Presentism and the Micro-Structure of Time

The standard account of the micro-structure of time is based on Cantor’s conception of continuity and thus views the time line as consisting of undenumerably many instants ordered by the B-theoretic earlier than relation. This may seem problematic for an A-theory of time such as presentism, according to which only what is present exists, for it seems to leave no room for the instants of a Cantorean time line. This paper defends a version of presentism that can accommodate the Cantorean conception and more generally any approach to the micro-structure of time based on durationless instants.The standard account of the micro-structure of time is based on Cantor’s conception of continuity and thus views the time line as consisting of undenumerably many instants ordered by the B-theoretic earlier than relation. This may seem problematic for an A-theory of time such as presentism, according to which only what is present exists, for it seems to leave no room for the instants of a Cantorean time line. This paper defends a version of presentism that can accommodate the Cantorean conception and more generally any approach to the micro-structure of time based on durationless instants

Casta\uf1eda\u2019s Moral Theory and Globalization

This paper examines the moral theory presented by Casta\uf1eda in his 1974 book The Stucture of Morality and illustrates its usefulness in dealing with some intercultural phenomena concerning women and children rights which globalization has brought to the fore. In particular, Casta\uf1eda\u2019s crucial distinction between moral codes and the moral ideal is highlighted. Moreover, the role that freedom and happiness play in his framework is discussed and further elaborated by appealing to Berlin\u2019s distinction between negative and positive freedom and current empirical studies on happiness

On the existential side of the eternalism-presentism dispute

ABSTRACT The current analytical debate on time is full of attempts to adjudicate from a purely theoretical standpoint among competing temporal ontologies. Little attention has instead been devoted to the existential attitudes -- emotional or ethical -- that may lurk behind, or ensue from, the endorsement of one of them. Some interesting opinions have however been voiced regarding the two most prominent views in the arena, namely eternalism and presentism; it has been said that the former is nourished by a fear of death, or more generally by a desire of preservation for whatever we find precious and valuable, and that the latter is fuelled by a propensity to reap whatever fruits the present brings, as enshrined in the carpe diem motto. This paper explores such a territory by focusing on the reality of past sentience, whether joyful or painful, and on the open future. The first part contrasts the reality of past sentience that comes with eternalism with the denial of this reality that follows from presentism, and argues that from an emotional, or perhaps even moral, standpoint the latter is preferable to the former. The second part clarifies why the eternalist must renounce the open future, whereas presentism is consistent with it, and considers how its rejection or acceptance, as the case may be, could be emotionally, or even morally, significant for our conception of ourselves as free agents. The conclusion offers a tentative proposal regarding which temporal ontology is superior from an existential perspective and some ruminations on the impact that all this may have on the theoretical side of the issue

I diritti audiovisivi sportivi nell'esperienza italiana

The aim of this paper is to examine the main issues related to audiovisual media services and sports in the Italian legal system. For this purpose, the results of scholars' researches are the basis for a deeper analysis, involving the structure of the market where audiovisual media services are exchanged on, as well as the wider European legal framework. Combining different institutions' regulatory activity also leads to a multilevel source system. Although apparently harmonious, it shows a lack of precise criteria as far as particularly detailed regulations are concerned, especially at the national Authorities' level

A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman’s skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate bridge principles. Steinberger has identified a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy of previous proposals. This paper argues that Steinberger’s list is in need of revision and his principle is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the normativity of logic

Moderate Presentism

Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as \u201cex-concrete.\u201d It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties

Properties

survey of major approaches to properties understood as universal

Properties

Panorama aggiornato delle principali teorie filosofiche su propriet\ue0 e relazioni intese come universal

Cohabiting with the Logical Paradoxes: A Negative Assessment and a Proposal

At the commonsensical level of the manifest image, we seem to take for granted logical laws of all sorts, including classical logic (CL) and naive principles of truth and predication (TP), which, however, generate logical paradoxes such as the liar, Russell’s paradox and Curry’s paradox. The formal logic of the scientific image comes to the rescue by proposing many competing formal systems that restore consistency, by sacrificing either principles of CL or principles of TP. We wish to explore a different path, which aims at saving both CL and TP, and deals with the paradoxes when they come to the fore, without swallowing contradictions or explosion. We consider the viability of Batens’ Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic (IAL) to pursue this goal and we end up with a negative assessment. We then sketch an alternative proposal that incorporates IAL’s distinction between provisional and final derivability

In Defense of Irreducible Relations

At least since Russell, mainstream analytic philosophy has distinguished internal and external relations and acknowledged the existence of both. This seems in line with both the manifest and scientific images of the world. However, there is a recent deflationary trend about relations, which focuses on the truthmakers of relational statements in order to show that putative external relations are in fact internal, and that internal relations do not really exist. Lowe’s posthumous 2016 paper is a thorough presentation of this line of thought. This article critically analyzes Lowe’s arguments in that paper, and some related arguments in recent works. It finds them wanting and thus reaffirms the irreducible reality of relations