Kampanye Produk Minuman Kesehatan Melalui Games Interaktif

Aplikasi Game adalah model permainan interaktif antara manusia dengan mesin sebagai penyedia menupermainan. Memainkan game membuat orang merasa terhibur dan sekaligus memacu ekspektasi kemenangan.Bagi orang marketing, substansi atau isi permainan game dapat digunakan sebagai media persuasi bagistrategi pemasaran produk. Karakter interaktif game membangun hubungan intens antara iklan dengancalon konsumen. Tujuan penelitian ini mengupas kemampuan game interaktif sebagai media kampanye bagitujuan pemasaran produk minuman isotonik yang berasal dari Jepang. Metode penelitian yang digunakanadalah studi kasus. Penelitian ini dilakukan terhadap game interaktif yang digunakan di Indonesia (versiIndonesia), di mana pemanfaatan game sebagai media kampanye ini tergolong baru. Sampai saat ini belumada strategi pemasaran demikian yang dilakukan untuk memasarkan produk di Indonesia. Hasil penelitianmenunjukkan bahwa, game menjadi tools of marketing yang baik dan mendorong pengguna untuk bergerakseiring instruksi pada game. Salah satu parameternya adalah pada saat penelitian dilakukan pada 2014, gamesudah didownload oleh sekitar 15.365 pengguna dengan komentar dan opini di media sosial (facebook dantwitter) untuk game iklan ini cukup tinggi

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices

Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions

We report new experimental data on a simple common value auction to investigate the extent to which bidding can be explained by logit QRE, in combination with different models about bidder beliefs: cursed equilibrium, level-k, and cognitive hierarchy. There is a close correspondence between the predicted bidding patterns in those models and the distribution of observed bids. The pattern of median bids in the data consists of a combination of overbidding with low signals, and near-value-bidding with higher signals. Logit QRE with heterogeneous bidders approximates this pattern. Combining QRE with any of the other models of belief formation leads to a closer match with the data. All the estimated models predict only small treatment effects across different versions of the game, consistent with the data. We also reanalyze an earlier dataset for the same game (Ivanov et al., 2010), which exhibited much more overbidding, and reach similar qualitative conclusions

Heterogeneity and the dynamics of technology adoption

We estimate the demand for a videocalling technology in the presence of both network effects and heterogeneity. Using a unique dataset from a large multinational firm, we pose and estimate a fully dynamic model of technology adoption. We propose a novel identification strategy based on post-adoption technology usage to disentangle equilibrium beliefs concerning the evolution of the network from observed and unobserved heterogeneity in technology adoption costs and use benefits. We find that employees have significant heterogeneity in both adoption costs and network benefits, and have preferences for diverse networks. Using our estimates, we evaluate a number of counterfactual adoption policies, and find that a policy of strategically targeting the right subtype for initial adoption can lead to a faster-growing and larger network than a policy of uncoordinated or diffuse adoption