Isoform-specific induction of a retinoid-responsive antigen after biolistic transfection of chimaeric retinoic acid/thyroid hormone receptors into a regenerating limb

Retinoic acid (RA) induces secretory differentiation in the wound epidermis of a regenerating amphibian limb. We investigated the role of individual RA receptor (RAR) types in the newt wound epidermis by introducing chimaeric RA/thyroid hormone (T3) receptors (chi alpha 1 and chi delta 1) that can be activated by T3. A biolistic particle delivery system was employed to transfect cells in the wound epidermis of a regenerating limb and approximately 10% of the cells in targeted surface areas expressed marker genes. Both chi alpha 1 and chi delta 1 were comparable in their ability to stimulate transcription of a synthetic reporter construct through a RA response element after activation with T3 in situ. This activation was also comparable to that obtained by the endogenous complement of RARs in the RA-treated, transfected wound epidermis. The RA-inducible WE3 antigen, a marker for secretory differentiation, which distinguishes the wound epidermis from normal skin (Tassava, R. A., Johnson-Wint, B. and Gross, J. 1986, J. Exp. Zool. 239, 229–240), was used to assess the functional role of chi alpha 1 and chi delta 1. Chimaeric receptors were transfected with an alkaline phosphatase marker gene, activated with T3, and the expression of both the marker and WE3 was analyzed by double-label immunofluorescence. Newt limbs transfected with chi delta 1 showed many double-labelled cells dependent on the presence of T3, whereas contralateral limbs transfected with an alkaline phosphatase marker lacking chimaeric receptor sequences did not

A comparison of arbitration procedures for risk averse disputants

We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of final offer arbitration, conventional arbitration, and some proposed alternatives to them. Our model allows the two disputants to be risk averse and assumes that the issue(s) in dispute can be summarized by a single quantifiable value. We compare the performance of the different arbitration procedures by analyzing the gap between the disputants' equilibrium offers and the width of the contract zone that these offers imply. Our results suggest that final offer arbitration should give results superior to those of conventional arbitration.Natural Sciences & Engineering Research Council (NSERC) Discovery Gran

The Collective Action Problem: Within-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in a given group before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which have the property that cheating on the cooperative agreement in a given group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast with Olson’s (1965) celebrated thesis but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, the larger group is as effective as the smaller group in furthering its interest

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction

We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all semi-symmetric equilibria. There are two types of equilibria: (1) each player in the best-shot group puts mass at the upper bound of the support, whereas each player in the other group puts mass at the lower bound of the support; (2) players in the best-shot group put masses at both the lower and the upper bounds, while the other group randomizes without a mass point. An earlier and longer version of this study was circulated under the title “The Group All-pay Auction with Heterogeneous Impact Functions.” We appreciate the comments of an Associate Editor and two anonymous referees, Kyung Hwan Baik, Walter Enders, Matt Van Essen, Paan Jindapon, David Malueg, Paul Pecorino, Seth Streitmatter, Ted Turocy, the participants at the 2015 conference of ‘Contest: Theory and Evidence’ at the University of East Anglia, and the seminar participants at the University of Alabama and Korea University. Iryna Topolyan gratefully acknowledges the support from the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center. Any remaining errors are our own

Taxes and Fiscal Sociology

This article reviews recent research in fiscal sociology. We specifically examine contributions to the study of taxation that illuminate core issues in the sociology of contemporary capitalism, including the causes of poverty and inequality in rich countries and of inequality between rich and poor countries. Research on developed countries suggests that tax policy changes are important for explaining rising income inequality, tax policies may structure durable inequalities of race and gender, and earnings-conditional tax subsidies may alleviate poverty more effectively and with less stigma than means-tested social spending. Scholars also find the most generous welfare states rely the most heavily on regressive taxes, although there is disagreement over how this association arises. Comparative research on developing countries shows consumption taxes are more conducive to growth than taxes on income, tax-financed spending benefits growth if it is spent on productive investments, and taxation strengthened democracy and state building in medieval and early modern Europe. However, there is disagreement as to whether taxation contributes to state building in contemporary developing countries and whether foreign aid undermines democracy by undermining taxation. These questions are the focus of considerable current research

Compulsory licensing and access to drugs

Compulsory licensing allows the use of a patented invention without the owner's consent, with the aim of improving access to essential drugs. The pharmaceutical sector argues that, if broadly used, it can be detrimental to innovation. We model the interaction between a company in the North that holds the patent for a certain drug and a government in the South that needs to purchase it. We show that both access to drugs and pharmaceutical innovation depend largely on the Southern country's ability to manufacture a generic version. If the manufacturing cost is too high, compulsory licensing is not exercised. As the cost decreases, it becomes a credible threat forcing prices down, but reducing both access and innovation. When the cost is low enough, the South produces its own generic version and access reaches its highest value, despite a reduction in innovation. The global welfare analysis shows that the overall impact of compulsory licensing can be positive, even when accounting for its impact on innovation. We also consider the interaction between compulsory licensing and the strength of intellectual property rights, which can have global repercussions in other markets beyond the South