Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure

Stochastic differential equations for evolutionary dynamics with demographic noise and mutations

We present a general framework to describe the evolutionary dynamics of an arbitrary number of types in finite populations based on stochastic differential equations (SDE). For large, but finite populations this allows to include demographic noise without requiring explicit simulations. Instead, the population size only rescales the amplitude of the noise. Moreover, this framework admits the inclusion of mutations between different types, provided that mutation rates, $\mu$, are not too small compared to the inverse population size 1/N. This ensures that all types are almost always represented in the population and that the occasional extinction of one type does not result in an extended absence of that type. For $\mu N\ll1$ this limits the use of SDE's, but in this case there are well established alternative approximations based on time scale separation. We illustrate our approach by a Rock-Scissors-Paper game with mutations, where we demonstrate excellent agreement with simulation based results for sufficiently large populations. In the absence of mutations the excellent agreement extends to small population sizes.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, accepted for publication in Physical Review

Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games

Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to rock--scissors--paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies cooperate, defect and loner i.e. those unwilling to participate in the public enterprise. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatio-temporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two- and three-strategy states which are either in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior and enables cooperators to persist at substantial levels.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figure

Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here, we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) in terms of conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways given previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions that the strategies are adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory, which could be either cooperation or defection. A transition between cooperative and defective attractors occurs as a function of different parameters such a mutation rate, replacement rate, and memory, all of which affect a player's ability to predict an opponent's behavior.Comment: 27 pages, including supplementary information. 5 figures, 4 suppl. figures. Version accepted for publication in PLoS Comp. Bio

Variable outcomes of human heart attack recapitulated in genetically diverse mice.

Clinical variation in patient responses to myocardial infarction (MI) has been difficult to model in laboratory animals. To assess the genetic basis of variation in outcomes after heart attack, we characterized responses to acute MI in the Collaborative Cross (CC), a multi-parental panel of genetically diverse mouse strains. Striking differences in post-MI functional, morphological, and myocardial scar features were detected across 32 CC founder and recombinant inbred strains. Transcriptomic analyses revealed a plausible link between increased intrinsic cardiac oxidative phosphorylation levels and MI-induced heart failure. The emergence of significant quantitative trait loci for several post-MI traits indicates that utilizing CC strains is a valid approach for gene network discovery in cardiovascular disease, enabling more accurate clinical risk assessment and prediction

Variable outcomes of human heart attack recapitulated in genetically diverse mice

Clinical variation in patient responses to myocardial infarction (MI) has been difficult to model in laboratory animals. To assess the genetic basis of variation in outcomes after heart attack, we characterized responses to acute MI in the Collaborative Cross (CC), a multi-parental panel of genetically diverse mouse strains. Striking differences in post-MI functional, morphological, and myocardial scar features were detected across 32 CC founder and recombinant inbred strains. Transcriptomic analyses revealed a plausible link between increased intrinsic cardiac oxidative phosphorylation levels and MI-induced heart failure. The emergence of significant quantitative trait loci for several post-MI traits indicates that utilizing CC strains is a valid approach for gene network discovery in cardiovascular disease, enabling more accurate clinical risk assessment and prediction

Searches at HERA for Squarks in R-Parity Violating Supersymmetry

A search for squarks in R-parity violating supersymmetry is performed in e^+p collisions at HERA at a centre of mass energy of 300 GeV, using H1 data corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 37 pb^(-1). The direct production of single squarks of any generation in positron-quark fusion via a Yukawa coupling lambda' is considered, taking into account R-parity violating and conserving decays of the squarks. No significant deviation from the Standard Model expectation is found. The results are interpreted in terms of constraints within the Minimal Supersymmetric Standard Model (MSSM), the constrained MSSM and the minimal Supergravity model, and their sensitivity to the model parameters is studied in detail. For a Yukawa coupling of electromagnetic strength, squark masses below 260 GeV are excluded at 95% confidence level in a large part of the parameter space. For a 100 times smaller coupling strength masses up to 182 GeV are excluded.Comment: 32 pages, 14 figures, 3 table