A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear security systems face. All of the cases of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders; given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well. Similarly, disgruntled workers from inside nuclear facilities have perpetrated many of the known incidents of nuclear sabotage. The most recent example of which we are aware is the apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear plant in the United States in 2012; the most spectacular was an incident three decades ago in which an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then detonated them.While many such incidents, including the two just mentioned, appear to have been intended to send a message to management, not to spread radioactivity, they highlight the immense dangers that could arise from insiders with more malevolent intent. As it turns out, insiders perpetrate a large fraction of thefts from heavily guarded non-nuclear facilities as well. Yet organizations often find it difficult to understandand protect against insider threats. Why is this the case?Part of the answer is that there are deep organizational and cognitive biases that lead managers to downplay the threats insiders pose to their nuclear facilities and operations. But another part of the answer is that those managing nuclear security often have limited information about incidents that have happened in other countries or in other industries, and the lessons that might be learned from them.The IAEA and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) produce"best practices" guides as a way of disseminating ideas and procedures that have been identified as leading to improved security. Both have produced guides on protecting against insider threats.5 But sometimes mistakes are even moreinstructive than successes.Here, we are presenting a kind of "worst practices" guide of serious mistakes made in the past regarding insider threats. While each situation is unique, and serious insider problems are relatively rare, the incidents we describe reflect issues that exist in many contexts and that every nuclear security manager should consider. Common organizational practices -- such as prioritizing production over security, failure to share information across subunits, inadequate rules or inappropriate waiving of rules, exaggerated faith in group loyalty, and excessive focus on external threats -- can be seen in many past failures to protect against insider threats

Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate

Presents Sagan's 2009 paper calling for rethinking the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between articles in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with seven response papers by international scholars about how to pursue nuclear disarmament

Induction of Paralysis and Visual System Injury in Mice by T Cells Specific for Neuromyelitis Optica Autoantigen Aquaporin-4.

While it is recognized that aquaporin-4 (AQP4)-specific T cells and antibodies participate in the pathogenesis of neuromyelitis optica (NMO), a human central nervous system (CNS) autoimmune demyelinating disease, creation of an AQP4-targeted model with both clinical and histologic manifestations of CNS autoimmunity has proven challenging. Immunization of wild-type (WT) mice with AQP4 peptides elicited T cell proliferation, although those T cells could not transfer disease to naïve recipient mice. Recently, two novel AQP4 T cell epitopes, peptide (p) 135-153 and p201-220, were identified when studying immune responses to AQP4 in AQP4-deficient (AQP4-/-) mice, suggesting T cell reactivity to these epitopes is normally controlled by thymic negative selection. AQP4-/- Th17 polarized T cells primed to either p135-153 or p201-220 induced paralysis in recipient WT mice, that was associated with predominantly leptomeningeal inflammation of the spinal cord and optic nerves. Inflammation surrounding optic nerves and involvement of the inner retinal layers (IRL) were manifested by changes in serial optical coherence tomography (OCT). Here, we illustrate the approaches used to create this new in vivo model of AQP4-targeted CNS autoimmunity (ATCA), which can now be employed to study mechanisms that permit development of pathogenic AQP4-specific T cells and how they may cooperate with B cells in NMO pathogenesis

Isochoric thermal conductivity of solid nitrogen

The isochoric thermal conductivity of solid nitrogen has been investigated on four samples of different densities in the temperature interval from 20 K to the onset of melting. In alfa-N2 the isochoric thermal conductivity exhibits a dependence weaker than 1/T; in beta-N2 it increases slightly with temperature. The experimental results are discussed within a model in which the heat is transported by low-frequency phonons or by "diffusive" modes above the mobility boundary. The growth of the thermal conductivity in beta-N2 is attributed to the decreasing "rotational" component of the total thermal resistance, which occurs as the rotational correlations between the neighboring molecules become weaker.Comment: Postscript 12 pages, 3 figures, 1 table. To be published in 200

Mechanisms for the formation of benzene in the atmosphere of Titan

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/95336/1/jgre1586.pd

The blameworthiness of health and safety rule violations

Man-made disasters usually lead to the tightening of safety regulations, because rule breaking is seen as a major cause of them. This reaction is based on the presumptions that the safety rules are good and that the rule-breakers are wrong. The reasons the personnel of a coke factory gave for breaking rules raise doubt about the tenability of these presumptions. It is unlikely that this result would have been achieved on the basis of a disaster evaluation or High-Reliability Theory. In both approaches, knowledge of the consequences of human conduct hinders an unprejudiced judgement about the blameworthiness of rule breaking