Involvement of autophagy in hypoxic-excitotoxic neuronal death.

Neuronal autophagy is increased in numerous excitotoxic conditions including neonatal cerebral hypoxia-ischemia (HI). However, the role of this HI-induced autophagy remains unclear. To clarify this role we established an in vitro model of excitotoxicity combining kainate treatment (Ka, 30 µM) with hypoxia (Hx, 6% oxygen) in primary neuron cultures. KaHx rapidly induced excitotoxic death that was completely prevented by MK801 or EGTA. KaHx also stimulated neuronal autophagic flux as shown by a rise in autophagosome number (increased levels of LC3-II and punctate LC3 labeling) accompanied by increases in lysosomal abundance and activity (increased SQSTM1/p62 degradation, and increased LC3-II levels in the presence of lysosomal inhibitors) and fusion (shown using an RFP-GFP-LC3 reporter). To determine the role of the enhanced autophagy we applied either pharmacological autophagy inhibitors (3-methyladenine or pepstatinA/E64) or lentiviral vectors delivering shRNAs targeting Becn1 or Atg7. Both strategies reduced KaHx-induced neuronal death. A prodeath role of autophagy was also confirmed by the enhanced toxicity of KaHx in cultures overexpressing BECN1 or ATG7. Finally, in vivo inhibition of autophagy by intrastriatal injection of a lentiviral vector expressing a Becn1-targeting shRNA increased the volume of intact striatum in a rat model of severe neonatal cerebral HI. These results clearly show a death-mediating role of autophagy in hypoxic-excitotoxic conditions and suggest that inhibition of autophagy should be considered as a neuroprotective strategy in HI brain injuries

Structural Studies Using X-ray Absorption Spectroscopy of Intermediates Formed by Reaction of Ozone with Halogeno(dodecaphenylporphyrinato)manganese(III) Derivatives

Difference EXAFS and XANES studies at the Mn K-edge are reported which shed light on the mechanisms of activation of the title compounds by ozone. The reaction of ozone with either the chloro- or b..

AE9, AP9 and SPM: New Models for Specifying the Trapped Energetic Particle and Space Plasma Environment

The radiation belts and plasma in the Earth’s magnetosphere pose hazards to satellite systems which restrict design and orbit options with a resultant impact on mission performance and cost. For decades the standard space environment specification used for spacecraft design has been provided by the NASA AE8 and AP8 trapped radiation belt models. There are well-known limitations on their performance, however, and the need for a new trapped radiation and plasma model has been recognized by the engineering community for some time. To address this challenge a new set of models, denoted AE9/AP9/SPM, for energetic electrons, energetic protons and space plasma has been developed. The new models offer significant improvements including more detailed spatial resolution and the quantification of uncertainty due to both space weather and instrument errors. Fundamental to the model design, construction and operation are a number of new data sets and a novel statistical approach which captures first order temporal and spatial correlations allowing for the Monte-Carlo estimation of flux thresholds for user-specified percentile levels (e.g., 50th and 95th) over the course of the mission. An overview of the model architecture, data reduction methods, statistics algorithms, user application and initial validation is presented in this paper.United States. Air Force (e contracts FA8718-05-C-0036, FA8718-10-C-001, FA8721-05-C-0002 and FA8802-09-C-0001)United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (grant NNG05GM22G

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will

Free will is not a testable hypothesis

Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a posteriori consideration of the relevant neuroscientific investigations, as well as on standard philosophy of science work on the notion of testability

Free will is not a testable hypothesis

Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a posteriori consideration of the relevant neuroscientific investigations, as well as on standard philosophy of science work on the notion of testability

Benign Infinity

According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for any form of meta-justification, non-dogmatic foundationalism merely rejects Laurence BonJour's claim that meta-justification must come from beliefs. Unlike its dogmatic counterpart, non-dogmatic foundationalism can allow for basic beliefs to receive meta-justification from non-doxastic sources such as experiences and memories. Construed thus, non-dogmatic foundationalism is compatible with Klein's principle that there is no justification without meta-justification. I conclude that Klein's rejection of foundationalism. fails. Nevertheless, I agree with Klein that when in response to a skeptical challenge we engage in the activity of defending our beliefs, the number of reasons we can give is at least in principle infinite. I argue that this type of infinity is benign because, when we continue to give reasons, we will eventually merely repeat previously stated reasons. Consequently, I reject Klein's claim that the more reasons we give the more we increase the justification of our beliefs

The descriptive content of names as predicate modifiers

In this paper I argue that descriptive content associated with a proper name can serve as a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and be an additional contribution of the name to the truth-conditions. Definite descriptions the so-and-so associated by speakers with a proper name can be used as qualifying prepositional phrases as so-and-so, so sentences containing a proper name NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means as so-and-so). Used as an adjunct, the descriptive content of a proper name expresses the additional circumstances of an action (a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose) and constitute a part of a predicate. I argue that qualifying prepositional phrases should be analyzed as predicate modifiers and propose a formal representation of modified predicates. The additional truth-conditional relevance of the descriptive content of a proper name helps to explain the phenomenon of the substitution failure of coreferential names in simple sentences

Single-Step Production of a Recyclable Nanobiocatalyst for Organophosphate Pesticides Biodegradation Using Functionalized Bacterial Magnetosomes

Enzymes are versatile catalysts in laboratories and on an industrial scale; improving their immobilization would be beneficial to broadening their applicability and ensuring their (re)use. Lipid-coated nano-magnets produced by magnetotactic bacteria are suitable for a universally applicable single-step method of enzyme immobilization. By genetically functionalizing the membrane surrounding these magnetite particles with a phosphohydrolase, we engineered an easy-to-purify, robust and recyclable biocatalyst to degrade ethyl-paraoxon, a commonly used pesticide. For this, we genetically fused the opd gene from Flavobacterium sp. ATCC 27551 encoding a paraoxonase to mamC, an abundant protein of the magnetosome membrane in Magnetospirillum magneticum AMB-1. The MamC protein acts as an anchor for the paraoxonase to the magnetosome surface, thus producing magnetic nanoparticles displaying phosphohydrolase activity. Magnetosomes functionalized with Opd were easily recovered from genetically modified AMB-1 cells: after cellular disruption with a French press, the magnetic nanoparticles are purified using a commercially available magnetic separation system. The catalytic properties of the immobilized Opd were measured on ethyl-paraoxon hydrolysis: they are comparable with the purified enzyme, with Km (and kcat) values of 58 µM (and 178 s−1) and 43 µM (and 314 s−1) for the immobilized and purified enzyme respectively. The Opd, a metalloenzyme requiring a zinc cofactor, is thus properly matured in AMB-1. The recycling of the functionalized magnetosomes was investigated and their catalytic activity proved to be stable over repeated use for pesticide degradation. In this study, we demonstrate the easy production of functionalized magnetic nanoparticles with suitably genetically modified magnetotactic bacteria that are efficient as a reusable nanobiocatalyst for pesticides bioremediation in contaminated effluents

Alternatives and responsibility: an asymmetrical approach

En este trabajo defiendo una visión asimétrica sobre la relación entre las posibilidades alternativas y la responsabilidad moral, según la cual se requiere tener posibilidades alternativas para ser culpable por lo que uno decide o hace, pero no para ser laudable por ello. Defiendo la no necesidad de alternativas para ser laudable a través de un examen de lo que yo llamo “ejemplos Lutero”. Mi defensa de la necesidad de alternativas para ser culpable procede en cambio mediante un análisis de los llamados “casos Frankfurt”. En ambos casos, mis argumentos se basan en la afirmación según la cual, en las adscripciones de responsabilidad moral, la cuestión principal no es si el agente podría haber hecho algo distinto, sino si debería haber hecho lo que hizo, de modo que la primera pregunta solo se vuelve apremiante cuando la respuesta a la segunda es negativa. Así, pues, en lo que se refiere a la responsabilidad moral, el concepto de obligación o deber moral es previo al de posibilidades alternativas.In this paper, I defend an asymmetrical view concerning the relationship between alternative possibilities and moral responsibility, according to which alternative possibilities are required for being blameworthy, but not praiseworthy, for what one decides or does. I defend the non-necessity of alternatives for praiseworthiness through an examination of what I call ‘Luther’ examples. My defence of the necessity of alternatives for blameworthiness proceeds instead through an analysis of so-called ‘Frankfurt’ examples. In both cases, my arguments rest on the contention that, in ascriptions of moral responsibility, the primary question is not whether the agent could have done otherwise, but whether she should have done what she did, so that the former question only becomes pressing when the answer to the latter is negative. Concerning moral responsibility, then, the concept of moral obligation or duty is prior to that of alternative possibilities