Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes

The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences

Mayorías basadas en diferencias: análisis de la consistencia y extensiones

En esta tesis se estudian las mayorías por diferencia de votos y por diferencia de apoyo. Los capítulos 1 y 2 se centran en el análisis de la transitividad y de la triple-aciclicidad de la relación de preferencia fuerte generada por las mayorías por diferencia de apoyo, al agregar relaciones de preferencia recíprocas individuales. En el capítulo 3 se estiman las probabilidades con las que se producen resultados colectivos consistentes, tanto en las mayorías por diferencia de apoyo como en las mayorías por diferencia de votos. En el capítulo 4 se extienden las mayorías por diferencia de votos al contexto de las preferencias lingüísticas, a través de conjuntos difusos y del modelo de las 2-tuplas; se justifica la equivalencia entre ambas modelizaciones bajo determinadas condiciones de regularidad y se estudian las propiedades que cumplen estas mayorías lingüísticasDepartamento de Economía Aplicad

Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support

In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters' intensities of preference between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e., on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision

La brecha de género en el desempeño en exámenes de opción múltiple

El proyecto pretende analizar si existe una brecha de género en el desempeño en exámenes de opción múltiple, ampliamente utilizados como sistemas de evaluación de las asignaturas de los distintos grados ofrecidos por la universidad.Depto. de Análisis Económico y Economía CuantitativaFac. de Ciencias Económicas y EmpresarialesFALSEsubmitte

Implementación de Pruebas Individuales para la Evaluación Continua en Métodos Cuantitativos (IPIPEC)

Depto. de Análisis Económico y Economía CuantitativaFac. de Ciencias Económicas y EmpresarialesFALSEsubmitte

Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences

International audienc

Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes

The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences.. Abstract The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. Under majorities based on difference of votes, the requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taking into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences. Keywords Majorities based on difference of votes · Probability · Transitivity · Triple-acyclicity

Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support

International audienc

Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support

In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters’ intensities of preference between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e., on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision