L'effet de pensée inconsciente en matière de décisions complexes : étude des modérateurs et processus mnésiques sous-jacents

Recent research suggests that when faced with a choice between several alternatives described with a large number of attributes, people make better choices if they do not consciously ponder over the alternatives but rather perform a distraction task for a few minutes before choosing. The improvement of decision making after distraction has been interpreted as evidence that “unconscious thought” occurs during the distraction period. So far, over a hundred studies investigated this phenomenon. About half of them replicated the effect. The research reported here contributes to this debate on two grounds. First, it highlights three factors which moderate the quality of the decisions made after a period of conscious deliberation or distraction. Second, we used two dual-memory process paradigms to gain insight on the memory processes underlying each decision mode. The seven experiments showed that the efficiency of conscious deliberation is moderated by factors, such as the presentation material or the presentation format of the alternatives, which affect the retrieval of precise memories. The quality of decision made after distraction is moderated by factors, such as the difficulty of the distraction task or the presentation format of the alternatives, which affect the retrieval of gist memories. Together these studies suggest that conscious deliberation efficiency is dependent upon the availability of precise memories whereas when a distraction period improves decision making, it also enhances the retrieval of gist memories.Des recherches récentes suggèrent que, lors de décisions complexes, les individus font de meilleurs choix, non pas lorsqu’ils essayent d’évaluer les avantages et les inconvénients de chaque option, mais plutôt lorsqu’ils réalisent une tâche de distraction pendant quelques minutes avant de choisir. Cette amélioration de la prise de décision consécutive à la distraction a été interprétée comme une preuve de la mise en œuvre de la « pensée inconsciente » au cours de la période de distraction. À ce jour, une centaine d’études ont examiné ce phénomène. La moitié d’entre-elles l’a reproduit. Les travaux de cette thèse contribuent à ce débat de deux façons. Premièrement, nous avons identifié trois variables qui modèrent la qualité des décisions prises après une période de réflexion ou de distraction. Deuxièmement, nous avons utilisé deux paradigmes issus des modèles duels de mémoire pour examiner les processus mnésiques qui sous-tendent ces modes de décisions. Les sept expériences menées ont montré que l’efficacité de la réflexion est modulée par des variables, comme le matériel ou le format de présentation des options, qui ont un impact sur la récupération de souvenirs précis. La qualité des décisions prises après distraction est modulée par des variables, comme la complexité de la tâche de distraction ou encore le format de présentation des options, qui ont un impact sur la récupération de souvenirs « gist » qui sont vagues et catégoriels. Ces études suggèrent que l’accessibilité à des souvenirs précis détermine l’efficacité de nos réflexions conscientes tandis qu'une période de distraction, lorsqu'elle est utile à la décision, favorise la récupération de souvenirs gist

Distinguishing the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge in evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in liking of a conditioned stimulus (CS) subsequent to its repeated pairing with a valent stimulus (US). Two studies that bring new light on the highly debated question of the role of awareness in EC were conducted. We developed an innovative method motivated by higher order and integration theories of consciousness to distinguish between the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge about the pairings. On each trial of the awareness test, participants had to indicate the valence of the US associated with a given CS and to make a ‘structural knowledge attribution’ by reporting the basis of their response. Valence identification accuracy was used to evaluate knowledge while the knowledge attribution was used to measure the conscious status of knowledge. Memory attribution indicated conscious knowledge about the pairings while feeling-based and random attributions indicated unconscious knowledge. A meta-analysis of the two studies revealed that valence identification accuracy was above chance level for memory and feeling-based attributions but not for the random attribution. EC was found in the three attributions. While EC effect size was medium for the memory attribution it was small for feeling-based and random attributions. Moreover, Experiment 2 included a delayed test. EC was still present 24 h after the conditioning took place. The results obtained for memory and feeling-based attributions suggest that both conscious and unconscious knowledge may underlie EC. The results obtained for random attribution suggest that EC may also occur without any knowledge of US valence

The unconscious-thought effect in complex decision making : an examination of the moderators and underlying processes

Des recherches récentes suggèrent que, lors de décisions complexes, les individus font de meilleurs choix, non pas lorsqu’ils essayent d’évaluer les avantages et les inconvénients de chaque option, mais plutôt lorsqu’ils réalisent une tâche de distraction pendant quelques minutes avant de choisir. Cette amélioration de la prise de décision consécutive à la distraction a été interprétée comme une preuve de la mise en œuvre de la « pensée inconsciente » au cours de la période de distraction. À ce jour, une centaine d’études ont examiné ce phénomène. La moitié d’entre-elles l’a reproduit. Les travaux de cette thèse contribuent à ce débat de deux façons. Premièrement, nous avons identifié trois variables qui modèrent la qualité des décisions prises après une période de réflexion ou de distraction. Deuxièmement, nous avons utilisé deux paradigmes issus des modèles duels de mémoire pour examiner les processus mnésiques qui sous-tendent ces modes de décisions. Les sept expériences menées ont montré que l’efficacité de la réflexion est modulée par des variables, comme le matériel ou le format de présentation des options, qui ont un impact sur la récupération de souvenirs précis. La qualité des décisions prises après distraction est modulée par des variables, comme la complexité de la tâche de distraction ou encore le format de présentation des options, qui ont un impact sur la récupération de souvenirs « gist » qui sont vagues et catégoriels. Ces études suggèrent que l’accessibilité à des souvenirs précis détermine l’efficacité de nos réflexions conscientes tandis qu'une période de distraction, lorsqu'elle est utile à la décision, favorise la récupération de souvenirs gist.Recent research suggests that when faced with a choice between several alternatives described with a large number of attributes, people make better choices if they do not consciously ponder over the alternatives but rather perform a distraction task for a few minutes before choosing. The improvement of decision making after distraction has been interpreted as evidence that “unconscious thought” occurs during the distraction period. So far, over a hundred studies investigated this phenomenon. About half of them replicated the effect. The research reported here contributes to this debate on two grounds. First, it highlights three factors which moderate the quality of the decisions made after a period of conscious deliberation or distraction. Second, we used two dual-memory process paradigms to gain insight on the memory processes underlying each decision mode. The seven experiments showed that the efficiency of conscious deliberation is moderated by factors, such as the presentation material or the presentation format of the alternatives, which affect the retrieval of precise memories. The quality of decision made after distraction is moderated by factors, such as the difficulty of the distraction task or the presentation format of the alternatives, which affect the retrieval of gist memories. Together these studies suggest that conscious deliberation efficiency is dependent upon the availability of precise memories whereas when a distraction period improves decision making, it also enhances the retrieval of gist memories

Attentional refreshing moderates the word frequency effect in immediate and delayed recall tasks

International audienc

Reducing Age Differences in the Retrieval of Verbatim and Gist Representations: Encoding Manipulations

Aging causes changes in episodic memory. While the ability to remember the general idea or gist of past episodes is relatively preserved from the effects of aging, the ability to remember the verbatim details of these episodes declines. The aim of the present study was to examine whether age-related differences in the quality of episodic representations could be reduced by manipulations of information encoding. Two experiments were conducted with younger adults (N = 63, 18-27 years old) and older adults (N = 61, 54-81 years old) in which either the retrieval of gist representations of studied items was facilitated by presenting items that could be grouped within the same category (Experiment 1) or the retrieval of verbatim details of studied items was facilitated by presenting the same items repeatedly (Experiment 2). Both manipulations proved effective in increasing retrieval of either gist or verbatim representations in a recognition task in younger and older adults. Increasing gist retrieval improved correct recognition performance for both younger and older adults, but also led the latter to make more recognition errors. Increasing verbatim retrieval improved correct recognition performance for both younger and older adults, and the gain was greater for older adults. These findings support the notion that age-related changes in episodic memory can be explained by changes in representational specificity and suggest that simple encoding manipulations could improve episodic memory in older adults

Reducing age differences in the retrieval of verbatim and gist representations: Encoding manipulations

International audienceAging causes changes in episodic memory. While the ability to remember the general idea or gist of past episodes is relatively preserved from the effects of aging, the ability to remember the verbatim details of these episodes declines. The aim of the present study was to examine whether age-related differences in the quality of episodic representations could be reduced by manipulations of information encoding. Two experiments were conducted with younger adults (NExp.1 = 32, NExp.2 = 31, 18-27 years old) and older adults (NExp.1 = 31, NExp.2 = 30, 54-81 years old) in which either the retrieval of gist representations of studied items was facilitated by presenting items that could be grouped within the same category (Exp. 1) or the retrieval of verbatim details of studied items was facilitated by presenting the same items repeatedly (Exp. 2). Both manipulations proved effective in increasing retrieval of either gist or verbatim representations in a recognition task in younger and older adults. Increasing gist retrieval improved correct recognition performance for both younger and older adults, but also led the latter to make more recognition errors. Increasing verbatim retrieval improved correct recognition performance for both younger and older adults, and the gain was greater for older adults. These findings support the notion that age-related changes in episodic memory can be explained by changes in the specificity of representations and suggest that simple encoding manipulations could improve episodic memory in older adults.</div

Short-Term Phantom Recollection in 8–10-Year-Olds and Young Adults

International audienceIllusory conscious experience of the “presentation” of unstudied material, called phantom recollection, occurs at high levels in long-term episodic memory tests and underlies some forms of false memory. We report an experiment examining, for the first time, the presence of phantom recollection in a short-term working memory (WM) task in 8- to 10-year-old children and young adults. Participants studied lists of eight semantically related words and had to recognize them among unpresented distractors semantically related and unrelated to the studied words after a retention interval of a few seconds. Regardless of whether the retention interval was filled with a concurrent task that interfered with WM maintenance, the false recognition rate for related distractors was very high in both age groups, although it was higher in young adults (47%) than children (42%) and rivaled the rate of target acceptance. The conjoint recognition model of fuzzy-trace theory was used to examine memory representations underlying recognition responses. In young adults, phantom recollection underpinned half of the false memories. By contrast, in children, phantom recollection accounted for only 16% of them. These findings suggest that an increase in phantom recollection use may underlie the developmental increase in short-term false memory

False memory at short and long term.

International audienc

False memory at short and long term

False memories are well-established long-term memory (LTM) phenomena. Recent reports of false recognition at short term suggest that working memory (WM) could also give rise to false memories, supporting the unitary view of memory. Alternatively, we hypothesized that the emergence of false memories at short term depends on the impairment of WM maintenance, memory performance relying then on LTM