Music played by the Eddie Basgall Orchestra

Music played by the Eddie Basgall orchestra 00:00:00 - Introduction 00:00:52 - Song, Frauha Polka 00:02:48 - Song, Nice Hall Polka 00:04:37 - Song, Nebraska Polka 00:09:07 - Song, Sugarbush Polka 00:11:43 - Song, Blue Skirt Waltz 00:15:04 - Song, Forsaken Love Waltz 00:18:27 - Song, unidentified waltz 00:20:40 - Song, unidentified polka 00:23:50 - Song, Hey Polka 00:25:50 - Song, unidentified polka 00:27:19 - Song, unidentified waltz 00:29:48 - Song, Sinking Ruddy Waltz 00:32:39 - Song, Du Du Liegst Mir Im Herzen waltz 00:35:35 - Song, Schneider Polka 00:37:47 - Song, Fat Man\u27s Polka 00:39:47 - Song, Hay Loft Polka 00:42:34 - Song, Clarinet Polka 00:45:28 - Song, Sputnik Polka 00:48:22 - Song, Sputnik Polka repeat 00:51:11 - Song, Ooh La La Polka 00:54:28 - Song, Flying Dutchman 00:56:23 - Song, The New Flying Dutchman 00:57:43 - Song, More Flying Dutchman 00:58:49 - Song, unnamed waltz 01:01:21 - Song, Du Du Liegst Mir Im Herzen waltz 01:03:57 - Song, Liechtensteiner Polka 01:05:59 - Song, Schweitzer Boot Waltz 01:09:14 - Song, The Prune Song Waltz 01:12:01 - Song, unidentified waltz 01:14:24 - Song, Bye-bye Baby Polka 01:17:48 - Song, Clarinet Polkahttps://scholars.fhsu.edu/sackett/1088/thumbnail.jp

How fair is an equitable distribution?

Envy is a rather complex and irrational emotion. In general, it is very difficult to obtain a measure of this feeling, but in an economical context envy becomes an observable which can be measured. When various individuals compare their possessions, envy arises due to the inequality of their different allocations of commodities and different preferences. In this paper we show that an equitable distribution of goods does not guarantee a state of fairness between agents and in general that envy cannot be controlled by tuning the distribution of goods.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figures, LaTEX; typos added; minor changes in plots; two new plots added; references added; minor changes in the acknowledgment

The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network

Bayes Without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice

In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann demonstrated that the introduction of an objective randomizing device into the Savage setting of subjective uncertainty considerably simplified the derivation of subjective probability from a decision maker's preferences over uncertain bets. The purpose of this paper is to present a more general derivation of classical subjective probability in such a framework, which neither assumes nor implies that the individual's risk preferences necessarily conform to the expected utility principle. We argue that the essence of "Bayesian rationality" is the assignment, correct manipulation, and proper updating of subjective event probablities when evaluating and comparing uncertain prospects, regardless of whether attitudes toward risk satisfy the expected utility property.

Ambiguity and public good provision in large societies

ArticleIn this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty, there may be less free-riding in large societies

Strong laws of large numbers for sub-linear expectations

We investigate three kinds of strong laws of large numbers for capacities with a new notion of independently and identically distributed (IID) random variables for sub-linear expectations initiated by Peng. It turns out that these theorems are natural and fairly neat extensions of the classical Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers to the case where probability measures are no longer additive. An important feature of these strong laws of large numbers is to provide a frequentist perspective on capacities.Comment: 10 page

Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

Author's pre-printIf players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, H5242750259