A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games

game theory;rationality

The consistency principle for games in strategic form

Game Theory

The dummy paradox of the bargaining set

bargaining;games

Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees

Environment;Mathematics

Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies

Equilibrium Theory;International Trade

On the Shapley-like Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers

This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a "Shapley-like" payoff mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave, which is in sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a single provider where the grand coalition is stable. We also show that irrespective of stability of the grand coalition, there always exist coalition structures which are not convergent to the grand coalition. Our results give us an important insight that a provider does not tend to cooperate with other providers in peer-assisted services, and be separated from them. To further study the case of the separated providers, three examples are presented; (i) underpaid peers, (ii) service monopoly, and (iii) oscillatory coalition structure. Our study opens many new questions such as realistic and efficient incentive structures and the tradeoffs between fairness and individual providers' competition in peer-assisted services.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures, an extended version of the paper to be presented in ICST GameNets 2011, Shanghai, China, April 201

Distributed Computing in the Asynchronous LOCAL model

The LOCAL model is among the main models for studying locality in the framework of distributed network computing. This model is however subject to pertinent criticisms, including the facts that all nodes wake up simultaneously, perform in lock steps, and are failure-free. We show that relaxing these hypotheses to some extent does not hurt local computing. In particular, we show that, for any construction task $T$ associated to a locally checkable labeling (LCL), if $T$ is solvable in $t$ rounds in the LOCAL model, then $T$ remains solvable in $O(t)$ rounds in the asynchronous LOCAL model. This improves the result by Casta\~neda et al. [SSS 2016], which was restricted to 3-coloring the rings. More generally, the main contribution of this paper is to show that, perhaps surprisingly, asynchrony and failures in the computations do not restrict the power of the LOCAL model, as long as the communications remain synchronous and failure-free

Locally Optimal Load Balancing

This work studies distributed algorithms for locally optimal load-balancing: We are given a graph of maximum degree $\Delta$, and each node has up to $L$ units of load. The task is to distribute the load more evenly so that the loads of adjacent nodes differ by at most $1$. If the graph is a path ($\Delta = 2$), it is easy to solve the fractional version of the problem in $O(L)$ communication rounds, independently of the number of nodes. We show that this is tight, and we show that it is possible to solve also the discrete version of the problem in $O(L)$ rounds in paths. For the general case ($\Delta > 2$), we show that fractional load balancing can be solved in $\operatorname{poly}(L,\Delta)$ rounds and discrete load balancing in $f(L,\Delta)$ rounds for some function $f$, independently of the number of nodes.Comment: 19 pages, 11 figure