Social influence protects collective decision making from equality bias

A basic tenet of research on wisdom of the crowds – and key assumption of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem – is the independence of voters’ opinions before votes are aggregated. However, we often look for others’ opinions before casting our vote. Such social influence can push groups towards herding, leading to “madness of the crowds”. To investigate the role of social influence in joint decision making, we had dyads of participants perform a visual odd-ball search task together. In the Independent (IND) condition participants initially made a private decision. If disagreeing, discussion and collective decision ensued. In the Influence (INF) condition no private decisions were made and collective decision was immediately negotiated. Dyads that did not accrue collective benefit under IND condition improved with added social influence under INF condition. In Experiment 2, covertly, we added noise to one of the dyad members’ visual search display. The resulting increased heterogeneity in dyad members’ performances impaired the dyadic performance under IND condition (Bahrami et al., 2010). Importantly, dyadic performance improved with social influence under INF, replicating Experiment 1. Further analyses revealed that under IND condition, dyads exercised equality bias (Mahmoodi et al., 2015) by granting undue credit to the less reliable partner. Under INF condition, however, the more reliable partner (correctly) dominated the joint decisions. While social influence may impede collective success under ideal conditions, our results demonstrate how it can help the group members overcome factors such as equality bias, which could potentially lead to catastrophic failure

Infants ask for help when they know they don’t know

Uncertainty monitoring is a core property of metacognition, allowing individuals to adapt their decision-making strategies depending on the state of their knowledge. Although it has been argued that other animals share these metacognitive abilities, only humans seem to possess the ability to explicitly communicate their own uncertainty to others. It remains unknown whether this capacity is present early in development, or whether it emerges later with the ability to verbally report one’s own mental states. Here, using a nonverbal memory-monitoring paradigm, we show that 20-month-olds can monitor and report their own uncertainty. Infants had to remember the location of a hidden toy before pointing to indicate where they wanted to recover it. In an experimental group, infants were given the possibility to ask for help through nonverbal communication when they had forgotten the toy location. Compared with a control group in which infants had no other option but to decide by themselves, infants given the opportunity to ask for help used this option strategically to improve their performance. Asking for help was used selectively to avoid making errors and to decline difficult choices. These results demonstrate that infants are able to successfully monitor their own uncertainty and share this information with others to fulfill their goals