Interpretation and Social Explanation

In this article I focus on those aspects of Keith Dowding’s book that are most concerned with interpretive approaches to the study of politics. I argue that, in ways not adequately captured by Dowding’s descriptions, the historical study of political concepts tells us something about their historical political effects and for this reason has a distinct value for how we think about and study politics. Furthermore, I argue, concepts of and about politics, including the concepts of political science, cannot be fully separated from the political contexts of which they are a part. Concepts which function as generalisable explanations at one point in time can shape the thinking and behaviour of political actors and thus be very particular causes. A philosophy or method of political science unaware of or inattentive to this dimension of politics and political science is incomplete

El concepto de ideología en el Marx maduro

In the texts from the mature Marx, we find a theory of scientific method (in political economy) as a process of «succesive approximations». The departure of the investigation is not the experience, but a caotic representation (Vorstellung) of the totality. The point of departure of the knowledge process will be, for Marx, ideology. In Capital, and specially in the section devoted to the commodity fetishism, we’ll discover the lacanian consequences of the marxian approach.<br><br>En los textos del Marx maduro encontramos planteada una teoría del método científico (en economía política) entendido como proceso de «aproximaciones sucesivas». El punto de partida de la investigación no es la experiencia sensible, sino una representación (Vorstellung) caótica de la totalidad. El punto de partida del proceso de conocimiento es, para Marx, la ideología. En nuestra lectura del apartado del fetichismo de la mercancía en El capital descubriremos las resonancias lacanianas del planteamiento de Marx

In Defense Of Bad Infinity: A Fichtean Response To Hegel's Differenzschrift

Hegel's very first acknowledged publication was, among other things, an attack on Fichte. In 1801, Hegel was still laboring in almost complete obscurity, while Fichte was an international sensation, though already somewhat past the peak of his meteoric career. In the 1801 Differenzschrift, Hegel cut his teeth by criticizing Fichte's already widelycriticised Wissenschaftslehre, and by demonstrating that Schelling's philosophical system was not simply to be equated with it. Fichte himself never bothered to respond to Hegel's criticisms; indeed he never publicly acknowledged their existence. This was not because he was unconcerned with criticisms of his views; quite the contrary. But at the time he had bigger fish to fry. He responded to Jacobi's criticisms, and to Schelling's; he replied in great detail to critical questions raised by Reinhold, and with vituperative intensity to objections raised by skeptics and purportedly loyal Kantians. But Hegel's Differenzschrift was left without a Fichtean rebuttal. This is a pity, both because of the missed opportunity to illuminate by controversy central issues at stake in the post-Kantian period, but also because it made it easier for Hegel simply to reiterate his youthful criticism as if it were the last word. And reiterate it he did: in one form or another Hegel's early criticisms of Fichte reappear at every subsequent stage of his career: in the Phenomenology, in the Science of Logic, in the Encyclopaedia, as the final chapter in Hegel's History of Philosophy, and in countless other minor works and documents from the Nachlass and correspondence

Cultural relativism and the discourse of intercultural communication: aporias of praxis in the intercultural public sphere

The premise of much intercultural communication pedagogy and research is to educate people from different cultures towards open and transformative positions of mutual understanding and respect. This discourse in the instance of its articulation realises and sustains Intercultural Communication epistemologically – as an academic field of social enquiry, and judgementally – as one which locates itself on a moral terrain. By adopting an ethical stance towards difference, the discourse of intercultural communication finds itself caught in a series of aporias, or performative contradictions, where interculturalists are projected simultaneously into positions of cultural relativism on the one hand and ideological totalism on the other. Such aporias arise because the theoretical premises upon which the discourse relies are problematic. We trace these thematics to a politics of presence operating within the discourse of intercultural communication and links this to questions of judgement and truth in the intercultural public sphere. We propose that the politics of presence be set aside in favour of an intercultural praxis which is oriented to responsibility rather than to truth

Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies

Originally published in American Political Science Review, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR. Copyright American Political Science Association

Towards a critical theory of communication as renewal and update of Marxist humanism in the age of digital capitalism

This paper's task is to outline some foundations of a critical, Marxist-humanist theory of communication in the age of digital capitalism. It theorises the role of communication in society, communication and alienation, communication in social struggles, social struggles for democratic communication, the contradictions of digital capitalism, and struggles for digital socialist humanism. Marxist humanism is a counter-narrative, counter-theory, and counter-politics to neoliberalism, new authoritarianism, and postmodernism. A critical theory of communication can should draw on this intellectual tradition. Communication and work stand in a dialectical relationship. Communication mediates, organises and is the process of the production of sociality and therefore of the reproduction of society. Society and communication are in class and capitalist societies shaped by the antagonism between instrumental and co-operative reason. Authoritarianism and humanism are two basic, antagonistic modes of organisation of society and communication. Instrumental reason creates and universalises alienation. Digital capitalism is a dimension of contemporary society where digital technologies such as the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, tablets, robots, and AI-driven (“smart”) technologies mediate the accumulation of capital, influence, and reputation. A Marxist-humanist theory of communication aims to inform struggles for a good, commons-based, public Internet in a good, commons-based society that has a vivid, democratic public sphere

Is the Market a Sphere of Social Freedom?

In this paper I examine Axel Honneth's normative reconstruction of the market as a sphere of social freedom in his 2014 book, Freedom's Right. Honneth's position is complex: on the one hand, he acknowledges that modern capitalist societies do not realize social freedom; on the other hand, he insists that the promise of social freedom is implicit in the market sphere. In fact, the latter explains why modern subjects have seen capitalism as legitimate. I will reconstruct Honneth's conception of social freedom and investigate how it is realized in the sphere in which Honneth sees it most successfully at work, the sphere of interpersonal relations. I then move on to the sphere of the market economy and discuss two related problems of this view that stem from his interpretation of Hegel. Next, I consider Honneth's method of “normative reconstruction” and his reconstructions of the sphere of consumption and, finally, the labor market. My conclusion will be that market institutions cannot realize social freedom, and that this insight should orient the philosophical direction of critical social theory