2,047 research outputs found

    Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics

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    This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. Each agent forms his belief about the future evolution of action distribution in the society to take an action that maximizes his expected discounted payo�. A perfect foresight path is de�ned to be a feasible path of the action distribution along which every agent with a revision opportunity takes a best response to this path itself. A Nash equilibrium is said to be absorbing if there exists no perfect foresight path escaping from a neighborhood of this equilibrium; a Nash equilibrium is said to be globally accessible if for each initial distribution, there exists a perfect foresight path converging to this equilibrium. By exploiting the monotone structure of the dynamics, a unique Nash equilibrium that is absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction is identi�ed for certain classes of supermodular games. For games with monotone potentials, the selection of the monotone potential maximizer is obtained. Complete characterizations of absorbing equilibrium and globally accessible equilibrium are given for binary supermodular games. An example demonstrates that unanimity games may have multiple globally accessible equilibria for a small friction

    Stochastic approximations and differential inclusions II: applications

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    We apply the theoretical results on "stochastic approximations and differential inclusions" developed in Benaim, Hofbauer and Sorin (2005) to several adaptive processes used in game theory including: classical and generalized approachability, no-regret potential procedures (Hart and Mas-Colell), smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine

    Phase transitions for rock-scissors-paper game on different networks

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    Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical mean-field approximations are performed to study the phase transitions in rock-scissors-paper game on different host networks. These graphs are originated from lattices by introducing quenched and annealed randomness simultaneously. In the resulting phase diagrams three different stationary states are identified for all structures. The comparison of results on different networks suggests that the value of clustering coefficient plays an irrelevant role in the emergence of a global oscillating phase. The critical behavior of phase transitions seems to be universal and can be described by the same exponents.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, to be published in PR

    Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics

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    The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the widely used replicator dynamics, which appears in this framework as the extreme case where replication is perfectly precise. This paper studies the influence of strictly dominated strategies on the location of the rest points of the replicator-mutator dynamics, at the limit where the mutation terms become arbitrarily small. It can be proved that such limit rest points for small mutation are Nash equilibria, so strictly dominated strategies do not occur at limit stationary points. However, we show through a simple case how strictly dominated strategies can have an influence on the location of the limit rest points for small mutation. Consequently, the characterization of the limit rest points of the replicator-mutator dynamics cannot in general proceed safely by readily eliminating strictly dominated strategiesJCyL (GREX251-2009 and VA006B09), Ministry of Science and Innovation (TIN2008-06464-C03-02, DPI2010-16920 and CSD2010-00034), Ministry of Education (grant JC2009-00263

    Periodicity of mass extinctions without an extraterrestrial cause

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    We study a lattice model of a multi-species prey-predator system. Numerical results show that for a small mutation rate the model develops irregular long-period oscillatory behavior with sizeable changes in a number of species. The periodicity of extinctions on Earth was suggested by Raup and Sepkoski but so far is lacking a satisfactory explanation. Our model indicates that this is a natural consequence of the ecosystem dynamics, not the result of any extraterrestrial cause.Comment: 4 pages, accepted in Phys.Rev.

    Statistical mechanics of ecosystem assembly

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    We introduce a toy model of ecosystem assembly for which we are able to map out all assembly pathways generated by external invasions. The model allows to display the whole phase space in the form of an assembly graph whose nodes are communities of species and whose directed links are transitions between them induced by invasions. We characterize the process as a finite Markov chain and prove that it exhibits a unique set of recurrent states (the endstate of the process), which is therefore resistant to invasions. This also shows that the endstate is independent on the assembly history. The model shares all features with standard assembly models reported in the literature, with the advantage that all observables can be computed in an exact manner.Comment: Accepted for publication in Physical Review Letter

    Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies

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    Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means of continuous strategies defining the extent of the contributions of each individual player to the common pool. If strategies are chosen from the unit interval, where 0 corresponds to pure defection and 1 corresponds to the maximal contribution, the question is what is the characteristic level of individual investments to the common pool that emerges if the evolution is guided by different benefit functions. Here we consider the steepness and the threshold as two parameters defining an array of generalized benefit functions, and we show that in a structured population there exist intermediate values of both at which the collective contributions are maximal. However, as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation increases the characteristic threshold decreases, while the corresponding steepness increases. Our observations remain valid if more complex sigmoid functions are used, thus reenforcing the importance of carefully adjusted benefits for high levels of public cooperation.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

    Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking

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    Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice-versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time-scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected

    Noise and Correlations in a Spatial Population Model with Cyclic Competition

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    Noise and spatial degrees of freedom characterize most ecosystems. Some aspects of their influence on the coevolution of populations with cyclic interspecies competition have been demonstrated in recent experiments [e.g. B. Kerr et al., Nature {\bf 418}, 171 (2002)]. To reach a better theoretical understanding of these phenomena, we consider a paradigmatic spatial model where three species exhibit cyclic dominance. Using an individual-based description, as well as stochastic partial differential and deterministic reaction-diffusion equations, we account for stochastic fluctuations and spatial diffusion at different levels, and show how fascinating patterns of entangled spirals emerge. We rationalize our analysis by computing the spatio-temporal correlation functions and provide analytical expressions for the front velocity and the wavelength of the propagating spiral waves.Comment: 4 pages of main text, 3 color figures + 2 pages of supplementary material (EPAPS Document). Final version for Physical Review Letter
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