Complexity Results for Modal Dependence Logic

Modal dependence logic was introduced recently by V\"a\"an\"anen. It enhances the basic modal language by an operator =(). For propositional variables p_1,...,p_n, =(p_1,...,p_(n-1);p_n) intuitively states that the value of p_n is determined by those of p_1,...,p_(n-1). Sevenster (J. Logic and Computation, 2009) showed that satisfiability for modal dependence logic is complete for nondeterministic exponential time. In this paper we consider fragments of modal dependence logic obtained by restricting the set of allowed propositional connectives. We show that satisfibility for poor man's dependence logic, the language consisting of formulas built from literals and dependence atoms using conjunction, necessity and possibility (i.e., disallowing disjunction), remains NEXPTIME-complete. If we only allow monotone formulas (without negation, but with disjunction), the complexity drops to PSPACE-completeness. We also extend V\"a\"an\"anen's language by allowing classical disjunction besides dependence disjunction and show that the satisfiability problem remains NEXPTIME-complete. If we then disallow both negation and dependence disjunction, satistiability is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. In this way we completely classify the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for all restrictions of propositional and dependence operators considered by V\"a\"an\"anen and Sevenster.Comment: 22 pages, full version of CSL 2010 pape

Impossible worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources

Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics

This paper contains an argument to the effect that possible worlds semantics renders semantic knowledge impossible, no matter what ontological interpretation is given to possible worlds. The essential contention made is that possible worlds semantic knowledge is unsafe and this is shown by a parallel with the preface paradox

Community of inquiry and inquiry-based learning

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Rich Situated Attitudes

We outline a novel theory of natural language meaning, Rich Situated Semantics [RSS], on which the content of sentential utterances is semantically rich and informationally situated. In virtue of its situatedness, an utterance’s rich situated content varies with the informational situation of the cognitive agent interpreting the utterance. In virtue of its richness, this content contains information beyond the utterance’s lexically encoded information. The agent-dependence of rich situated content solves a number of problems in semantics and the philosophy of language (cf. [14, 20, 25]). In particular, since RSS varies the granularity of utterance contents with the interpreting agent’s informational situation, it solves the problem of finding suitably fine- or coarse-grained objects for the content of propositional attitudes. In virtue of this variation, a layman will reason with more propositions than an expert

Game theoretical semantics for some non-classical logics

Paraconsistent logics are the formal systems in which absurdities do not trivialise the logic. In this paper, we give Hintikka-style game theoretical semantics for a variety of paraconsistent and non-classical logics. For this purpose, we consider Priest’s Logic of Paradox, Dunn’s First-Degree Entailment, Routleys’ Relevant Logics, McCall’s Connexive Logic and Belnap’s four-valued logic. We also present a game theoretical characterisation of a translation between Logic of Paradox/Kleene’s K3 and S5. We underline how non-classical logics require different verification games and prove the correctness theorems of their respective game theoretical semantics. This allows us to observe that paraconsistent logics break the classical bidirectional connection between winning strategies and truth values

Probabilistic Consensus of the Blockchain Protocol

We introduce a temporal epistemic logic with probabilities as an extension of temporal epistemic logic. This extension enables us to reason about properties that characterize the uncertain nature of knowledge, like “agent a will with high probability know after time s same fact”. To define semantics for the logic we enrich temporal epistemic Kripke models with probability functions defined on sets of possible worlds. We use this framework to model and reason about probabilistic properties of the blockchain protocol, which is in essence probabilistic since ledgers are immutable with high probabilities. We prove the probabilistic convergence for reaching the consensus of the protocol

Theory of Concepts

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