Media pluralism: What matters for governance and regulation?

Media pluralism is valued in most jurisdictions because it contributes to a well-informed citizenry. The authors examine what media policy and regulatory levers appear to affect five types of citizen knowledge across the European Union. They conclude that concentration of titles matters more than ownership in newsprint; and that neither type of concentration matters in broadcasting in the same way, but the regulatory regime for public service broadcasting does, particularly for political knowledge

What happens if you single out? An experiment

We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness

Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect

Impact of discussion on preferences elicited in a group setting

BACKGROUND: The completeness of preferences is assumed as one of the axioms of expected utility theory but has been subject to little empirical study. METHODS: Fifteen non-health professionals was recruited and familiarised with the standard gamble technique. The group then met five times over six months and preferences were elicited independently on 41 scenarios. After individual valuation, the group discussed the scenarios, following which preferences could be changed. Changes made were described and summary measures (mean and median) before and after discussion compared using paired t test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. Semi-structured telephone interviews were carried out to explore attitudes to discussing preferences. These were transcribed, read by two investigators and emergent themes described. RESULTS: Sixteen changes (3.6%) were made to preferences by seven (47%) of the fifteen members. The difference between individual preference values before and after discussion ranged from -0.025 to 0.45. The average effect on the group mean was 0.0053. No differences before and after discussion were statistically significant. The group valued discussion highly and suggested it brought four main benefits: reassurance; improved procedural performance; increased group cohesion; satisfying curiosity. CONCLUSION: The hypothesis that preferences are incomplete cannot be rejected for a proportion of respondents. However, brief discussion did not result in substantial number of changes to preferences and these did not have significant impact on summary values for the group, suggesting that incompleteness, if present, may not have an important effect on cost-utility analyses

Social dilemmas among unequals

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Nature Research via the DOI in this record.Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for evolution of cooperation, based on repeated interactions. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humansand is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfar. Most previous models of reciprocity neglect inequality. They assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities, and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioral experiment where we vary the subjects’ endowments and their productivities. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. In contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency, and public goods provisioning.European Research Council Start GrantGraph GamesAustrian Science Fund (FWF)Office of Naval ResearchJohn Templeton FoundationISTFELLOW program