Intentional Binding Is Driven by the Mere Presence of an Action and Not by Motor Prediction

Intentional binding refers to the fact that when a voluntary action produces a sensory outcome, action and outcome are perceived as being closer together in time. This phenomenon is often attributed, at least partially, to predictive motor mechanisms. However, previous studies failed to unequivocally attribute intentional binding to these mechanisms, since the contrasts that have been used to demonstrate intentional binding covered not only one but two processes: temporal control and motor identity prediction. In the present study we aimed to isolate the respective role of each of these processes in the emergence of intentional binding of action-effects. The results show that motor identity prediction does not modulate intentional binding of action-effects. Our findings cast doubts on the assumption that intentional binding of action effects is linked to internal forward predictive process

Illusory temporal binding in meditators

We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion; and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). Here we report that experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators rather than non-meditators display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome towards an intentional action. Mindfulness meditation involves awareness of causal connections between different mental states, including intentions. We argue that this supports improvements in metacognition targeted at motor intentions. Changes in metacognitive ability may result in an earlier and less veridical experience of the timing of action outcomes either through increased access to sensorimotor pre-representations of an action outcome or by affording greater precision to action timing judgements. Furthermore, as intentional binding is an implicit measure of the sense of agency, these results also provide evidence that mindfulness meditators experience a stronger sense of agency

Action selection and action awareness

Human actions are often classified as either internally generated, or externally specified in response to environmental cues. These two modes of action selection have distinct neural bases, but few studies investigated how the mode of action selection affects the subjective experience of action. We measured the experience of action using the subjective compression of the interval between actions and their effects, known as ‘temporal binding’. Participants performed either a left or a right key press, either in response to a specific cue, or as they freely chose. Moreover, the time of each keypress could either be explicitly cued to occur in one of two designated time intervals, or participants freely chose in which interval to act. Each action was followed by a specific tone. Participants judged the time of their actions or the time of the tone. Temporal binding was found for both internally generated and for stimulus-based actions. However, the amount of binding depended on whether or not both the choice and the timing of action were selected in the same way. Stronger binding was observed when both action choice and action timing were internally generated or externally specified, compared to conditions where the two parameters were selected by different routes. Our result suggests that temporal action–effect binding depends on how actions are selected. Binding is strongest when actions result from a single mode of selection

Examining the effect of Libet clock stimulus parameters on temporal binding

Temporal binding refers to the subjective temporal compression between actions and their outcomes. It is widely used as an implicit measure of sense of agency, that is, the experience of controlling our actions and their consequences. One of the most common measures of temporal binding is the paradigm developed by Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras (2002) based on the Libet clock stimulus. Although widely used, it is not clear how sensitive the temporal binding effect is to the parameters of the clock stimulus. Here, we present five experiments examining the effects of clock speed, number of clock markings and length of the clock hand on binding. Our results show that the magnitude of temporal binding increases with faster clock speeds, whereas clock markings and clock hand length do not significantly influence temporal binding. We discuss the implications of these results

How voluntary actions modulate time perception

Distortions of time perception are generally explained either by variations in the rate of pacing signals of an “internal clock”, or by lag-adaptation mechanisms that recalibrate the perceived time of one event relative to another. This study compares these accounts directly for one temporal illusion: the subjective compression of the interval between voluntary actions and their effects, known as ‘intentional binding’. Participants discriminated whether two cutaneous stimuli presented after voluntary or passive movements were simultaneous or successive. In other trials, they judged the temporal interval between their movement and an ensuing tone. Temporal discrimination was impaired following voluntary movements compared to passive movements early in the action-tone interval. In a control experiment, active movements without subsequent tones produced no impairment in temporal discrimination. These results suggest that voluntary actions transiently slow down an internal clock during the action-effect interval. This in turn leads to intentional binding, and links the effects of voluntary actions to the self

Biases in the perceived timing of perisaccadic perceptual and motor events

Subjects typically experience the temporal interval immediately following a saccade as longer than a comparable control interval. One explanation of this effect is that the brain antedates the perceptual onset of a saccade target to around the time of saccade initiation. This could explain the apparent continuity of visual perception across eye movements. Thisantedating account was tested in three experiments in which subjects made saccades of differing extents and then judged either the duration or the temporal order of key events. Postsaccadic stimuli underwent subjective temporal lengthening and had early perceived onsets. A temporally advanced awareness of saccade completion was also found, independently of antedating effects. These results provide convergent evidence supporting antedating and differentiating it from other temporal biases

Beyond the Libet clock: modality variants for agency measurements

The Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to our capability to control our own actions and influence the world around us. Recent research in HCI has been exploring SoA to provide users an instinctive sense of “I did that” as opposed to “the system did that”. However, current agency measurements are limited. The Intentional Binding (IB) paradigm provides an implicit measure of the SoA. However, it is constrained by requiring high visual attention to a “Libet clock” onscreen. In this paper, we extend the timing stimulus through auditory and tactile cues. Our results demonstrate that audio timing through voice commands and haptic timing through tactile cues on the hand are alternative techniques to measure the SoA using the IB paradigm. They both address limitations of the traditional method (e.g., lack of engagement and visual demand). We discuss how our results can be applied to measure SoA in tasks involving different interactive scenarios common in HCI

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency

TMS stimulation over the inferior parietal cortex disrupts prospective sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling an external event through one's own action. On one influential view, sense of agency is inferred after an action, by "retrospectively" comparing actual effects of actions against their intended effects. However, it has been recently shown that earlier processes, linked to action selection, may also contribute to sense of agency, in advance of the action itself, and independently of action effects. The inferior parietal cortex (IPC) may underpin this "prospective" contribution to agency, by monitoring signals relating to fluency of action selection in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Here, we combined transcranial stimulation (TMS) with subliminal priming of action selection to investigate the causal role of these regions in the prospective coding of agency. In a first experiment, we showed that TMS over left IPC at the time of action selection disrupts perceived control over subsequent effects of action. In a second experiment, we exploited the temporal specificity of single-pulse TMS to pinpoint the exact timing of IPC contribution to sense of agency. We replicated the reduction in perceived control at the point of action selection, while observing no effect of TMS-induced disruption of IPC at the time of action outcomes

Exposure to delayed visual feedback of the hand changes motor-sensory synchrony perception

We examined whether the brain can adapt to temporal delays between a self-initiated action and the naturalistic visual feedback of that action. During an exposure phase, participants tapped with their index finger while seeing their own hand in real time (~0 ms delay) or delayed at 40, 80, or 120 ms. Following exposure, participants were tested with a simultaneity judgment (SJ) task in which they judged whether the video of their hand was synchronous or asynchronous with respect to their finger taps. The locations of the seen and the real hand were either different (Experiment 1) or aligned (Experiment 2). In both cases, the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) was uniformly shifted in the direction of the exposure lags while sensitivity to visual-motor asynchrony decreased with longer exposure delays. These findings demonstrate that the brain is quite flexible in adjusting the timing relation between a motor action and the otherwise naturalistic visual feedback that this action engenders