

Francesco Orilia

Castañeda's Moral Theory and Globalization

Abstract This paper examines the moral theory presented by Castañeda in his 1974 book *The Structure of Morality* and illustrates its usefulness in dealing with some intercultural phenomena concerning women and children rights which globalization has brought to the fore. In particular, Castañeda's crucial distinction between moral codes and the moral ideal is highlighted. Moreover, the role that freedom and happiness play in his framework is discussed and further elaborated by appealing to Berlin's distinction between negative and positive freedom and current empirical studies on happiness.

Keywords morality, happiness, freedom, values, globalization

1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) revive the interest given to the moral theory put forward by the late Hector-Neri Castañeda in *The Structure of Morality* (1974), and (ii) show the usefulness of Castañeda's framework in dealing with intercultural phenomena that globalization has vividly brought to the fore.

Castañeda's moral theory has been discussed to some extent until the 1980s, although not as much as Castañeda's work in action theory and deontic logic (Castañeda 1975) and on indexicals (Castañeda 1967).¹ However, since Castañeda's death in 1991, his philosophical contributions

¹ Cf. the references in the "Philosophical Bibliography" compiled by Gregory Landini in Tomberlin 1986. Among those on Castañeda's theory of morality (p. 427), the extensive critical discussion in Wong 1984, §3.2 is especially significant.

Francesco Orilia (✉)

Department of Humanities, Philosophy and Human Sciences Section, University of Macerata,
Macerata 62100, Italy

E-mail: orilia@unimc.it

tend to be neglected, despite their significance. This is particularly true of *The Structure of Morality*, which appears to be totally ignored nowadays.² This is a pity, as we should agree with Bruce Aune that it provides “one of the most intricate theories of morality to have appeared in recent years and also ... one of the most interesting” (Aune 1986, 291).

In the following, I shall first present Castañeda's moral theory. I shall highlight in particular its most fundamental distinction between a *moral code* adopted by a certain community and the *moral ideal* providing a vantage point wherefrom, in an effort to produce moral progress, moral codes can in principle be criticized and changed (§2). As we shall see, two other key ideas play a crucial role in Castañeda's viewpoint, namely that morality is concerned with everybody's aspiration to happiness, and that the moral ideal accordingly requires that everybody have the freedom to pursue happiness. I shall thus try to clarify how freedom (§3) and happiness (§4) should be understood in Castañeda's approach. As regards the former, I shall appeal to Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive freedom. As regards the latter, I shall draw on current empirical studies on happiness. Next, in an effort to encourage a better appreciation of the originality of Castañeda's standpoint, I shall compare his theory to the most prominent alternative approaches in moral philosophy (§5). Finally, I shall show how Castañeda's framework, in particular its distinction between moral codes and the moral ideal, allows us to address insightfully some issues involving children and women rights that have become prominent in this era of globalization (§6).

2 Moral Codes and the Moral Ideal

At the core of *The Structure of Morality* (SoM, in brief), we find a distinction between a *practical code*, a *moral code*, and the *moral ideal* (*morality*) (SoM, 6 ff.). A *practical code* is a system of rules for action providing general guidelines for an agent or community of agents; it may be somewhat vague or imprecise, but it has in any case a logical structure, as its rules are

² Nothing in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ever mentions this book and the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* mentions it only once among “other worthwhile readings” in the entry on moral dilemmas (McConnell 2018).

hierarchically arranged and connected by chains of entailments. A *moral code* is a *moral* practical code; it is *moral* insofar as it is somehow inspired by the moral ideal, or simply *morality*, the nature of which will be clarified below. Thus, a moral code turns out to be an “adopted specification of the ideal of morality, however inept and clumsy, however sophisticated and accurate” (SoM, 188).

The members of a community have many different (non-moral) requirements (wants, needs, obligations), which can be subdivided into three main kinds. First, there are requirements originating from the fact that agents, *qua* human beings, have physico-chemical, biological and psychological constitutions, which give rise to basic wants and needs. Second, there are requirements coming from the fact that agents are thinking beings who have the power of making decisions on the basis of their knowledge of the world, which in turn brings forth complex habits and inclinations and the adoption of sophisticated goals. Third, there are requirements arising from the fact that agents are social creatures fulfilling various roles (citizen, spouse, parent, relative, friend, teacher, judge, policeman, etc.).

These non-moral requirements may happen to come into conflict with one another. A moral code governs such conflicts of requirements by means of what Castañeda calls an *ethos*, i.e., a set of principles for the ordering of non-moral requirements, based on the ideal of harmonizing the interests of all members of the community, by somehow taking into account in one way or another their different obligations, needs, and desires. This constitutes the *ethical* dimension of morality. Suppose, for example, that Tom, a fireman, has promised his son to take him to the football game on Sunday, but then, on that very Sunday, he is called to duty to extinguish a fire. Thus, Tom, as a father, given his promise, ought to take his son to the football game. Yet, at the same time, Tom, as a fireman, given the call, ought to be on duty to extinguish the fire. The two requirements are in conflict. However, the moral code, we may assume, ranks the latter as higher than the former, and thus Tom, ought, everything considered, to fulfill his duty to extinguish the fire.

In addition to an *ethos*, a moral code also comprises a system of *euergetical rules* (from the Greek “*euergheito*” = “to do good”), which constrain in a markedly moral way the resolution of conflicts that the *ethos* is meant to address. They give rise to requirements that normally prevail over

those arising from one's typical functions. Here are the euergetical rules provided by Castañeda:

- Eu.1. Do not kill a man, unless it is in self-defense.
- Eu.2. Do not cause suffering just for the sake of suffering.
- Eu.3. Never cause pointless pain, i.e. pain that can be avoided without its avoidance imperiling the attainment of an end other than causing pain.
- Eu.4. Do not treat others as mere means to your happiness.
- Eu.5. Do not refuse to help a person in distress, when it is in your power to help.
- Eu.6. Do unto others as you would have them unto you.
- Eu.7. Always treat others as ends in themselves (i.e. as pursuers of ends).
- Eu.8. Always leave a person a little better and happier than when you found her. (SoM, 216)

Rules such as these are presumably present, more or less explicitly, in every moral code and constitute the *euergetical* dimension of morality. To illustrate, imagine that Professor Smith is driving in order to go teach his class in half an hour at 9:00 p.m. and runs into Jones, who was wounded in a car accident and needs help. Then, Smith, euergetically (according to Eu.5), ought to help Jones, even though he ought also, as a professor, to teach his class at 9:00 p.m. In this conflict of requirements, the euergetical *ought* is ranked higher and Smith ought, everything considered, to help Jones.

Castañeda acknowledges that moral codes are not explicitly articulated:

Undoubtedly, neither the ethos nor the euergetical rules are clearly and precisely formulated anywhere The ethos is a complex idea only parts of whose outline are clear. Segments of the ethos are ingrained as practices of action and for criticisms of actions and agents. The euergetic rules are, likewise, vague and imprecise so that they can be serviceable in different circumstances. They are for the most part not taught as abstract principles, but as attitudes or propensities for judging and acting. (SoM, 13–14)

Despite this vagueness, every community has its own moral code (or morality), which we may try to *describe* independently of whether we like it

or not. Accordingly, we can speak of “the Eskimo morality, the Patagonian morality, the morality of the capitalist classes, the Nazi morality” (SoM, 6). Typically, by abiding by one’s moral code, an agent can solve his or her conflicts of requirements and act morally, i.e. in conformity with the ideal of morality. However, as the example of the Nazi morality immediately suggests, this cannot be taken for granted. We shall dwell on this in more detail below.

The *moral ideal* can be viewed as a complex of propositions and norms (SoM, 15–16) that embody “the ideal of the harmonization of everybody’s interests” (SoM, 15), on the basis of “a neutral point of view that in principle could be adopted by everybody” (SoM, 197). It is *eudaimonistic*, since it provides “a point of view that accommodates a minimum maximum of self-realization for each person” (SoM, 16). From the eudaimonistic perspective of the moral ideal, the *happiness* of *each* agent is important: “If a man’s maximal self-fulfillment is happiness, then *morality is concerned with the ideal of the maximal consistent happiness for everybody*” (SoM, 186; emphasizes original). At the same time, morality is also “an ideal requiring agents to act with consideration to the interests of others” (SoM, 185). Accordingly, in view of the goal of harmonizing the interests of all agents, morality may demand, up to a limit, some self-sacrifice to agents and thus impose constraints on their aspiration to happiness. This, on the one hand, brings about a perennial source of potential conflict: “it is part and parcel of morality that there may be *a conflict between one’s self-interest and moral duty*” (SoM, 186; emphasizes original). On the other hand, it contains the general recipe for the resolution of any such conflict:

Morality is concerned with viable future happinesses. It includes the idea of all agents withdrawing, if necessary, to a viable future happiness so that all agents can attain a maximal feasible self-realization. (SoM, 201)

Thus, happiness is a key concept in Castañeda’s conception of morality. Correlatively, freedom is another crucial notion. The eudaimonistic aspect of morality presupposes the freedom by virtue of which anybody can construct a life plan that appears to be most conducive to happiness, in the light of one’s beliefs and inclinations: “Morality, therefore, is also an ideal of *maximal freedom* for everyone” (SoM, 187; emphasis original).

From the point of view of the ideal of morality, moral codes can in principle be criticized and changed:

It is central to our conception of morality, and to our ordinary moral language, that we can speak of moral progress or retrogress. Indeed we engage in moral criticism not only of ours, but of other moral codes. (SoM, 20)

Accordingly, Castañeda envisages a *metathetical* dimension in the moral ideal (in Greek, “methatesis” = “change”). Thus, it may happen that, from the point of view of her moral code, an agent ought to do a certain action, *A*, and yet this action does not comply with the moral ideal. In this case, the agent ought not, morally, to do *A*, even though she ought to do *A* from the point of view of the moral code in question. Since the latter can in principle be criticized and changed, the moral *ought* is taken to be overriding.³

In sum, morality aims at harmonizing interests when conflicts of interest arise in a way that takes into accounts the three dimensions of morality outlined above. In a conflictual situation, morality demands that all of the agents involved in the conflict be open to renouncing some of their goals in order to take into account the goals of the other agents. Thus, the agent who wants to act morally may have to introduce with her action some degree of unhappiness in her life or in the life of the other agents involved (where this unhappiness is characterized by Castañeda in terms of the number of life plans that an agent must give up once some of her goals are disrupted by the acting agent) (SoM, §5.3). In light of this, Castañeda provides some “principles of moral ordering” (SoM, 207). They are meant to determine, at least in principle, which of the actions available to an agent in a given circumstance is morally preferable. On the basis of these principles, Castañeda even arrives at a “characterization of the moral ordering of normative systems” (SoM, 212). Let us stick, however, to the idea of ordering actions to see what Castañeda has in mind. In the previous example of the fireman who goes on duty to extinguish a fire, thereby failing to take his son to a football game, we may assume that the action of going on duty causes

³ Castañeda emphasizes, however, that fostering changes in the moral code of one's community must be done with some prudence, for the risk of impacting the cohesion of the community must be taken into account (SoM, 15).

some unhappiness for both the fireman and the fireman's son, to the extent that they give up their cherished goal of going to the football match together. However, there would be, we may surmise, a higher amount of unhappiness generated by the fireman's alternative action of going to the football game, if we consider the frustrated goals of the people involved in the fire, as well as the frustrated fireman's goal of helping people in his role as a fireman, or even the child's desire of seeing that his father has acted responsibly. In the other example, in which Professor Smith comes across the wounded Jones, we can imagine that, if Smith helps Jones, he causes some unhappiness both in himself and in the students who were expecting his lecture. However, the unhappiness generated by the alternative action of ignoring Jones is worse; the unhappiness for Jones is obvious in this case, but there may also be unhappiness for Smith himself, on account of his ignoring Jones' suffering and the euergetical rule of helping people in need.

The principles of moral ordering proposed by Castañeda are, however, obscure and controversial in many respects; they have been criticized by Aune (1986, §3), and Castañeda has admitted in his reply that they need substantial refinement:

I acknowledge that further work has to be done in the theory of moral ordering of actions. E.g., we need a well-developed subtheory of the role of the thresholds of sacrifice morality can demand in general and on the thresholds of sacrifice morally sanctioned institutions may morally impose. Other parameters have to be considered, besides numbers of persons affected and the degrees in which actions tend to support or disrupt agents' ends. Furthermore, the theory of moral ordering of actions, systems of actions, and normative networks has to be developed into a foundational theory of justice. (Castañeda 1986, 380)

For present purposes, it is not worth going into the details of these principles in their original formulation. It is important to note, however, that whatever their imperfections are, they are meant to incorporate aspects that strongly differentiate Castañeda's view from Bentham's act utilitarianism:

The conception of human nature, happiness and morality behind the ordering principles ... is *not* the classical utilitarian conception of the

greatest happiness for the greatest number. As is well known from repeated criticism of classical utilitarianism, the criterion of the greatest number leads to injustices and cruelties of forced martyrdoms. The fact is that the classical principle of Bentham “everybody counts for one; nobody counts for more than one” is misleading. At one level of analysis this principle treats each man as interchangeable with another ... But ... morality contains not only a principle of equality, but a principle of *individuality*. From the point of view of morality no man, more generally, no agent, is interchangeable: each one has an inalienable right to choose his form of happiness, except for interference with the happiness of other agents. Each man has, in Kant's term, a *dignity*. (SoM, 208)

We must leave for another occasion the important task of revising the principles of moral ordering in a way that takes into account what Castañeda indicates in the above quotes. For the time being, let us focus on how freedom and happiness are to be understood according to Castañeda.

3 Freedom as a Precondition of Morality

As we saw, the moral ideal prescribes that everybody have the freedom to pursue her own happiness, inasmuch as this is compatible with everybody else's pursuit of happiness. This raises the issue of how one's individual freedom is to be understood, and how and to what extent it may be constrained to make room for the analogous freedom of all other agents.

Following Berlin 1969, in political theory one typically distinguishes between negative and positive freedom. As Berlin puts it,

[T]he first of these political senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the “negative” sense, is involved in the answer to the question “What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?” The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in the answer to the question “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than

that? ” The two questions are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap. (Berlin 1969, 121–22)

As regards negative freedom, Berlin clarifies that it is “simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree” (Berlin 1969, 122).

On the other hand, in relation to positive freedom, Berlin explains:

[T]he “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s acts of f will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer-deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. (Berlin 1969, 131)

In a nutshell, the former is the absence of coercion from other agents, and the latter is a capacity for autonomous self-realization. Arguably, Castañeda has in mind both sorts of freedom, when he tells us that morality “is ... an ideal of *maximal freedom* for everyone” (SoM, 187), or that it “grants each agent the *freedom* to choose his way of self-realization subject, of course, to the general restraints it imposes in the case of conflicts among agents” (SoM, 200).

Let us first focus on negative freedom. The above quote speaks of “maximal freedom for everyone” in pursuing one’s happiness. Patently, the maximality in question is a maximality compatible with everybody else’s freedom of pursuing one’s happiness. It is thus not an unlimited freedom, as it is always subject to the obligation of taking into account other people’s interests in an effort to harmonize one’s interests with theirs. This may mean giving up otherwise legitimate desires and expectations, and thereby

accepting a degree of happiness lower than the one that could have been achieved, had these desires and expectations been fulfilled. At the same time, morality does not prescribe any specific way of pursuing one's happiness; indeed it does not even "demand that a man be happy" (SoM, 201). Accordingly, one may imagine that Castañeda implicitly assumes something like Mill's harm principle, namely:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. (Mill 2001, 13)

However, Castañeda's emphasis on self-realization strongly suggests that his moral ideal also presupposes positive freedom. The importance of this can be seen by focusing on an imaginary world described by Tomis Kapitan in an attempt to question Castañeda's conception of morality:

[T]here is just one massive society of human beings living together in a single planet abundant in natural resources. The society is divided into two major groups, the Masters and the Slaves. For the Masters, pleased with their lot, the status quo is exactly as they want it to be—and so too for the Slaves, for they have been cleverly educated and conditioned to accept the prevailing state of things [The slaves] feel they themselves are slave-worthy only ... and ... have no desire to become Masters. At the same, the Slaves are denied much, e.g., a liberal education, freedom to travel, opportunity to own houses and land, choice of their own careers and work, participation in their own governance, the pleasures of philosophy, and so on. Still, not desiring these things they are not bitter about being

excluded from them The Masters, we can suppose, believe and desire otherwise, humoring themselves over the delusions of the Slaves. (Kapitan 1984, 267–68)

According to Kapitan, in this world there is a perfect harmonization of ends and thus maximal happiness for everybody. In particular, there is no frustration of the Slaves' ends brought about by coercive behavior of the Masters. However, Kapitan claims, this society is “dramatically short on justice” (Kapitan 1984, 268). This is meant to suggest that there is a problem with Castañeda's characterization of the ideal of morality as requiring the harmonization of ends toward the goal of a consistent maximal freedom for everybody. Given his view of morality, we should judge that everybody is acting morally in this society, but since this society is unjust, it must be false that everybody is acting morally in this society. The conundrum is resolved, I think, precisely by bringing positive freedom into the picture. Because of the conditioning that they underwent, the Slaves lack the positive freedom that could allow them many different roads to self-realization. Thus, the Masters, who brought about the conditioning, acted immorally, because they thwarted the fundamental aspirations to self-realization attributable to the Slaves *qua* human beings. Moreover, the Masters who take advantage of the Slaves' labor also act immorally inasmuch as they fail to promote educational programs that free the Slaves from the conditioning that has deprived them of legitimate desires and goals that they would have otherwise enjoyed.

Roberto Mosciatti made a suggestion that goes in the direction of attributing an especially strong conception of positive freedom to Castañeda. He appropriately pointed out that, in the light of the metathetical dimension of morality, the notion of freedom encapsulated in the moral ideal is describable not only as a capacity to fulfill needs and interests or to have access to a set of options and choices, but also as a capacity to make room for an emancipation from principles and beliefs which need to be dismissed once they no longer serve our ethical purposes.⁴

⁴ Mosciatti went on to note that this level of freedom “is approximately what Jiddu Krishnamurti would identify as freedom from the ‘known’ and from ‘the tyranny of the expected,’ presupposing a type of subjectivity that is in ‘moral becoming’ and that, as such, is predisposed for remodeling itself over time” (Roberto Mosciatti, personal communication, July 13, 2017).

4 Happiness and Research on Happiness

As noted above, the specific moral code of a community may be seen as an attempt at implementing the moral ideal, which means that the code somehow implicitly embodies a view of the kind of happiness that the agents in the community may aspire to, as based on a conception of their nature, inclinations and motivations. Ultimately, however, morality is concerned with *all* agents, and this makes it *inter-communitarian*. Hence, no moral code can in the end neglect the aspiration to happiness of members of other communities, who may possibly abide by different moral codes. Thus, gathering knowledge on how people achieve, or fail to achieve, happiness in all corners of the world should make us more aware of what is most conducive to happiness, thereby allowing us to characterize more accurately the ideal of morality and to favor implementations that approximate the ideal as closely as possible. Toward this end, one could take advantage of the currently flourishing studies on what people in different countries report regarding their happiness and well-being. Enormous amounts of data have been and are being collected (see, e.g., Helliwell et al. 2017). However, in order to properly interpret them it is important to be clear on which conception of happiness is guiding us.

Following Haybron (2011, §2.3), we may distinguish between *life-satisfaction* theories and *affect-based* views, which in turn subdivide into *hedonism* and *emotional states* views.

Life-satisfaction theories identify happiness with enjoying, in Haybron's words, "a favorable attitude toward one's life as a whole." Haybron goes on to explain:

[t]his attitude ... typically involves some sort of global judgment: an endorsement or affirmation of one's life as a whole. This judgment may be more or less explicit, and may involve or accompany some form of affect. It may also involve or accompany some aggregate of judgments about particular items or domains within one's life. (Haybron 2011, §2.1)

As regards affect-based views, hedonism simply identifies happiness with a positive balance of pleasant over unpleasant experience, whereas emotional state views try and provide a more articulate account. According to it,

happiness could be described, in Haybron's words, as follows:

...an agent's emotional condition as a whole. This includes nonexperiential aspects of emotions and moods (or perhaps just moods), and excludes pleasures that don't directly involve the individual's emotional state. It might also include a person's *propensity* for experiencing various moods, which can vary over time. Happiness on such a view is more nearly the opposite of depression or anxiety—a broad psychological condition—whereas hedonistic happiness is simply opposed to unpleasantness. (Haybron 2011, §2.1)

Haybron also considers a *hybrid* approach that aims at combining the virtues of both life satisfaction and affect-based views (Haybron 2011, §2.1). However, he dismisses views of this sort, since they “cast their net too widely” and thus are very much open to the risk of being “uninformative.”

Nevertheless, the huge amount of empirical data on happiness currently available provides information both on the aspects emphasized by life-satisfaction approaches and on those emphasized by affect-based theories. This is acknowledged by Haybron himself:

Perhaps the best single snapshot of the correlates of happiness from a global perspective is the Gallup World Poll study In that study, the life satisfaction measure was more strongly related to material prosperity, as noted above: household income, along with possession of luxury conveniences and satisfaction with standard of living. The affect measures, by contrast, correlated most strongly with what the authors call “psychosocial”: whether people reported being treated with respect in the last day, having family and friends to count on, learning something new, doing what they do best, and choosing how their time was spent. (Haybron 2011, §3.3)

In the light of this, the compromise provided by a hybrid view may well be the best option; it seems to offer the most appropriate framework in order to accommodate all these data and to take advantage of them in policy making. Admittedly, Castañeda's emphasis on the construction of a life plan and on

self-realization suggests the attribution to him of a life-satisfaction approach to happiness, and his criticism of hedonism also goes in that direction. Nevertheless, he also finds a grain of truth in hedonism:

A man's *concrete happiness* consists in his threading his life along a course that he can trace drawing from a large number of possible plans. This holistic feature of happiness has been hidden to hedonism. Hedonism exhausts itself in correctly grasping the elementary truth that individual satisfactions must be constituents of a happy life. (SoM, 26)

This, I submit, suggests that he may be open to a hybrid view.

5 Comparison with Other Ethical Theories

It is instructive to consider Castañeda's theory in connection to other theories of morality. As we shall see, although his standpoint can hardly be classified with one or another particular traditional approach, it combines aspects of some of them in interesting ways. James Fieser's entry "Ethics"⁵ in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/>) conveniently distinguishes and presents in broad outline the following views: virtue theories, duty (or deontological) theories, and consequentialist theories, the latter of which is subdivided into ethical altruism, ethical egoism, and utilitarianism. Let us dwell on all of them.

The virtue-theoretical approach can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle and has been more recently revived by MacIntyre (1981). It is centered around the identification of virtues which one should strive for and cultivate, and vices which should by all means be avoided. Among the former there are wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, sincerity; and among the latter, cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. The possession of virtues and the avoidance of vices is conducive to a good and happy life, and also grounds good habits of characters, which in turn typically unfold in morally correct behavior. Hence,

⁵ I have consulted Fieser's entry in May 2019. There is no indication of when it was first published.

virtue theories are typically eudaimonistic; rather than proposing moral rules to be obeyed for their own sake, they recommend the pursuit of virtues, and thus of morality, as the best guide to happiness. In line with virtue theories, Castañeda recognizes that it is part and parcel of morality to urge the pursuit of virtues. The euergetic dimension of morality is supposed to take care of this:

...euergetic requirements [such as] Eu.6-Eu.8 aim at the development in each agent of a moral, or virtuous, frame of mind. Their concern is to have every agent work out in himself a general attitude of consideration toward others, especially those who come in contact with him. (SoM, 216)

Moreover, as we saw in detail, Castañeda's moral ideal most crucially includes an eudaimonistic aspect, as can be seen in its concern for the aspiration to happiness of all agents.

The deontological approach can be traced back at least to Kant and has been defended in more recent times by Ross (1930). The central idea here is that morality is grounded on specific obligations that must be obeyed for their own sake, regardless of their consequences; in particular, when obeying them may have a negative impact of our pursuit of happiness. Among such obligations, there could be, for example duties not to kill, not to steal, not to lie, to nurture one's children, to donate to charity. Famously, Kant (1788) thought that all moral duties could be derived by a single categorical imperative, which tells us that we should always treat people as ends in themselves, and never as means to an end. Ross (1930) provides his own list of duties, based on what he takes to be our ordinary moral convictions. Such duties are for him *prima facie* duties, since he admits that there may be circumstances in which some of them can be in conflict. In such cases, we can have, in his opinion, an intuitive knowledge as to which among the conflicting *prima facie* duties is the actual duty, i.e., the one to be obeyed. Castañeda's approach is also deontological, and similarly admits that there may exist conflicts between obligations such as the ones envisioned by Ross. Indeed, as we have seen, according to Castañeda, morality is grounded on an overarching ideal of a harmonious resolution of conflicts. The deontological element arises, as in Kant, from the basic recognition of the equal dignity of

all agents, such that they are treated as ends in themselves. This leads, on the one end, to euergetical obligations that dominate over other sorts of obligations one may have; and, on the other hand, it may also lead in certain circumstances to obligations to retreat from an otherwise preferable pursuit of happiness, to an alternative road to happiness, which is less satisfactory from the point of view of self-interest, but is respectful of the interests of other agents.

According to consequentialism, what is morally right or wrong depends on the consequences of conduct on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. In its ethical-egoistic version, only the acting agent must be taken into account in the analysis; in its ethical-altruistic version, all agents except the acting agent are relevant; finally, in its most popular version, namely utilitarianism, all agents are relevant. Clearly, ethical egoism and altruism are completely ruled out by Castañeda's view, as it insists on a concern for *all* agents. As regards utilitarianism, we must, as is well known, distinguish between act and rule utilitarianism. According to the former, typically associated with Jeremy Bentham, one should evaluate single actions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. According to the latter, cost-benefit analysis should instead be used to establish rules of conduct. As we saw, Castañeda explicitly distances himself from act utilitarianism by taking for granted a non-negotiable primary dignity of each individual agent. However, in his search for principles of moral ordering Castañeda's approach has something in common with the cost-benefit analysis put forward by act utilitarians. Regarding rule utilitarianism, typically associated with John Stuart Mill, we may say that the rules of conduct that the rule utilitarian presumably ends up endorsing tend to coincide with Castañeda's euergetical obligations. The latter, however, are not endorsed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis; they are rather taken for granted as typically embedded in our moral codes.

6 Globalization Problems

In this section we shall be concerned with *ethical* value judgements, in particular instances of them which may be put forward in the kinds of intercultural contexts that are being generated more and more frequently by globalization. Such judgements are of forms such as these: that *X* does *A* is

right/wrong, or *A*'s doing *X* is morally preferable to *A*'s doing *Y*. They are typically backed up by *ought* judgements such as: *X* ought to do *A*, or *X* ought not to do *A* (SoM, 196), which I shall then also regard as ethical value judgements. As we saw, *ought* judgements can be relativized to specific requirements coming from components internal to a moral code. As we shall now see, they can more generally be relativized to a whole moral code. Moreover, they can even be backed up directly by the moral ideal itself, which makes the *ought* in question absolutely overriding.⁶ We shall focus on three examples.

Polygyny is typically allowed in Muslim countries and forbidden in most non-Muslim countries. There is then, we may assume, a moral code accepted in a Muslim country such as Afghanistan, according to which it is permitted that Yanis has two wives, Sultana and Parwana. The three of them, as a result of their free decision, have happily led their life together. When Yanis migrates to Italy, he ends up in a non-Muslim country with a different moral code, according to which it is forbidden that anybody have two wives. At some point, Yanis is rich enough to support both of his wives economically and issues a request to the Italian government for a reunion with his two wives, who had remained in Afghanistan.

Should the request be granted? Surely one may judge that it is wrong, according to the moral code currently accepted in Italy, that Yanis has two wives. But how should the matter be evaluated from the standpoint of the ideal of morality? It could be argued that, from that point of view, the reunion should be granted: to forbid it would amount to thwarting the freedom and aspiration to happiness of Yanis, Sultana, and Parwana. It may well be objected that the Muslim moral code asymmetrically allows for polygyny and not for polyandry, which signals an imbalance in the rights of men and women. This is something, one may urge, that the moral ideal should not grant, since it is equally concerned with the freedom, self-realization and happiness of *every* agent, thus independently of his or her gender. One can reply, however, that a moral code that forbids both polygyny and polyandry limits freedom for both men and women, so that perhaps the best response to

⁶ The overriding quality of the *ought* does not grant that the judgement really be endorsed by the relevant agent so as to cause the agent to act appropriately, for of course moral requirements may happen to be unattended (SoM, 10).

the inequality in a moral code permitting only polygyny is the introduction of polyandry as well, rather than the rejection of polygyny. In sum, from the point of view of the moral ideal, one may say that the aspiration for Yanis, Sultana, and Parwana to reunite is legitimate: it is right, morally, that their request be accepted. At the same time, this judgement, as put forward in the context of a moral code that grants equal rights to men and women in all respects, points to a possible reform of this moral code: it should make room, at least in principle, for both polyandry and polygyny.⁷

Let us now consider female genital mutilation (FGM). It is widely practiced in many African countries, typically on girls who are from 4 to 14 years old, despite being a source of severe pain and frustration throughout the sexual life of the victim. This is due to several errant reasons, including a desire to repress and reduce female sexuality, and beliefs that hold, for example, that female genitals induce infections and are obscene or that FGM favors fertility and the survival of the newborn. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is currently active against FGM in 22 countries, including Sudan, and its website (consulted in July 2017) reports the case of a Sudanese woman, Fatema, who has rejected this practice and has not allowed that her child, Imteman, to undergo FGM.

In this situation, we may suppose, the following ethical value judgements could be put forward:

- (1) Fatema ought, according to the traditional Sudanese moral code, to allow Imteman to undergo FGM;
- (2) Fatema ought, according to the moral ideal, not to allow Imteman to undergo FGM.

Clearly, Fatema has recognized the overriding nature of the moral *ought* and acted on the basis of (2), rather than (1). Endorsing (2) presupposes a more general value judgement concerning the Sudanese code: it is implicitly considered as defective in a certain respect and in need of replacement by an amended code that eliminates the defect.

UNICEF is also active against child labor and presents it as a serious problem in its website as follows:

⁷ This does not rule out that polyandry and/or polygyny may in certain circumstances be morally unjust (SoM, 17).

Millions of children around the world are trapped in child labour, depriving them of their childhood, their health and education, and condemning them to a life of poverty and want. Of course, there is work that children do to help their families in ways that are neither harmful nor exploitative. But many children are stuck in unacceptable work for children—a serious violation of their rights.... Child labour is the combined product of many factors, such as poverty, social norms condoning it, lack of decent work opportunities for adults and adolescents, migration, and emergencies. (UNICEF 2017)

The website shows a photograph of a victim of child labor: a girl who works at a brick factory in the Shahdra neighborhood, north of Lahore, capital of the Punjab Province, in India.

Let us then assume that the Punjab moral code allows for child labor. Suppose now that some rich country, *RC*, imports bricks from Punjab, since they are conveniently cheap. In doing this, of course *RC* sets aside concerns about child labor. There are grounds here for saying that *RC*'s moral code also allows for child labor. Accordingly, the following ethical value judgements are true:

(3) the Shahdra girl ought, according to the Punjab moral code, to make bricks rather than going to school;

(4) the Shahdra girl ought, according to *RC* moral code, to make bricks rather than going to school.

Nevertheless, arguably, this other judgement is also true:

(5) the Shahdra girl ought, according to the moral ideal, to go to school and not make bricks.

This calls for reform of both the Punjab and the *RC* moral codes. Correlatively, one may add, it also calls for actions aiming at overcoming the economic problems that presumably favor child labor in Punjab.

7 Conclusion

The rich moral theory put forward by Hector-Neri Castañeda in SoM deserves to be more widely appreciated and further elaborated. Here I considered how freedom should be understood in Castañeda's framework and

how current empirical research on happiness may give additional substance to the role that this key notion plays in it. I have also tried to highlight how Castañeda's crucial distinction between the moral code and the moral ideal may be used to shed light on ethical issues arising in the wave of globalization.

To be sure, more work should be done to promote and develop Castañeda's framework. I hope that this essay may stimulate new efforts in this direction.

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