The Public Sector\u27s Experience and Response to Private Competition: The Case of Nepal

Private schools have become a mainstay in developing countries. The private market share in primary education in low-income countries has nearly doubled from 12% in 1990 to 22% in 2010 (World Bank, 2013). There is a long-running debate amongst academics and the policy community about how increased choice, through charter, voucher, or private schools, will affect the education system. School choice advocates expect higher parental satisfaction through choice and improvements in public schooling through competition. Skeptics are concerned about the loss of shared citizenship and the potential for further stratification as the government reduces its provider role in education. Despite the fact that both advocates and skeptics have focused many of their arguments on the potential impact of choice on the public school system, these consequences remain largely uninvestigated in developing countries. In the dissertation, I provide the first comprehensive analysis of how competition from private schools affects public schools in a developing South Asian country: Nepal. I utilize a mixed methods approach to analyze a unique competition- focused dataset compiled from extensive primary and secondary data collection. I find no evidence to suggest that public schools in Nepal have improved as result of private competition. However, there is a recent surge of quasi-private policies being implemented by public schools. I show that the key obstacles to improvement include not only well-known factors such as bureaucratic rigidities and financial constraints, but also lesser-recognized impediments such as direct political interference in the education sector and stigmatization of public schooling. In conclusion, the historical analysis of the Nepal context suggests that private competition is unlikely to automatically induce public school improvements in developing countries. However, the emergence of quasi-private policies in public schools suggests that competitive pressures coupled with accountability incentives can affect public school behavior. Thus, choice systems need to include well-timed accountability mechanisms and targeted financial and leadership supports to have an enduring productive impact on public schools

The public sector\u27s experience and response to private competition: The case of Nepal

Private schools have become a mainstay in developing countries. The private market share in primary education in low-income countries has nearly doubled from 12% in 1990 to 22% in 2010 (World Bank, 2013). There is a long-running debate amongst academics and the policy community about how increased choice, through charter, voucher, or private schools, will affect the education system. School choice advocates expect higher parental satisfaction through choice and improvements in public schooling through competition. Skeptics are concerned about the loss of shared citizenship and the potential for further stratification as the government reduces its provider role in education. Despite the fact that both advocates and skeptics have focused many of their arguments on the potential impact of choice on the public school system, these consequences remain largely uninvestigated in developing countries. In the dissertation, I provide the first comprehensive analysis of how competition from private schools affects public schools in a developing South Asian country: Nepal. I utilize a mixed methods approach to analyze a unique competition- focused dataset compiled from extensive primary and secondary data collection. I find no evidence to suggest that public schools in Nepal have improved as result of private competition. However, there is a recent surge of quasi-private policies being implemented by public schools. I show that the key obstacles to improvement include not only well-known factors such as bureaucratic rigidities and financial constraints, but also lesser-recognized impediments such as direct political interference in the education sector and stigmatization of public schooling. In conclusion, the historical analysis of the Nepal context suggests that private competition is unlikely to automatically induce public school improvements in developing countries. However, the emergence of quasi-private policies in public schools suggests that competitive pressures coupled with accountability incentives can affect public school behavior. Thus, choice systems need to include well-timed accountability mechanisms and targeted financial and leadership supports to have an enduring productive impact on public schools

Implicit Transfers in IMF Lending, 1973-2003

We compute realized transfers implicit in IMF lending from 1973-2003, based on 2003 IMF repayment projections and promised debt relief. IMF lending rates to high-and middleincome countries fell short of industrial country borrowing rates by 30-150 basis points over the period as a whole, but exhibited a small premium after 1987. The subsidy received by low-income and HIPC countries was much higher (400-600 basis points, respectively). In 2002 NPV terms, cumulative transfers were 12-15 percent of 2002 GDP for the HIPCs, 2-3 percent for low income countries, and less than ¾ percent for the emerging market countries.International Monetary Fund;Moral hazard;HIPC Initiative;Subsidies;Heavily indebted poor countries;debt, debt relief, interest, repayment, loans, bond, present value, bonds, net present value, discounting, bond rate, cash flows, yield curve, government bond, debts, payments, default risk, creditor, credit risk, interest rate risk, obligations, creditor countries, government bonds, multilateral debt, internal rate of return, bond rates, creditors, net cash flows, money market, overdue obligations, borrowing costs, discount rate, bond markets, debt forgiveness, debt reduction, bond yields, sovereign bonds, taxpayers, money market interest rates, interest charges, money market interest, debtors, denominated bond, global ? bond index, financial system, term bond, private debt, long term loans, money market rate, debt sustainability, international financial system, bailouts, bond index, debtor countries, medium term bonds, bond yield, rate bonds, yield curves, global ? bond, money market rates, international reserves, risk premium, international financial architecture, short interest, term bonds, debt problems, debt outstanding, currency crises, medium term bond, financial safety net, overdue charges, debt flows

Education for all 2000-2015: the influence of global interventions and aid on EFA achievements

This chapter provides a short overview on the history of global Education For All (EFA) efforts, progress in achieving the six EFA goals, and international aid for EFA policies. It shows that, despite modest movement in achieving the EFA goals, some of it due to explicit policies and actions undertaken by governments, international agencies, donors and non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) since Dakar, the progress has been uneven. Much of the broad EFA agenda remains unfinished, as none of the goals was reached. The global EFA mechanisms that did work often did so despite, rather than because of, international attempts to coordinate EFA. Much hope had been placed on external financing to accelerate EFA progress. While aid did increase, the overall volume of external assistance fell well short of the assessed need, was insufficiently targeted to countries most in need, declined as a share of recipient governments’ budgets over the period, and was not always delivered effectively

Education for all 2000–2015: review and perspectives

This article provides a brief overview of global progress towards the six EFA objectives and international assistance to EFA strategies. It shows that, despite modest moves toward EFA achievement – some of them through explicit policies and actions by governments, international organizations, donors, and NGOs – progress since Dakar has been uneven. Much of the broad EFA agenda remains unfinished, as none of the objectives have been achieved. The global EFA mechanisms worked despite, not because of international EFA coordination efforts. Much hope had been placed on the external financing of EFA in order to accelerate EFA progress. While aid has increased, the total volume of external aid has fallen well below what has been identified as necessary, has been insufficiently focused in the most needy countries, has decreased as a proportion of recipient governments' budgets for the period and has not always been delivered effectively