Perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Bulgaria: Results of a national survey 2023

The Working Paper presents the results of a nationwide survey of 1,209 individuals in Bulgaria, conducted in February to early March 2023. The survey examined how corruption is perceived in Bulgaria by different types of respondents, and what kind of behaviour is considered acceptable. It also looked at respondents' perceptions of anti-corruption efforts and under which circumstances they would be more likely to report corruption to the authorities

Power-seeking, networking and competition: why women do not rise in parties

Why do women fail to rise in parties, especially youth parties? This analysis shows that female party members' preferences regarding the purpose of a committee, networking and the election rule in party organisations differ from male party members' which is likely a reason why women face challenges to rise in parties. This article investigates for the first time these gender based differences in preferences simultaneously by conducting a survey experiment with youth party members. Respondents ( n > 1200) were asked if they would run for a seat in a decision-making committee of their youth party. In order to analyse which youth party members opt for which opportunities, the purpose of these committees, the networking opportunities they provide, and the election rule for these committees vary at random. The results show that female members hesitate to join committees that would grant them power, and that they are less likely to opt for upward networking opportunities than their male party colleagues. This effect is particularly strong in hierarchically organised youth parties of centre-right parties. Findings on preferred election rules mostly hold for women from left-wing parties. In contrast to men, this group prefers party quotas. Analysing differences by gender and political orientation, this article shows a clear gender preference gap exists both within and across youth parties

Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?

To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the 'EMU Positions' data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors' positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis

Policy or person?:What voters want from their representatives on Twitter

Social media have the potential to transform democracies as they allow for direct contact between representatives and represented. Politicians can use social media to show their policy positions but they can also give insight into their private lives. Based on survey experiments in Germany and Switzerland we show that social media messages about politicians’ private lives rather deter voters. Instead, we find that voters prefer candidates that communicate policy positions. The effect of a policy-oriented communication style on Twitter can even lead to appreciating a politician from a different party in Switzerland, which has an electoral system that gives a strong incentive to cultivate a personal vote

Roll-Call Votes in the German Bundestag: A New Dataset, 1949-2013

This letter introduces a comprehensive data collection on roll-call votes (RCVs) in the German Bundestag between 1949 and 2013. RCVs are one of the most important data sources on parliamentary behavior. Beyond producing legislative output, RCVs put the positions of Members of Parliament (MPs) and party groups on the public record, serve party leaders as an instrument with which to monitor backbench behavior, and enable opposition parties to obstruct parliamentary business (Saalfeld 1995a). RCVs from various parliaments have been used to investigate, among others, party competition and legislative coalition formation, the strategic behavior of individual MPs and legislative parties, party unity and intraparty politics, and MP responsiveness to voters and other outside interests (for example, Carey 2007; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008; Eggers and Spirling 2016; Hix 2004; Hix and Noury 2016; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Empirical research can rely on comprehensive longitudinal roll-call data for a number of countries, most notably the US Congress (for example, Lewis et al. 2017; Poole and Rosenthal 1997),1 the European Parliament (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005), and the British House of Commons (for example, Eggers and Spirling 2016; Norton 1975); on some cross-country comparative datasets for shorter periods of time (Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Hix and Noury 2016; Sieberer 2006); and on numerous contemporary and historical single-country datasets.2 For the German Bundestag, RCV data has thus far only been available for limited periods of time (Ohmura 2014b; Saalfeld 1995b; Sieberer 2010; Stratmann 2006). At the same time, the Bundestag is an attractive parliament to study. It is one of the most powerful legislatures in a parliamentary democracy (Sieberer 2011); its internal organization is rather elaborate (Saalfeld 2000); and its mixed electoral system offers attractive opportunities to analyze one of the most fundamental aspects of legislative behavior: the effect of electoral rules on legislative voting (for example, Manow 2015; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2015). The datasets described here contain information on individual voting behavior and a wide array of variables that characterize the MPs and RCVs they voted on. The data are freely available to the academic community at Harvard Dataverse.3 In this letter, we describe the structure of the datasets, present descriptive information on key variables and discuss potential research questions to be addressed with the data

Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone

This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states' power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are threefold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success-particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity

Politicians’ theories of voting behavior

While political scientists regularly engage in spirited theoretical debates about elections and voting behavior, few have noticed that elected politicians also have theories of elections and voting. Here, we investigate politicians’ positions on eight central theoretical debates in the area of elections and voting behavior and compare politicians’ theories to those held by ordinary citizens. Using data from face-to-face interviews with nearly 1,000 politicians in eleven countries, together with corresponding surveys of more than 12,000 citizens, we show that politicians overwhelmingly hold thin, minimalist, “democratic realist” theories of voting, while citizens’ theories are more optimistic and policy oriented. Politicians’ theoretical tendencies – along with their theoretical misalignment from citizens – are remarkably consistent across countries. These theories are likely to have important consequences for how politicians campaign, communicate with the public, think about public policy, and represent their constituents

Bargaining in Legislatures, Portfolio Allocation, and the Electoral Costs of Governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. We add to this portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalized by voters for participating in government, increase the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This “cost of governing” shifts their seat reservation price– the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomized survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behavior between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reaction