Visibility diagrams and experimental stripe structure in the quantum Hall effect

We analyze various properties of the visibility diagrams that can be used in the context of modular symmetries and confront them to some recent experimental developments in the Quantum Hall Effect. We show that a suitable physical interpretation of the visibility diagrams which permits one to describe successfully the observed architecture of the Quantum Hall states gives rise naturally to a stripe structure reproducing some of the experimental features that have been observed in the study of the quantum fluctuations of the Hall conductance. Furthermore, we exhibit new properties of the visibility diagrams stemming from the structure of subgroups of the full modular group.Comment: 8 pages in plain TeX, 7 figures in a single postscript fil

Stress transmission in granular matter

The transmission of forces through a disordered granular system is studied by means of a geometrical-topological approach that reduces the granular packing into a set of layers. This layered structure constitutes the skeleton through which the force chains set up. Given the granular packing, and the region where the force is applied, such a skeleton is uniquely defined. Within this framework, we write an equation for the transmission of the vertical forces that can be solved recursively layer by layer. We find that a special class of analytical solutions for this equation are L\'evi-stable distributions. We discuss the link between criticality and fragility and we show how the disordered packing naturally induces the formation of force-chains and arches. We point out that critical regimes, with power law distributions, are associated with the roughness of the topological layers. Whereas, fragility is associated with local changes in the force network induced by local granular rearrangements or by changes in the applied force. The results are compared with recent experimental observations in particulate matter and with computer simulations.Comment: 14 pages, Latex, 5 EPS figure

Modular Groups, Visibility Diagram and Quantum Hall Effect

We consider the action of the modular group $\Gamma (2)$ on the set of positive rational fractions. From this, we derive a model for a classification of fractional (as well as integer) Hall states which can be visualized on two ``visibility" diagrams, the first one being associated with even denominator fractions whereas the second one is linked to odd denominator fractions. We use this model to predict, among some interesting physical quantities, the relative ratios of the width of the different transversal resistivity plateaus. A numerical simulation of the tranversal resistivity plot based on this last prediction fits well with the present experimental data.Comment: 17 pages, plain TeX, 4 eps figures included (macro epsf.tex), 1 figure available from reques

Correction par bloc des transitoires de la caméra infrarouge ISOPIIOT C-100 avec un modèle non linéaire dissymétrique

Les photo-détecteurs utilisés en astronomie infrarouge à très bas niveau de flux présentent généralement une rémanence lors d'un changement d'illumination. Ce phénomène transitoire est non linéaire et dissymétrique selon que le flux entrant croît ou décroît. Pour le détecteur ISOPHOT C-100 embarqué sur le satellite ISO, nous avons montré qu'un modèle semi-empirique permet de décrire avec une bonne précision (de l'ordre de quelques pour-cent) ces transitoires. Une méthode d'inversion permet de corriger ces transitoires. Les limitations de l'approche sont détaillées

Compensating Commitments: The Law and Economics of Commitment Bonds That Compensate for the Possibility of Forfeiture

This Article introduces compensating commitment bonds, which make it more affordable for a government, entity, or individual to commit to some course of action. These bonds, like traditional government or corporate bonds, can generate revenue for committing parties. A bond seller makes a commitment and promises to pay a forfeit if the seller fails to meet the bond conditions. The bond buyer pays the seller to be contractually designated as the recipient of any amounts the bond seller forfeits. This approach has potential application in a range of legal situations. Governments and other parties may use such bonds to facilitate commitments to principles from which they later may face temptation to deviate. Such bonds also can facilitate legislative compromise or the settlement of private legal disputes. The Article identifies a variety of incentive-equivalent commitment bond structures as well as the circumstances under which a particular implementation is likely to be most effective. It also explores hurdles to the use of such bonds, including the concerns that the courts might find a legislature’s use of such bonds to entrench its preferences unconstitutional and that a legislature might issue such bonds but cancel them after failing to maintain a commitment

Too Big to Fail — U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market

The multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem. The legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host of business conduct and anti-competitive protections, including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S. financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to “evade” Dodd-Frank. In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page, triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions executed outside the United States. The key point of that guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be “guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since 1992. In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade association privately circulated to its members standard contractual language that would, for the first time, “deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662 footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank. As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S., were these swaps formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’ newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank. In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it will never be finalized during a Trump Administration. Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many market regulators and swaps trading experts that large portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where Dodd- Frank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S. taxpayer. While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate, some other means will have to be found to avert another multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S. banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory framework affords state attorneys general and state financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae” actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, Dodd- Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens. That kind of litigation to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now badly needed