Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex Cover

The Adwords and Online Bipartite Matching problems have enjoyed a renewed attention over the past decade due to their connection to Internet advertising. Our community has contributed, among other things, new models (notably stochastic) and extensions to the classical formulations to address the issues that arise from practical needs. In this paper, we propose a new generalization based on matroids and show that many of the previous results extend to this more general setting. Because of the rich structures and expressive power of matroids, our new setting is potentially of interest both in theory and in practice. In the classical version of the problem, the offline side of a bipartite graph is known initially while vertices from the online side arrive one at a time along with their incident edges. The objective is to maintain a decent approximate matching from which no edge can be removed. Our generalization, called Matroid Online Bipartite Matching, additionally requires that the set of matched offline vertices be independent in a given matroid. In particular, the case of partition matroids corresponds to the natural scenario where each advertiser manages multiple ads with a fixed total budget. Our algorithms attain the same performance as the classical version of the problems considered, which are often provably the best possible. We present $1-1/e$-competitive algorithms for Matroid Online Bipartite Matching under the small bid assumption, as well as a $1-1/e$-competitive algorithm for Matroid Online Bipartite Matching in the random arrival model. A key technical ingredient of our results is a carefully designed primal-dual waterfilling procedure that accommodates for matroid constraints. This is inspired by the extension of our recent charging scheme for Online Bipartite Vertex Cover.Comment: 19 pages, to appear in EC'1

Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem

We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio better than 2. We thus consider randomized mechanisms. We give a natural and explicit extension of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (RSDM) specifically for the House Allocation problem where preference lists can include ties. We thus obtain a universally truthful randomized mechanism for finding a Pareto optimal matching and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of eovere-1. The same bound holds even when agents have priorities (weights) and our goal is to find a maximum weight (as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto optimal matching. On the other hand we give a lower bound of 18 over 13 on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. In the case that the mechanism must additionally be non-bossy, an improved lower bound of eovere-1 holds. This lower bound is tight given that RSDM for strict preference lists is non-bossy. We moreover interpret our problem in terms of the classical secretary problem and prove that our mechanism provides the best randomized strategy of the administrator who interviews the applicants

Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions

The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96} says that in a single-item auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves a higher revenue than the optimal auction's revenue on the original set of bidders, when values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution. We give a version of Bulow and Klemperer's result in settings where bidders' values are drawn from non-i.i.d. irregular distributions. We do this by modeling irregular distributions as some convex combination of regular distributions. The regular distributions that constitute the irregular distribution correspond to different population groups in the bidder population. Drawing a bidder from this collection of population groups is equivalent to drawing from some convex combination of these regular distributions. We show that recruiting one extra bidder from each underlying population group and running the Vickrey auction gives at least half of the optimal auction's revenue on the original set of bidders

Budget constraints in prediction markets

We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget constraints of individual traders affect their ability to impact the market price. As a concrete application of our characterization, e give sufficient conditions for a property we call budget additivity: two traders with budgets B and B0 and the same beliefs would have a combined impact equal to a single trader with budget B +B0. That way, even if a single trader cannot move the market much, a crowd of like-minded traders can have the same desired effect. When the set of payoff vectors associated with outcomes, with coordinates corresponding to securities, is affinely independent, we obtain that a generalization of the heavily-used logarithmic market scoring rule is budget additive, but the quadratic market scoring rule is not. Our results may be used both descriptively, to understand if a particular market maker is affected by budget constraints or not, and prescriptively, as a recipe to construct markets.postprin

Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders

In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of webpages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad slots of the same page needs to satisfy various prespecified constraints including exclusion constraints, diversity constraints, and the like. Upon arrival of a user, the ad serving system needs to allocate a set of ads to the current webpage respecting these per-page allocation constraints. Previous slot-based settings ignore the important concept of a page and may lead to highly suboptimal results in general. In this article, motivated by these applications in display advertising and inspired by the submodular welfare maximization problem with online bidders, we study a general class of page-based ad allocation problems, present the first (tight) constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems, and confirm the performance of our algorithms experimentally on real-world datasets. A key technical ingredient of our results is a novel primal-dual analysis for handling free disposal, which updates dual variables using a “level function” instead of a single level and unifies with previous analyses of related problems. This new analysis method allows us to handle arbitrarily complicated allocation constraints for each page. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves a 1 &minus frac 1 e &minus o(1)-competitive ratio. Moreover, our experiments on real-world datasets show significant improvements of our page-based algorithms compared to the slot-based algorithms. Finally, we observe that our problem is closely related to the submodular welfare maximization (SWM) problem. In particular, we introduce a variant of the SWM problem with online bidders and show how to solve this problem using our algorithm for whole-page optimization.postprin

LP-based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy cannot be bounded by a constant (e.g. [6, 7, 11, 5, 2]). In particular, we describe a vertex cover game with a price of anarchy of 2. The rules of the games capture the structure of the linear programming relaxations of the underlying optimization problems, and our bounds are established by analyzing these relaxations. Furthermore, for linear costs we exhibit linear time best response dynamics that converge to these almost optimal Nash equilibria. These dynamics mimic the classical greedy approximation algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3]

Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players

Absence of evidence of Xenotropic Murine Leukemia Virus-related virus infection in persons with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and healthy controls in the United States

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>XMRV, a xenotropic murine leukemia virus (MuLV)-related virus, was recently identified by PCR testing in 67% of persons with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and in 3.7% of healthy persons from the United States. To investigate the association of XMRV with CFS we tested blood specimens from 51 persons with CFS and 56 healthy persons from the US for evidence of XMRV infection by using serologic and molecular assays. Blinded PCR and serologic testing were performed at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and at two additional laboratories.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Archived blood specimens were tested from persons with CFS defined by the 1994 international research case definition and matched healthy controls from Wichita, Kansas and metropolitan, urban, and rural Georgia populations. Serologic testing at CDC utilized a Western blot (WB) assay that showed excellent sensitivity to MuLV and XMRV polyclonal or monoclonal antibodies, and no reactivity on sera from 121 US blood donors or 26 HTLV-and HIV-infected sera. Plasma from 51 CFS cases and plasma from 53 controls were all WB negative. Additional blinded screening of the 51 cases and 53 controls at the Robert Koch Institute using an ELISA employing recombinant Gag and Env XMRV proteins identified weak seroreactivity in one CFS case and a healthy control, which was not confirmed by immunofluorescence. PCR testing at CDC employed a <it>gag </it>and a <it>pol </it>nested PCR assay with a detection threshold of 10 copies in 1 ug of human DNA. DNA specimens from 50 CFS patients and 56 controls and 41 US blood donors were all PCR-negative. Blinded testing by a second nested gag PCR assay at the Blood Systems Research Institute was also negative for DNA specimens from the 50 CFS cases and 56 controls.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>We did not find any evidence of infection with XMRV in our U.S. study population of CFS patients or healthy controls by using multiple molecular and serologic assays. These data do not support an association of XMRV with CFS.</p