Surviving elections: election violence, incumbent victory, and post-election repercussions

It is often assumed that government-sponsored election violence increases the probability that incumbent leaders remain in power. Using cross-national data, we show that election violence increases the probability of incumbent victory, but can generate risky post-election dynamics. These differences in the consequences of election violence reflect changes in the strategic setting over the course of the election cycle. In the pre-election period, anti-incumbent collective action tends to be focused on the election itself, either through voter mobilization or opposition-organized election boycotts. In the post-election period, by contrast, when a favorable electoral outcome is no longer a possibility, anti-government collective action more often takes the form of mass political protest, which in turn can lead to costly repercussions for incumbent leaders

The Challenges of the External Vote

UID/CPO/04627/2019Over the last few decades, emigrants all over the world have gained expanded voting rights. Despite the normative debates about this issue, there are few empirical studies on why states decide to implement external voting and how electoral systems perform. This chapter seeks to fill this gap by looking at the Portuguese case. Our study suggests that a combination of political and socio-economic factors explains the implementa tion of external voting. On the other hand, the interests of political parties and the low level of civil society engagement are key factors in the failure of both electoral reforms and attempts to overcome the shortcomings of external voting.publishersversionpublishe

Did aid promote democracy in Africa?: the role of technical assistance in Africa’s transitions

Did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in Africa in the 1990s? We argue that after the Cold War, donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage. To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents—from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. We test our theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization