False memory for analogical inferences: An indicator of text representational change but not of conceptual change

Se puso a prueba si la falsa memoria de inferencias analógicas implica un cambio conceptual acerca del análogo meta (AM), tal como sugieren, por ejemplo, Blanchette y Dunbar (2002), o sólo un cambio en la representación del texto meta. En el primer experimento un grupo que recibió un análogo base (AB) después de leer un análogo meta cometió falsos reconocimientos de inferencias analógicas en mayor medida que un grupo sin AB. No hubo sin embargo diferencias entre aquellos participantes que cometieron falsos reconocimientos y los que no en cuanto al grado de acuerdo con las inferencias. En el segundo experimento se obtuvieron los mismos resultados en un grupo en el que se controló que los participantes hubieran generado las inferencias esperadas. Se concluye que la falsa memoria de inferencias analógicas es un indicador de cambio en la representación del texto meta pero no de cambio conceptual con respecto al tema tratado por el texto meta.Two experiments investigated whether the false memory for analogical inferences implies a conceptual change of the target analog (TA), as suggested, for example, by Blanchette and Dunbar (2002), or only a representational change of the target text. In the first experiment a group of participants that received a source analog (SA) after having read a TA, produced more false recognitions of analogical inferences than a group without a SA. However, there was no difference between the participants who misrecognized analogical inferences and the ones who did not on the level of agreement with those inferences. In the second experiment the same results were obtained in a group where the generation of the expected inferences was controlled. These experiments show that the false memory for analogical inferences is an indicator of representational change of the target text but it is not an indicator of conceptual change of the target issue described by the target text

Analogy, an Alternative Model. Critics to the standard model of analogical problems solving and proposals for an alternative one

Los autores realizaron una extensión de la crítica de Hofstadter al enfoque estándar sobre el pensamiento analógico, representado por la teoría de la proyección de la estructura de Gentner y la teoría de las múltiples restricciones de Holyoak y Thagard. Basados en esta extensión, propusieron un modelo no serial de solución de problemas por analogía. Contra el enfoque estándar, el modelo postula que: (a) las personas detectan y evalúan diferencias entre elementos puestos en correspondencia antes del subproceso de generación de inferencias y las consideran para controlar este subproceso, y (b) las propiedades de un elemento para un rol (PERs) juegan un rol crucial en estas operaciones de detección y evaluación, y también en los subprocesos post-inferenciales. Un experimento mostró que: (a) las personas detectan y evalúan la relevancia de diferencias entre elementos emparejados antes de la generación de inferencias, (b) inhiben las inferencias literales ante diferencias relevantes, y (c) detienen la transferencia ante diferencias insuperables. Los resultados mostraron también que las PERs base son reactivadas en diferentes momentos del proceso transferencial. Los datos obtenidos son incompatibles con el modelo estándar, que trata la generación de inferencias como un mecanismo sintáctico y excluye los análisis semánticos contextuales del estudio del proceso analógico.The authors made an extension of Hofstadter‘s criticisms against the standard approach in analogical thinking represented by the structure-mapping theory of Gentner and the multiconstraint theory of Holyoak and Thagard. Based on this extension, they proposed a non-serial model of analogical problem solving. Against the standard approach, the model postulates that: (a) people detect and evaluate differences between mapped elements before the subprocess of inference generation and consider them in order to control it, and (b) properties of an element that explain why the element could fill a certain role in the base problem resolution (PERs) play a crucial role in these detection and evaluation operations, and also in post-inferences subprocesses. An experiment showed that: (a) people detect and evaluate the relevance of differences between mapped elements before inference generation, (b) that they inhibit the generation of literal inferences when they face relevant differences, and (c) that they stop the subprocess when they recognize insuperable ones. The results also showed that base PERs are reactivated at different moments of analogical transfer. The data obtained are incompatible with the standard theories of analogical thinking, which treat inference generation as a syntactic mechanism and exclude contextual semantic analysis from the study of analogy.

False memory for analogical inferences: An indicator of text representational change but not of conceptual change

Se puso a prueba si la falsa memoria de inferencias analógicas implica un cambio conceptual acerca del análogo meta (AM), tal como sugieren, por ejemplo, Blanchette y Dunbar (2002), o sólo un cambio en la representación del texto meta. En el primer experimento un grupo que recibió un análogo base (AB) después de leer un análogo meta cometió falsos reconocimientos de inferencias analógicas en mayor medida que un grupo sin AB. No hubo sin embargo diferencias entre aquellos participantes que cometieron falsos reconocimientos y los que no en cuanto al grado de acuerdo con las inferencias. En el segundo experimento se obtuvieron los mismos resultados en un grupo en el que se controló que los participantes hubieran generado las inferencias esperadas. Se concluye que la falsa memoria de inferencias analógicas es un indicador de cambio en la representación del texto meta pero no de cambio conceptual con respecto al tema tratado por el texto meta.Two experiments investigated whether the false memory for analogical inferences implies a conceptual change of the target analog (TA), as suggested, for example, by Blanchette and Dunbar (2002), or only a representational change of the target text. In the first experiment a group of participants that received a source analog (SA) after having read a TA, produced more false recognitions of analogical inferences than a group without a SA. However, there was no difference between the participants who misrecognized analogical inferences and the ones who did not on the level of agreement with those inferences. In the second experiment the same results were obtained in a group where the generation of the expected inferences was controlled. These experiments show that the false memory for analogical inferences is an indicator of representational change of the target text but it is not an indicator of conceptual change of the target issue described by the target text

La Teoría de la Asignación Categorial Sobre el Pensamiento Analógico: un Desafío a la Teoría de la Proyección de Estructura

The dominant theory of analogical thinking since the 1980s is the structure mapping theory. In this paper, a new theory about reasoning by analogy is presented: the category assignment theory. It is argued that this theory is able to explain better than the first how a specific type of analogies are interpreted and evaluated, namely, those in which the facts compared constitute examples of a schema-governed category. The arguments presented are accompanied by brief descriptions of the studies that provided support for the new theory. The responses of the structure-mapping theory to the objections raised by the category proposal are discussed.La teoría dominante sobre el pensamiento analógico desde los 80 hasta la actualidad es la teoría de proyección de estructura. En este trabajo se presenta una nueva teoría sobre el razonamiento por analogía: la teoría de la asignación categorial. Se argumenta que esta teoría es capaz de explicar mejor que la primera cómo se interpretan y evalúan un tipo específico de analogías, a saber, aquellas en las que los hechos comparados constituyen ejemplares de una categoría relacional de esquema. Los argumentos presentados son acompañados por breves descripciones de los estudios que brindan apoyo a la nueva teoría. Se discuten las respuestas de la teoría de proyección de estructura a las objeciones formuladas por la teoría de la asignación categorial

La comprensión de metáforas no requiere realizar simulaciones sensorio-motoras del dominio base

Existe evidencia de que las personas empleamos metáforasconceptuales (MCs) para interpretar expresiones metafóricas(EMs), aunque los datos disponibles con respecto a si lacomprensión de éstas EMs requiere simulaciones sensoriomotorasde los dominios base de esas MCs es escasa yequívoca. Se llevó a cabo un experimento para determinarsi dichas simulaciones sensorio-motoras son necesarias oenriquecen al menos la comprensión de EMs. Videntes yno videntes de nacimiento parafrasearon EMs novedosasderivadas de la MC ver-comprender. El nivel de comprensiónalcanzado fue evaluado por jueces independientes. Losno videntes de nacimiento mostraron una muy buenacomprensión de estas EMs y su rendimiento en esta tarea no fue inferior a la de los videntes. Se concluye quelas simulaciones sensorio-motoras no son necesarias nienriquecen la comprensión de EMs y que las MCs amodalesresultan suficientes para la tarea. Se discuten las implicacionesde los resultados obtenidos para el enfoque corporeizadode la teoría de metáfora conceptual de Lakoff y Johnson

The Understanding of Visual Metaphors by the Congenitally Blind

Results from a narrow set of empirical studies suggest that blind individuals’ comprehension of metaphorical expressions does not differ from that of sighted participants. However, prominent accounts of metaphor comprehension yield different predictions about the blind’s ability to comprehend visual metaphors. While conceptual metaphor theory leads to predicting that blind individuals should lag behind their sighted peers in making sense of this particular kind of utterances, from traditional accounts of analogical reasoning it follows that blind individuals’ ability to comprehend the literal meaning of visual concepts might be sufficient to support their metaphorical application. In Experiment 1, 20 sighted and 20 congenitally blind participants were asked to select the most appropriate meaning for visual, grasping and filler metaphorical expressions. Results failed to reveal group differences for any type of metaphorical expressions. In order to implement a more stringent test of blind individuals’ ability to understand visual metaphors, in Experiment 2 blind and sighted participants were presented with very novel figurative expressions, as indicated by low or no occurrence in the “Google” corpus. In line with the results of Experiment 1, blind participants’ comprehension of visual metaphors was both high in absolute terms and comparable to that of sighted participants. We advance some speculations about the mechanisms by which blind individuals comprehend visual metaphors and we discuss the implications of these results for current theories of metaphor

Analogies Without Commonalities? Evidence of Re-representation via Relational Category Activation

Analogies between cases with matching sets of connected relational structure is well-explained by existing theory. Re-representation is posited as an important mechanism to increase the flexibility of analogical processing by allowing the alignment of non-identical predicates across compared cases. It has been proposed that certain kind of categories can be characterized in terms of the relational structure that its exemplars tend to satisfy. Such relational categories have the property that all members of the category are analogous to one another. We ask whether a process of re-representation can alter the construal of a case and bring two evidently non-analogous cases into analogical alignment if they are both seen as members of the same relational category. We examine analogies between pairs of cases where the base is a canonical example of a relational category and the target would not be considered a member of the category on its own – critically, the cases themselves share no evident relational identities or similarities. In Experiment 1, we ask whether presenting a target case as part of an analogical pairing alters its construal. In Experiment 2, the pairs are presented for judgment as potential analogies. In both studies, participants interpret the target cases differently (consistent with the relational category) as a result of processing the analogy. There are two main implications: (1) a form of re-representation is at work in which the activation of a relational category triggers an alternate construal of the target case; and (2) this suggests a path to analogical status for cases that lack relational identities or similarities if the cases can both be fit to the same relational category

LOS LÍMITES DEL MODELO ESTÁNDAR ACERCA DEL COMPONENTE SEMÁNTICO EN EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE CORRESPONDENCIAS ANALÓGICAS

We argue that the treatment given to semantics by the standard programs of analogical mapping (e.g., SME) reduces semantics to the influence of preestablished similarities between propositional elements on the mapping of these elements, and that the theoretical conception under this treatment supposes serious limits. We claim, in accordance with the High Level Perception Theory, that attempts to simulate analogical mapping should aim to equip programs with semantic abilities such as the detection of contextual similarities and the construction of analogue representations in response to mapping demands. We agree with the High Level Perception Theory in that programs like SME do not understand the analogies they produce, and in that they suppose a fallacious way of computational modeling. We argue that the responses given to the criticisms formulated by the High Level Perception Theory are not adequate, and that these criticisms deserve more attention in the field of analogical thinking.Se postula que el tratamiento dado al componente semántico en los programas dominantes del establecimiento de correspondencias analógico (e.g., SME) reduce la semántica a la influencia de similitudes preestablecidas sobre el emparejamiento de elementos proposicionales, y que la concepción teórica que subyace a este tratamiento supone importantes limitaciones. Se sostiene, junto a la teoría de percepción de alto nivel (TPAN), que los intentos de simulación computacional del establecimiento de correspondencias deberían proponerse incorporar en los programas habilidades semánticas tales como el establecimiento de similitudes contextuales y la construcción de representaciones de los análogos según las exigencias que plantea el establecimiento de correspondencias. Se apoya la idea de la TPAN de que programas como SME carecen de comprensión de las analogías que realizan y suponen un modo falaz de simulación computacional. Se postula que las respuestas dadas a las críticas formuladas por la TPAN no son adecuadas y que estas críticas deberían recibir mayor atención en el área del pensamiento por analogía

Analogy, an Alternative Model. Critics to the standard model of analogical problems solving and proposals for an alternative one

The authors made an extension of Hofstadter‘s criticisms against the standard approach in analogical thinking represented by the structure-mapping theory of Gentner and the multiconstraint theory of Holyoak and Thagard. Based on this extension, they proposed a non-serial model of analogical problem solving. Against the standard approach, the model postulates that: (a) people detect and evaluate differences between mapped elements before the subprocess of inference generation and consider them in order to control it, and (b) properties of an element that explain why the element could fill a certain role in the base problem resolution (PERs) play a crucial role in these detection and evaluation operations, and also in post-inferences subprocesses. An experiment showed that: (a) people detect and evaluate the relevance of differences between mapped elements before inference generation, (b) that they inhibit the generation of literal inferences when they face relevant differences, and (c) that they stop the subprocess when they recognize insuperable ones. The results also showed that base PERs are reactivated at different moments of analogical transfer. The data obtained are incompatible with the standard theories of analogical thinking, which treat inference generation as a syntactic mechanism and exclude contextual semantic analysis from the study of analogy. </div