17 research outputs found
Ownership and Control: A Spanish Survey
The paper analyses the ownership structure of a large sample of Spanish listed companies. The results are analysed in terms of governance implications under the agency theory context. The results show a picture with concentrated ownership where stock markets are relatively low important. Direct ownership and voting blocks, which account for indirect ownership through third companies, are larger for non-financial firms followed by families or individuals and financial firms other than banks. Nevertheless, the use of intermediate companies (pyramiding), is not frequent according to our data. Banks seem not to play the important role they did in the past and the recent privatisation reduced to a minimum level, state shareholdings on listed companies.Ownership, Control, Spain
A clash of governance logics: foreign ownership and board monitoring
We ask whether and when shareholder-oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder-oriented setting by introducing shareholder-oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder-oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder-oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co-existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign ownersThe authors also acknowledge support from the Fundación Juan March, Fundación Ramon Areces, Projects ECO2010-22105-C03-03, ECO2010-21393-C04-01, ECO2010-21393-C04-02, and ECO2013-48328-C03-3-P financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
Propiedad y control : una perspectiva europea
Este trabajo ilustra los problemas de gobierno de la empresa europea utilizando la estructura de propiedad como elemento central. Europa continental se caracteriza por una elevada concentración de la propiedad, con agrupaciones de votos significativas, frente al Reino Unido o Estados Unidos que presentan una propiedad muy dispersa. La tipología de accionistas significativos permite comprender mejor el modelo de gobierno dominante y apuntar soluciones. También presentamos la evolución reciente de la estructura de propiedad para las grandes empresas cotizadas en España y sus principales características. Reseñamos, finalmente, la retribución y sustitución de directivos como mecanismos contractuales que permiten alinear los intereses de accionistas y directivos.Idazlan honek Europako enpresa gobernatzeko dauden arazoak azaltzen ditu, horretarako jabetzaren egitura ardatz gisa erabiltzen duelarik. Kontinenteko Europan, jabetza oso kontzentratuta dago eta boto emaileen taldeak oso garrantzitsuak dira. Erresuma Batuan edo Estatu Batuetan, ordea, jabetza oso sakabanatuta dago. Akziodun garrantzitsuen tipologiak aukera ematen du gobernatzeko eredu nagusia hobeto ulertzeko eta irtenbideak eskaintzeko. Halaber, Espainian kotizatzen duten enpresa handienen jabetza egiturak azken urteotan izan duen bilakaera eta beraren ezaugarri nagusiak aurkeztu dira. Azkenik, zuzendarien ordainketa eta ordezkatzea deskribatu dira akziodunen eta zuzendarien interesak elkartzea ahalbidetzen duten kontratu mekanismoa baita.This paper uses the ownership structure of firms as a key element to understand corporate governance problems. Countries in continental Europe are characterized by high levels of ownership concentration and significant voting blocks. United Kingdom and the US have a quite dispersed ownership. The different types of significant shareholders allow us to better understand the dominant governance model and point out solutions. We also describe the recent ownership evolution for Spanish listed firms and their characteristics. Finally, we consider executive compensation and executive turnover as control mechanisms that allow us the matching of shareholders' interests and managers' ones
Verringern Management-Entlohnungskosten die Agency-Kosten?: Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen
In the UK, the top executive remuneration policy is not geared towards the creation of value but compensation revisions are rather driven by changes in corporate size, measured by sales growth. This suggests that managing larger firms requires special managerial skills. Even in UK companies with high concentration of control, no significant pay-for-performance relation has been discovered. In Spain, CEOs of larger firms receive higher cash-based compensation than those of small companies. For Spanish listed firms, we find that increases in corporate value are followed by increases in implicit (cash-based) CEO remuneration. However, this positive pay-for-share price performance elasticity is not present in all Spanish corporations: a remuneration policy aiming at the maximisation of corporate value is present in companies with a high degree of shareholder control. Only strong blockholders seem to be able to impose their share price related compensation scheme upon management. It should be noted that share prices trigger increases in CEO remuneration only if the share price returns are higher than those of the industry peers. In Spanish firms without high control concentration, modifications in managerial remuneration depend upon changes in accounting returns in prior years: if the change in the firm's return on assets (ROA) outperforms the industry ROA, the executive directors' cash compensation increases in the subsequent period. In these companies, the lack of blockholders gives management more