGNE TO KANT: AN ANTHOLOGY, 505(J.B. Schneewind ed., 1990) (The actual phrase is "the greatest happiness for thegreatest number").2 See id. at 460-502.a See JAMES V. McGLYNN & JULES J. TONER, MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES 53-60 (1962).4 See Alasdair Maclntyre, "Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis:" An Essayon the Release of Moral Philosophy to Bureaucratic Theory, in ETHICAL THEORYAND BUSINESS 266-87 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 1983); see alsoALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1984).[Vol.75:303PANEL THREE: THE COMMON GOODcommon common good and the teleological common commongood.The possessive common common good is the way a scholarrefers to the possessions we hold in common. It is the things wehold in common: air, water, and space. For instance, Finniswould talk about this as a type of common good as the amount ofhappiness or goodness in the world that we would hold incommon.5 Garrett Hardin, in his famous essay, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, talks about the common good in this way.6The teleological common common good is the way scholarsrefer to the common good as those goods towards which each ofus aims. For Aquinas this teleological common common good isto know the truth about God and to live in community. That isthe good we have in common. It is that towards which we allaim. For Finnis and Grisez this consists of a list, the basic list ofcommon basic human goods. 7 These are the things each of us, ashumans, have in common, and toward which we aim.The possessive common common good, however, finds aplace in almost everybody's moral theory. Its scope, whether itbe large or small, depends upon other elements in that theory.But, the idea of the teleological common common good isespecially problematic for liberal theorists who begin by denyingthat it is possible to have a common common good towards whicheach of us absolutely aims. This is because the teleologicalcommon common good weighs upon their morals.III. THE SUPERSESSIVE COMMON GOODThe third notion of the common good of which onesometimes hears is the supersessive common good. Thesupersessive common good is common good that is believed tooverride all of the individuals who constitute the community. Ittakes on a life of its own. There are two subtypes of thesupersessive common good, a factional type and a Hegelian type.The factional type includes those systems in which some5 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).6 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, reprinted in MANAGINGTHE COMMONS 16-30 (Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds. 1977).7 See FINNIS, supra note 5, at 85-91. Finnis states these "basic forms of good forus" include: "life," "play," "knowledge," "aesthetic experience," "friendship,""practical reasonableness," and "religion." Id.; see also GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELLSHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 42-53(1974).20011 305ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEWportion of the population takes on the role of representing thecommon good, often through the State. This State may be in theform of a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a junta. Its rule may bebenign or malignant. It may take the form of L'etat c'est moi.8So the supersessive common good is self-pleasing. It states "I amthe king" or more familiarly, "what's good for business is good forAmerica." The individual good of a few people becomes thecommon good of all.In Hegelian thought there is the view that the Statesupersedes the interests of the individuals. The interests of theindividuals are synthetically and systematically subsumed intothe State. Their spirit is made concrete in the State and issusceptible to distortion and manipulation. There is theconstant danger of collapsing to totalitarianism, which is notpopular in the western world.IV. THE INTEGRAL COMMON GOODThe fourth notion of the common good is the integralcommon good. This is the kind of good that comes explicitly frommutual human interaction and cannot be divided into equallyaggregative parts. There are two types of integral common good:a conditional integral common good and a constitutive integralcommon good.The conditional integral common good is a good that comesfrom mutual association. Finnis describes it as "a set ofconditions which enables the members of the community toattain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realizereasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of whichthey have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/ornegatively) in a community."9 In other words, there is a commongood that is a set of conditions which allows members of societyto come together, but only for the purpose of each individual toflourish.The constitutive common good refers to those more robustnotions of the common good that hold that being in a communityof relationships with other human beings is itself a good.Therefore, being in a relationship, being part of the community,being part of each other is itself a good. It is a good that eitherSDIcTIONNAIRE JURODIQUE I, FRANsAIS-ANGLAis (1953).9 FINNIS, supra note 5, at 155.[Vol.75:303PANEL THREE: THE COMMON GOODpartly or completely desires what is the good for me. This meansthat part of my good is the good of the community of us in thisroom. I think this is the most traditional sense of the commongood. This is what Aristotle meant when he said man or peopleare political animals. St. Thomas said every man or every one ofus is part of the community, so that we belong to the communityin virtue of what we are. The relationship of being in thecommunity is the value of the constitutive common good.V. CLASSIFYING PHILOSOPHERS' NOTIONS OF COMMON GOODWe observe similarities and differences when we classifyphilosophers using this set of notions of the common good. Forinstance, the utilitarians all employ the notion of the aggregativecommon good. Many of them also employ the teleologicalcommon common good. According to Mill everybody is alreadyprescribed to aim at happiness. Bentham thought everyone'sgoal was pleasure. Today, however, most utilitarians deny thatthere is really a common common good.A liberal such as Rawls would scoff at the teleologicalcommon common good. He would accept the conditional integralcommon good. He believed we come together only on thecondition that it helps us with our own projects.10 There is nogood out there that we have in common. The common good issimply that set of conditions that allows us to live by our ownlights and to finish our own projects.A natural law thinker like Finnis has a strong notion of theteleological common common good. This is evident in those basichuman goods we talked about; friendship, religion and life. Healso holds a more restrained notion of the conditional integralcommon good, just like the liberal thinkers. For Finnis it is thatset of conditions that help each of us to realize the common goodthat is ours.A communitarian like Michael Sandel would have adifferent view. He holds a stronger notion of the integralcommon good: the constitutive integral common good. Sandelstates, "community describes not just what they have as humanbeings but also what they are, not a relationship they choose, as10 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-24 (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press1999) (1971); see also JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 242-45 (Samuel Freemaned., 1999).2001]ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEWin voluntary association, but an attachment they discover, notmerely an attribute but a constituent of their identity.""Therefore, being in community in the constitutive integralsense of the common good is part of the new communitarianism.Communitarians, however, like liberals, are agnostics about ateleological common common good. Thus, while they believebeing together is itself a good, they cannot say exactly what it iswe are suppose to do once we are together.The Catholic tradition, which has Aristotelian-Thomisticroots, affirms both the teleological common common good and theconstitutive integral common good. Thus, the good for each of usis specified, and part of the good for each of us is being inrelation to the community. Yet there is a goal towards whicheach of us moves, which runs afoul of both the newcommunitarians and liberals in its deliberate and definitivespecification of the good for each.Although that is a lot to sort out, it helps to be able to figureout where people are at when they throw around the phrase, the"common good," around in ways that are very different from theway others use the phrase. And, mixing and matching differentinterpretations of the "common good," one can show how thingswork.VI. THE COMMON GOOD AND SUICIDEI now want to discuss the more challenging question posedby Professor Harper: does the adoption of the new natural lawtheorist view of the common good in place of the more classicalCatholic notion of the common good make any difference? Doesit make a difference whether you take this strong integral senseof the common good in a constitutive way or whether you take itin the more conditional way that Finnis does? To illustrate that,I want to discuss suicide.I do not know how many of you know Thomas of Aquinas'arguments about why suicide is wrong. There are basicallythree arguments: it is unnatural, ungrateful and anti-social. 12 Itis unnatural because it is a sin against nature because being andgoodness are co-extensive in St. Thomas' metaphysical schema.1 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, Justice and the Good, reprinted in LIBERALISM AND THELIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1988).12 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1273)[Vol.75:303PANEL THREE: THE COMMON GOODNature builds a survival instinct in everyone and a rationalcreature cannot overcome that instinct without behavingirrationally. Suicide is also an act of ingratitude towards God.God gave us life as a gift.St. Thomas' belief that suicide is anti-social is based on thenotion that it is a sin against the common good. If you killyourself, it's a sin against the common good. There is support forthis belief in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.13What does Finnis say about suicide? Interestingly, Finnisdoes not say much about suicide. If you look in the index ofNatural Law and Natural Rights you are directed to "seemurder"14 and then there is one footnote about suicide.'5Can Finnis' view of the common good claim that suicide is asin against the common good? If he is a proponent of theconditional integral common good, which believes in associationfor one's individual purpose, I do not think he can, if he is toremain consistent to this view.If I am in excruciating pain and I am not flourishing in acommunity, I can opt out of the association with the community.The common good no longer serves its conditional purpose ofhelping me to flourish; therefore, suicide is not an offenseagainst the common good. I do not think Finnis would saysuicide is wrong because it is anti-social. I do not believe Finnisis a fan of suicide, as I am sure Professor Harper would know.Finnis would say, well, the purpose of the association, thecommon good of the society, is to help me to flourish as anindividual. If I do not recognize life as a basic good, then I amnot flourishing as a human being and the community cannotsupport me in my decision not to commit suicide. This collapsesinto an argument against suicide based on the teleologicalcommon good. Suicide is wrong because it is not good for anyhuman being.That is a variation on St. Thomas' first argument againstsuicide because it is unnatural. I think Finnis would say suicideis "unnatural" because it is unreasonable.St. Thomas, Aristotle and Catholic social thinking can saysuicide is wrong because it is an act against the teleologicalcommon good because they hold that being in a relationship is a13 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Oswald trans., 1962).14 See FINNIS, supra note 5, at 424.15 See id. at 229.2001] 309ST. JOHNS LAWREVIEWgood in itself. So if I kill myself, I have directly harmed thecommon good, I have directly harmed my relationship with God.They also hold that we all have the common common good.A new communitarian like Sandel might also hold thatsuicide is wrong on the grounds that it is anti-social, not that itis unnatural. He is an agnostic about the teleological commoncommon good. He cannot say that being alive is a good foreverybody because it is up to us to individually choose what isgood for us. He would say that he strongly believes inrelationships.These will probably not answer Professor Harper's question.These diverse thoughts come to the same conclusion usingdifferent notions of the common good. He might ask whether itmatters. Since they employ different reasons, perhaps there willbe cases in which these theories diverge and I am simply notclever enough to figure out what they are.This leads to more questions. Is the common good actuallyidentical with my own good? Is it merely part of my own good?Does it simply mean that I have to overcome my usual pettyjealousies and actually rejoice when a colleague writes aninteresting paper I wish I had written and consider her successpart of my own? Does a constitutive notion of the integralcommon good not lean dangerously toward the supersessivecommon good?These and a lot of other interesting questions, I think, couldbe fruitfully debated. But I hope at least this classification mayhelp bring some clarification to this very difficult notion of thecommon good and help us answer some of the questions that Iposed. There is a lot at stake in how we answer them.[Vol.75:303310

Four Basic Notions of the Common Good

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Four Basic Notions of the Common Good

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