The Impact of regulatory capital regulation on balance sheet structure, intermediation cost and growth

URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2016.htmlDocuments de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2016.61 - ISSN : 1955-611XAs Europe is subject to a protracted recession, it should be asked whether the reform of the financial sector is not costly in terms of potential growth. Our analysis shows that the negative effect of the Basel III package excepted by the pre-QE studies are almost annihilated today. The recession must then have other causes: falling corporate lending volumes resulted from falling demand in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but this is longer the case. The EU is trying to incentivize corporate lending, via forward guidance as well as ‘supporting factor’ cutting down the Basel capital requirements. The macroeconomic theorists are trying to account for future success of monetary policy around zero nominal interest rate via the risk-taking channel. All these clever initiatives failed to deliver. As a consequence, we might infer that banks are simply not taking any risks: rather than appealing to risk aversion, we would like to argue that the banks seem especially embarrassed by future regulatory developments, which appear remote and uncertain. The binding constraint for corporate lending and growth in the EU is then plausibly a combination of banks' expectations of future regulation and strong uncertainty aversion. While we offer some mitigation prospects, we hope that the theoretical developments of the recent years will quickly yield both theoretical advances and practical results.Malgré les assouplissements récents de la règlementation bancaire afin de permettre une reprise des prêts aux entreprises, il semble que le paquet Bâle III ait un effet néfaste sur la croissance. Le texte s'interroge sur la contrainte active parmi l'ensemble des nouvelles règles. Il semblerait que les banques soient devenues très averses à l'incertitude, en particulier à l'incertitude sur l'évolution des règles qui leurs sont imposées. En conséquence nous proposons de modifier la nature des provisions en capital et le nombre de régulateurs ayant un pouvoir de décision sur le niveau des capitaux

On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games

We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable conditions, the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case. The counterexamples occur in very simple parallel graphs.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figure

The asymptotic price of anarchy for k-uniform congestion games

We consider the atomic version of congestion games with affine cost functions, and analyze the quality of worst case Nash equilibria when the strategy spaces of the players are the set of bases of a k-uniform matroid. In this setting, for some parameter k, each player is to choose k out of a finite set of resources, and the cost of a player for choosing a resource depends affine linearly on the number of players choosing the same resource. Earlier work shows that the price of anarchy for this class of games is larger than 1.34 but at most 2.15. We determine a tight bound on the asymptotic price of anarchy equal to ≈1.35188. Here, asymptotic refers to the fact that the bound holds for all instances with sufficiently many players. In particular, the asymptotic price of anarchy is bounded away from 4/3. Our analysis also yields an upper bound on the price of anarchy <1.4131, for all instances

Mechanical Metamaterials with Negative Compressibility Transitions

When tensioned, ordinary materials expand along the direction of the applied force. Here, we explore network concepts to design metamaterials exhibiting negative compressibility transitions, during which a material undergoes contraction when tensioned (or expansion when pressured). Continuous contraction of a material in the same direction of an applied tension, and in response to this tension, is inherently unstable. The conceptually similar effect we demonstrate can be achieved, however, through destabilisations of (meta)stable equilibria of the constituents. These destabilisations give rise to a stress-induced solid-solid phase transition associated with a twisted hysteresis curve for the stress-strain relationship. The strain-driven counterpart of negative compressibility transitions is a force amplification phenomenon, where an increase in deformation induces a discontinuous increase in response force. We suggest that the proposed materials could be useful for the design of actuators, force amplifiers, micro-mechanical controls, and protective devices.Comment: Supplementary information available at http://www.nature.com/nmat/journal/v11/n7/abs/nmat3331.htm

Tradable credit scheme for rush hour travel choice with heterogeneous commuters

This article proposes a tradable credit scheme for managing commuters travel choices. The scheme considers bottleneck congestion and modal split in a competitive highway-transit network with heterogeneous commuters who are distinguished by their valuation of travel time. The scheme charges all auto travelers who pass the bottleneck during a peak-time window in the form of mobility credits. Those who avoid the peak-time window, by either traveling outside the peak-time window or switching to the transit mode, may be rewarded credits. An artificial market is created so that the travelers may trade these credits with each other. We formulate the credit price and the rewarded and charged credits under tradable credit scheme. Our analyses indicate that the optimal tradable credit scheme can achieve nearly 40% efficiency gains depending on the level of commuters heterogeneity. In addition, this scheme distributes the benefits among all the commuters directly through the credit trading. Our results suggest that in assessing the efficiency of tradable credit scheme, it is important to take into account the commuters heterogeneity. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine the sensitivity of tradable credit scheme designs to various system parameters

Priority for the Worse Off and the Social Cost of Carbon

The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a monetary measure of the harms from carbon emission. Specifically, it is the reduction in current consumption that produces a loss in social welfare equivalent to that caused by the emission of a ton of CO2. The standard approach is to calculate the SCC using a discounted-utilitarian social welfare function (SWF)—one that simply adds up the well-being numbers (utilities) of individuals, as discounted by a weighting factor that decreases with time. The discounted-utilitarian SWF has been criticized both for ignoring the distribution of well-being, and for including an arbitrary preference for earlier generations. Here, we use a prioritarian SWF, with no time-discount factor, to calculate the SCC in the integrated assessment model RICE. Prioritarianism is a well-developed concept in ethics and theoretical welfare economics, but has been, thus far, little used in climate scholarship. The core idea is to give greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse off individuals. We find substantial differences between the discounted-utilitarian and non-discounted prioritarian SCC

Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing

In load balancing problems there is a set of clients, each wishing to select a resource from a set of permissible ones, in order to execute a certain task. Each resource has a latency function, which depends on its workload, and a client's cost is the completion time of her chosen resource. Two fundamental variants of load balancing problems are {\em selfish load balancing} (aka. {\em load balancing games}), where clients are non-cooperative selfish players aimed at minimizing their own cost solely, and {\em online load balancing}, where clients appear online and have to be irrevocably assigned to a resource without any knowledge about future requests. We revisit both selfish and online load balancing under the objective of minimizing the {\em Nash Social Welfare}, i.e., the geometric mean of the clients' costs. To the best of our knowledge, despite being a celebrated welfare estimator in many social contexts, the Nash Social Welfare has not been considered so far as a benchmarking quality measure in load balancing problems. We provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria and on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm under very general latency functions, including polynomial ones. For this particular class, we also prove that the greedy strategy is optimal as it matches the performance of any possible online algorithm