Strategic equilibrium in economies with a continuum of agents

In this note, a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents who behave strategically in endowments and preferences is considered. A notion of equilibrium, namely, strategic equilibrium is defined. It is shown that price-taking and strategic behavior leads to identical results

Linear exchange economies with a continuum of agents.

The purpose of this paper is to study how the equilibrium prices vary with respect to the initial endowments in a linear exchange economy with a continuum of agents. We first state the model and give conditions of an increasing strength for existence, uniqueness and continuity of equilibrium prices.Then, if we restrict ourselves to economies with essentially bounded initial endowments and if we assume that there is, from the point of view of preferences, only a finite number of types of agents, we show that, on an open dense subset of the space of initial endowments, the equilibrium price vector is an infinitely differentiable function of the initial endowments. The proof of this claim is based on an explicit formula allowing to compute the equilibrium price vector around a so-called "regular" endowment where it is known.Linear utilities; Indirect utility function; Walrasian equilibrium; Atomless measure space of agents; Open mapping theorem;

Strategic equilibrium in economies with a continuum of agents.

In this note, a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents who behave strategically in endowments and preferences is considered. A notion of equilibrium, namely, strategic equilibrium is defined. It is shown that price-taking and strategic behavior leads to identical results.Strategic equilibrium; Pure exchange economy; Continuum economy;

Some discrete approaches to continuum economies

Given the preferences of the agents of a continuum economy, we define the average and unanimous preference. This allow us to consider several sequences of economies, in which only a finite number of different agents' characteristics can be distinguished. We obtain approximation results for the core of these economies

On equilibrium existence in infinite horizon economies

In sequential economies with finite or infinite-lived real assets in positive net supply, we introduce constraints on the amount of borrowing in terms of the market value of physical endowments. We show that, when utility functions are either unbounded and separable in states of nature or separable in commodities, these borrowing constraints not only preclude Ponzi schemes but also induce endogenous Radner bounds on short-sales. Therefore, we obtain existence of equilibrium. Moreover, equilibrium also exists when both assets are numerarie and utility functions are quasilinear in the commodity used as numerarie.Equilibrium, Infinite horizon incomplete markets, Infinite-lived real assets.

Union Games: Technological Unemployment

Given a production economy, we define a trade union game by considering strategic behavior on factor supplies. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as trade union equilibria. First we analyze situations under which unemployment of factors are supported as trade union equilibria. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. In this line, we suggest a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the related literature. Then, we state a limit result which shows that when the market power of trade unions decreases the corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria converges to the walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors.Trade Union Games, unemployment, walrasian equilibrium, manipulability.

Infinite horizon economies with borrowing constraints

We consider infinite horizon economies with incomplete financial markets. Securities are in positive net supply and may be infinite-lived. We establish existence of equilibria by requiring borrowing constrains instead of portfolio restrictions..Equilibrium, Infinite horizon incomplete markets, Infinite-lived real assets.

A price mechanism in economies with asymmetric information

In this paper we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim is to describe the equilibrium price formation and how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. For it, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley-Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).C72/ D51

Algunas consideraciones sobre el mecanismo del veto

En esta nota se generalizan los conceptos clásicos de núcleo y Equilibrio de Edgeworth de una economía de intercambio. Para ello, se introducen las nociones de S-Núcleo y S-Equilibrio de Edgeworth, donde S es un conjunto de coaliciones permitidas, y se estudian algunas propiedades. Se aporta una caracterización del concepto S-Equilibrio de Edgeworth, mediante la definición de los conceptos equivalentes de S-Nucleo fuzzy y S-Nucleo fuzzy en con coeficientes racionales. Se prueba que, bajo determinadas hipótesis, para conseguir asignaciones del nucleo, de equilibrio walrasiano, equilibrios de Edgeworth 0 asignaciones del nucleo fuzzy de una economía, no es necesario considerar la formación de todas las coaliciones, sino que es suficiente permitir el veto de un subconjunto de coaliciones S, distinto del total. Estos resultados se obtienen tanto para economías definidas sobre un espacio de mercancias de dimensión finita, como para el caso infinito-dimensional

Coaliciones y competencia perfecta

En este trabajo estudiamos propiedades del mecanismo competitivo referentes a incentivos coalicionales. Para ello, definimos un test de competencia perfecta, que denominamos test de compatibilidad de incentivos coalicionales en el límite. Probamos que en el caso finito-dimensional existe un conjunto genérico de economías continuas que superan dicho test. Los resultados obtenidos para economías continuas que superan dicho test. Los resultados obtenidos para economías continuas admiten interpretaciones discretas que conducen a resultados límites sobre compatibilidad de incentivos coalicionales para sucesiones de economías finitas