An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games

This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, Sequential, Intuitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilibrium selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered. The pattern of outcomes suggest that individuals select the more refined equilibria up to the divinity concept. However, an anomaly occurs in the game in which the stable equilibrium is a clear preference among the subjects. Since the concepts are nested this suggests that the outcomes are game specific. Sender behavior does not seem to follow any specific decision rule (e.g., Nash, minmax, PIR, etc.) while receiver actions tend to correspond to the Nash equilibrium outcomes

Game theory of mind

This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution

Honesty mediates the relationship between serotonin and reaction to unfairness

How does one deal with unfair behaviors? This subject has long been investigated by various disciplines including philosophy, psychology, economics, and biology. However, our reactions to unfairness differ from one individual to another. Experimental economics studies using the ultimatum game (UG), in which players must decide whether to accept or reject fair or unfair offers, have also shown that there are substantial individual differences in reaction to unfairness. However, little is known about psychological as well as neurobiological mechanisms of this observation. We combined a molecular imaging technique, an economics game, and a personality inventory to elucidate the neurobiological mechanism of heterogeneous reactions to unfairness. Contrary to the common belief that aggressive personalities (impulsivity or hostility) are related to the high rejection rate of unfair offers in UG, we found that individuals with apparently peaceful personalities (straightforwardness and trust) rejected more often and were engaged in personally costly forms of retaliation. Furthermore, individuals with a low level of serotonin transporters in the dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) are honest and trustful, and thus cannot tolerate unfairness, being candid in expressing their frustrations. In other words, higher central serotonin transmission might allow us to behave adroitly and opportunistically, being good at playing games while pursuing self-interest. We provide unique neurobiological evidence to account for individual differences of reaction to unfairness

Quantum decision making by social agents

The influence of additional information on the decision making of agents, who are interacting members of a society, is analyzed within the mathematical framework based on the use of quantum probabilities. The introduction of social interactions, which influence the decisions of individual agents, leads to a generalization of the quantum decision theory developed earlier by the authors for separate individuals. The generalized approach is free of the standard paradoxes of classical decision theory. This approach also explains the error-attenuation effects observed for the paradoxes occurring when decision makers, who are members of a society, consult with each other, increasing in this way the available mutual information. A precise correspondence between quantum decision theory and classical utility theory is formulated via the introduction of an intermediate probabilistic version of utility theory of a novel form, which obeys the requirement that zero-utility prospects should have zero probability weights.Comment: This paper has been withdrawn by the authors because a much extended and improved version has been submitted as arXiv:1510.02686 under the new title "Role of information in decision making of social agents

Expression of Protease-Activated Receptor 1 and 2 and Anti-Tubulogenic Activity of Protease-Activated Receptor 1 in Human Endothelial Colony-Forming Cells

Endothelial colony-forming cells (ECFCs) are obtained from the culture of human peripheral blood mononuclear cell (hPBMNC) fractions and are characterised by high proliferative and pro-vasculogenic potential, which makes them of great interest for cell therapy. Here, we describe the detection of protease-activated receptor (PAR) 1 and 2 amongst the surface proteins expressed in ECFCs. Both receptors are functionally coupled to extracellular signal-regulated kinase (ERK) 1 and 2, which become activated and phosphorylated in response to selective PAR1- or PAR2-activating peptides. Specific stimulation of PAR1, but not PAR2, significantly inhibits capillary-like tube formation by ECFCs in vitro, suggesting that tubulogenesis is negatively regulated by proteases able to stimulate PAR1 (e.g. thrombin). The activation of ERKs is not involved in the regulation of tubulogenesis in vitro, as suggested by use of the MEK inhibitor PD98059 and by the fact that PAR2 stimulation activates ERKs without affecting capillary tube formation. Both qPCR and immunoblotting showed a significant downregulation of vascular endothelial growth factor 2 (VEGFR2) in response to PAR1 stimulation. Moreover, the addition of VEGF (50–100 ng/ml) but not basic Fibroblast Growth Factor (FGF) (25–100 ng/ml) rescued tube formation by ECFCs treated with PAR1-activating peptide. Therefore, we propose that reduction of VEGF responsiveness resulting from down-regulation of VEGFR2 is underlying the anti-tubulogenic effect of PAR1 activation. Although the role of PAR2 remains elusive, this study sheds new light on the regulation of the vasculogenic activity of ECFCs and suggests a potential link between adult vasculogenesis and the coagulation cascade

Hybrid Mechanical Systems

We discuss hybrid systems in which a mechanical oscillator is coupled to another (microscopic) quantum system, such as trapped atoms or ions, solid-state spin qubits, or superconducting devices. We summarize and compare different coupling schemes and describe first experimental implementations. Hybrid mechanical systems enable new approaches to quantum control of mechanical objects, precision sensing, and quantum information processing.Comment: To cite this review, please refer to the published book chapter (see Journal-ref and DOI). This v2 corresponds to the published versio

Occasional errors can benefit coordination

The chances solving a problem that involves coordination between people are increased by introducing robotic players that sometimes make mistakes. This finding has implications for real-world coordination problems

The martyrdom effect : when pain and effort increase prosocial contributions

Most theories of motivation and behavior (and lay intuitions alike) consider pain and effort to be deterrents. In contrast to this widely held view, we provide evidence that the prospect of enduring pain and exerting effort for a prosocial cause can promote contributions to the cause. Specifically, we show that willingness to contribute to a charitable or collective cause increases when the contribution process is expected to be painful and effortful rather than easy and enjoyable. Across five experiments, we document this “martyrdom effect,” show that the observed patterns defy standard economic and psychological accounts, and identify a mediator and moderator of the effect. Experiment 1 showed that people are willing to donate more to charity when they anticipate having to suffer to raise money. Experiment 2 extended these findings to a non-charity laboratory context that involved real money and actual pain. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the martyrdom effect is not the result of an attribute substitution strategy (whereby people use the amount of pain and effort involved in fundraising to determine donation worthiness). Experiment 4 showed that perceptions of meaningfulness partially mediate the martyrdom effect. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrated that the nature of the prosocial cause moderates the martyrdom effect: the effect is strongest for causes associated with human suffering. We propose that anticipated pain and effort lead people to ascribe greater meaning to their contributions and to the experience of contributing, thereby motivating higher prosocial contributions. We conclude by considering some implications of this puzzling phenomenon. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

A Test of Rank-Dependent Utility in the Context of Ambiguity

Experimental investigations of non-expected utility have primarily concentrated on decision under risk (probability triangles). The literature suggests, however, that ambiguity is one of the main causes for deviations from expected utility (EU). This article investigates the descriptive performance of rank-dependent utility (RDU) in the context of choice under ambiguity. We use the axiomatic difference between RDU and EU to critically test RDU against EU. Surprisingly, the RDU model does not provide any descriptive improvement over EU. Our data suggest other framing factors that do provide descriptive improvements over EU

How brains make decisions

This chapter, dedicated to the memory of Mino Freund, summarizes the Quantum Decision Theory (QDT) that we have developed in a series of publications since 2008. We formulate a general mathematical scheme of how decisions are taken, using the point of view of psychological and cognitive sciences, without touching physiological aspects. The basic principles of how intelligence acts are discussed. The human brain processes involved in decisions are argued to be principally different from straightforward computer operations. The difference lies in the conscious-subconscious duality of the decision making process and the role of emotions that compete with utility optimization. The most general approach for characterizing the process of decision making, taking into account the conscious-subconscious duality, uses the framework of functional analysis in Hilbert spaces, similarly to that used in the quantum theory of measurements. This does not imply that the brain is a quantum system, but just allows for the simplest and most general extension of classical decision theory. The resulting theory of quantum decision making, based on the rules of quantum measurements, solves all paradoxes of classical decision making, allowing for quantitative predictions that are in excellent agreement with experiments. Finally, we provide a novel application by comparing the predictions of QDT with experiments on the prisoner dilemma game. The developed theory can serve as a guide for creating artificial intelligence acting by quantum rules.Comment: Latex file, 20 pages, 3 figure