Resistance to learning and the evolution of cooperation

In many evolutionary algorithms, crossover is the main operator used in generating new individuals from old ones. However, the usual mechanism for generating offsprings in spatially structured evolutionary games has to date been clonation. Here we study the effect of incorporating crossover on these models. Our framework is the spatial Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. For this evolutionary game, it has been reported that occasional errors (mutations) in the clonal process can explain the emergence of cooperation from a non-cooperative initial state. First, we show that this only occurs for particular regimes of low costs of cooperation. Then, we display how crossover gets greater the range of scenarios where cooperative mutants can invade selfish populations. In a social context, where crossover involves a general rule of gradual learning, our results show that the less that is learnt in a single step, the larger the degree of global cooperation finally attained. In general, the effect of step-by-step learning can be more efficient for the evolution of cooperation than a full blast one

Disciplinariedad, interdisciplinariedad, transdisciplinariedad–Vínculos y límites–

La siguiente reflexión gira en torno a la manera como se ha desarrollado el saber en general y la ciencia en particular. Se hace un breve recorrido por las épocas en que el saber tenía un carácter global, época que podría llamarse del saber pre-disciplinar; luego se considera el paradigma que se origina en la ciencia clásica en los siglos XVII y siguientes. Se trata de ver las dificultades o limitaciones que el paradigma disciplinar del siglo XIX trae consigo y el intento de resolverlas mediante el recurso a la interdisciplinariedad, recurso que no parece resolver problemas tales como la ausencia de visión integrada e integral del saber con miras a enfocar desafíos de la vida cotidiana en su complejidad. Se examina la vía de la transdisciplinariedad, la cual se ocupa de lo que hay "entre" "a través" y "más allá" de la ciencia, pero se tropieza con el paradigma, hasta ahora dominante, de la disciplinariedad e interdisciplinariedad que difícilmente ceden terreno, Se reflexiona sobre la similitud entre las dificultades que encontró el paradigma de la ciencia cuántica y las que encuentra la visión transdisciplinar. Ambas afrontan paradojas si se les juzga con la mentalidad de la ciencia tradicional. Finalmente, se hace hincapié sobre el largo camino a recorrer hasta que quizás se regrese, en alguna medida, a lo que fue el saber pre-disciplinar, el cual incluía elementos que hoy son deseables, pero naturalmente, sin que esto signifique a renunciar completamente a lo que los paradigmas posteriores aportaron de bueno

Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas

One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared we can cast a vast variety of scenarios, including traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the nplayer game as well as of the evolutionary dynamics. Beyond, we extend our analysis to a general class of public good games where competition among individuals with the same strategy exists