Strategic capital budgeting: asset replacement under market uncertainty

In this paper the impact of product market uncertainty on the optimal replacement timing of a production facility is studied. The existing production facility can be replaced by a technologically more advanced and thus more cost-effective one. We take into account strategic interactions among the firms competing in the product market by analyzing the problem in a duopolistic setting. We calculate the value of each firm and show that i) a preemptive (simultaneous) replacement occurs when the associated sunk cost is low (high), ii) despite the preemption effect uncertainty always raises the expected time to replace, and iii) the relationship between the probability of optimal replacement within a given time interval and uncertainty is decreasing for long time intervals and humped for short time intervals. Furthermore it is shown that result ii) carries over to the case where firms have to decide about starting production rather than about replacing existing facilities

Uncertainty and stepwise investment

We analyze the optimal investment strategy of a firm that can complete a project either in one stage at a single freely chosen time point or in incremental steps at distinct time points. The presence of economies of scale gives rise to the following trade-off: lumpy investment has a lower total cost, but stepwise investment gives more flexibility by letting the firm choose the timing individually for each stage. Our main question is how uncertainty in market development affects this trade-off. The answer is unambiguous and in contrast with a conventional real-options intuition: higher uncertainty makes the single-stage investment more attractive relative to the more flexible stepwise investment strategy

Innovation Strategies in a Competitive Dynamic Setting

This paper presents a dynamic model of a competitive R&D and production duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers. Two asymmetric firms operate for a limited period of time and dispose their knowledge capital in the end. Both firms and the social planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over the competitive one regardless of the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Accumulation of knowledge capital results allows the monopolist to have lower marginal cost of production and charge a lower market price than a fully competitive duopoly. Being able to define the degree of knowledge exchange when creating a research joint venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available.innovation, R&D, spillovers, cooperation

Firm Level Productivity under Imperfect Competition in Output and Labor Markets

This article examines the role of the interaction between product market and labor market imperfections in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG). Embedding Dobbelaere and Mairesse’s (2009) generalization of Hall’s (1990) approach, allowing for the possibility that wages are determined according to an efficient bargaining process between employers and employees, we correct estimated TFPG for possible biases arising from labor market imperfections. Our analysis contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we propose a new empirical measure of TFPG which takes into account possible biases coming from imperfect competition on both labor and output markets, whereas Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009) focus on the decomposition of the Solow residual. Second, in contrast to most of the literature following Hall’s approach, we estimate market power including the user cost of capital stock. Third, we measure the sensitivity of TFPG to an alternative specification of competition based on relative profits. Using a large Dutch firm-level panel database over the period 1989-2005, we find that workers’ unions power, and in general rigidities of the labor market, affect firms’ marginal cost, and, consequently, the markups. Moreover, taking into account variable returns to scale and imperfect competition in the output market translate into increased TFPG, while accounting for labor market bargaining power leads to lower TFPG. Next, the investigation of our empirical relationship between the price-cost margin and an alternative specification of imperfect competition of the output market (profit elasticity) as a sensitivity analysis of the TFPG shows that adding more structure to the competition measure does not affect the level of productivity change.

Numerical Analysis of Markov-Perfect Equilibria with Multiple Stable Steady States: A Duopoly Application with Innovative Firms

Dawid H, Keoula M, Kort PM. Numerical Analysis of Markov-Perfect Equilibria with Multiple Stable Steady States: A Duopoly Application with Innovative Firms. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2017;7(4):555-577