120 research outputs found

    Emergencia, causalidad y realismo

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    L'origen del concepte modern d'emergència es remunta a la meitat del segle xix, quan els filòsofs realistes es van començar a plantejar per primera vegada les profundes similituds que hi havia en els camps de la física i la química entorn de la qüestió de la causalitat. L'exemple clàssic de causalitat que ofereix la física és el d'una col·lisió entre dues molècules o altres objectes rígids en la qual l'efecte global és una simple suma. Però quan dues molècules interactuen químicament, emergeix un ens completament nou, com quan l'hidrogen i l'oxigen interactuen i formen l'aigua. Hi havia la creença que el fet que emergissin propietats i capacitats noves a partir d'una interacció causal tenia importants implicacions filosòfiques per a la naturalesa de l'explicació científica. Concretament, l'absència de la novetat en les interaccions físiques significava que l'explicació dels seus efectes es podia reduir a una deducció a partir de lleis o principis generals. Tanmateix, la síntesi de l'aigua sí que produeix una cosa nova, una cosa que emergeix a partir d'ens que interactuen com a causes. Això va portar alguns filòsofs a l'errònia conclusió que els efectes emergents no es poden explicar, o, cosa que és el mateix, que un efecte només serà emergent mentre no s'hagi trobat la llei de la qual es dedueix. Aquesta línia de pensament va passar a convertir-se, a començaments del segle xx, en una filosofia completament desenvolupada, una filosofia basada en la idea que l'emergència era intrínsecament inexplicable. Aquest article afirma que, encara que la primera onada de filòsofs emergentistes va aconseguir veure que el concepte d'emergència era una poderosa manera de bloquejar el reduccionisme i , per tant, d'atorgar a altres camps diferents de la física el respecte que es mereixien, es van equivocar pel que fa a la seva inexplicabilitat inherent: les propietats emergents d'un tot sorgeixen a partir de les interaccions causals entre les seves parts, interaccions que constitueixen un mecanisme explicatiu d'aquestes propietats.The origin of the modern concept of emergence can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century, when realist philosophers first began to ponder the deep dissimilarities between causality in the fields of physics and chemistry. The classic example of causality in physics is a collision between two molecules or other rigid objects in which the overall effect is a simple addition. However, when two molecules interact chemically, an entirely new entity may emerge, as when hydrogen and oxygen interact to form water. The fact that novel properties and capacities emerge from a causal interaction was believed to have important philosophical implications for the nature of scientific explanation. In particular, the absence of novelty in physical interactions meant that explaining their effects could be reduced to deduction from general principles or laws. However, the synthesis of water does produce something new, something that emerges from the interacting entities acting as causes. This led some philosophers to the erroneous conclusion that emergent effects could not be explained, or, what amounts to the same thing, that an effect is emergent only so long as a law from which it can be deduced has not been found. This line of thought went on to become a full-fledged philosophy in the early twentieth century, based on the idea that emergence was intrinsically inexplicable. This essay argues that while the first wave of emergentist philosophers correctly saw that the concept of emergence was a powerful way to block reductionism and, therefore, to give fields other than physics their due respect, they were wrong about its inherent inexplicability: the emergent properties of a whole arise from the causal interactions between its parts, and these interactions constitute an explanatory mechanism for those properties.El origen del concepto moderno de emergencia se remonta a mitad del siglo xix, cuando los filósofos realistas empezaron por primera vez a plantearse las profundas similitudes que existían en los campos de la física y la química en torno a la cuestión de la causalidad. El ejemplo clásico de causalidad que ofrece la física es el de una colisión entre dos moléculas u otros objetos rígidos en la que el efecto global es una simple suma. Pero cuando dos moléculas interactúan químicamente, emerge un ente completamente nuevo, como cuando el hidrógeno y el oxígeno interactúan y forman el agua. Se creía que el hecho de que emergieran propiedades y capacidades nuevas a partir de una interacción causal tenía importantes implicaciones filosóficas para la naturaleza de la explicación científica. En concreto, la ausencia de la novedad en las interacciones físicas significaba que la explicación de sus efectos podía reducirse a una deducción a partir de leyes o principios generales. Sin embargo, la síntesis del agua sí produce algo nuevo, algo que emerge a partir de entes que interactúan como causas. Esto condujo a algunos filósofos a la errónea conclusión de que los efectos emergentes no pueden explicarse, o, lo que es lo mismo, que un efecto sólo será emergente mientras no se haya encontrado la ley de la cual se deduce. Esta línea de pensamiento pasó a convertirse, a principios del siglo xx, en una filosofía completamente desarrollada, una filosofía basada en la idea de que la emergencia era intrínsecamente inexplicable. Este artículo sostiene que, aunque la primera ola de filósofos emergentistas acertó a ver que el concepto de emergencia era una poderosa manera de bloquear el reduccionismo y, por lo tanto, de otorgar a otros campos diferentes de la física el respeto que estos se merecían, se equivocaron acerca de su inherente inexplicabilidad: las propiedades emergentes de un todo surgen a partir de las interacciones causales entre sus partes, interacciones que constituyen un mecanismo explicativo de esas propiedades

    An "ethical moment" in data sharing

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    This study draws on interviews with forty-nine members of a biomedical research community in the UK that is involved in negotiating data sharing and access. During an interview, an interviewee used the words “ethical moment” to describe a confrontation between collaborators in relation to data sharing. In this article, I use this as a lens for thinking about relations between “the conceptual and the empirical” in a way that allows both analyst and actor to challenge the status quo and consider other ethical possibilities. Drawing on actor network theory (ANT), I approach “the empirical” using the concepts of controversy and ontological uncertainty as methodological tools to tackle the problem of ethics. I suggest that these concepts also provide a bridge for understanding the ontological structure of the virtual and the actual, as described in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. While other science and technology studies scholars have sought to draw on Deleuze, this article addresses the integration of ethics and empirical research. It arises as a critical reaction to existing treatments of this problem as found in empirical ethics, especially in the sociology of bioethics, and indirectly in ANT texts

    Transformational responses to climate change: beyond a systems perspective of social change in mitigation and adaptation

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    There is a growing imperative for responses to climate change to go beyond incremental adjustments, aiming instead for society-wide transformation. In this context, sociotechnical (ST) transitions and social–ecological (SE) resilience are two prominent normative agendas. Reviewing these literatures reveals how both share a complex-systems epistemology with inherent limitations, often producing managerial governance recommendations and foregrounding material over social drivers of change. Further interdisciplinary dialogue with social theory is essential if these frameworks are to become more theoretically robust and capable of informing effective, let alone transformational, climate change governance. To illustrate this potential, ideas from Deleuze and Guattari's political writing as well as other approaches that utilize the notion social fields (as opposed to sociosystems) are combined to more fully theorize the origins and enactment of social change. First, the logic of systems is replaced with the contingency of assemblages to reveal how pluralism, not elitism, can produce more ambitious and politicized visions of the future. In particular, this view encourages us to see social and ecological tensions as opportunities for thinking and acting differently rather than as mere technical problems to be solved. Secondly, the setting of social fields is introduced to situate and explain the power of ideas and the role of agency in times of uncertainty. The potential of such insights is already visible in some strands of climate change mitigation and adaptation research, but more needs to be done to advance this field and to bring it into dialogue with the mainstream systems based literature

    Remembering the City: Changing Conceptions of Community in Urban China

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    Adopting complimentary integrative research methodologies, this article examines changing conceptions of community amongst urban residents within the city of Suzhou, Jiangsu province, China. Whilst the impact of urban transformation from a macro-perspective, deploying large scale quantitative measures to capture resident perceptions within China’s mega-cities, has been addressed, there is something of a scholarly lacuna that adopts a micro-perspective to explore the nation-state’s smaller developing cities. Thus, through local residents’ past memories, ‘everyday’ experiences of (former) urban communities, and reflections on a particular way of life, we focus upon the subjective/affective meanings and memories attached to processes of urban change. We place emphasis on the manner in which residents make sense of socio-spatial transformations in relation to the (re)making of community, local social interaction, and a sense of belonging. Discussion centres on the affective and embodied notions of a particular way of life in (older) communities; sensory performances that were deemed difficult to replicate within modern development zones and the broader field of contemporary Chinese society

    Bionic bodies, posthuman violence and the disembodied criminal subject

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    This article examines how the so-called disembodied criminal subject is given structure and form through the law of homicide and assault. By analysing how the body is materialised through the criminal law’s enactment of death and injury, this article suggests that the biological positioning of these harms of violence as uncontroversial, natural, and universal conditions of being ‘human’ cannot fully appreciate what makes violence wrongful for us, as embodied entities. Absent a theory of the body, and a consideration of corporeality, the criminal law risks marginalising, or altogether eliding, experiences of violence that do not align with its paradigmatic vision of what bodies can and must do when suffering its effects. Here I consider how the bionic body disrupts the criminal law’s understanding of human violence by being a body that is both organic and inorganic, and capable of experiencing and performing violence in unexpected ways. I propose that a criminal law that is more receptive to the changing, technologically mediated conditions of human existence would be one that takes the corporeal dimensions of violence more seriously and, as an extension of this, adopts an embodied, embedded, and relational understanding of human vulnerability to violence

    The mirage of the metropolis: city imaging in the age of digital chorography

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    Even as cities evolved geographically, the basis of city imaging (as codified by Kevin Lynch) remained relatively stable for over half a century. More recently, digitally driven transformations in urban life challenge the continued relevance of established city-imaging paradigms. Although digital navigation and mapping devices are readily at hand to neutralize any disorienting predicaments, the ability to image cognitively the wider urban environment remains integral to the construction of a meaningful sense of place. Towards the objective of reconciling city imaging with the place-making challenges of the contemporary metropolis, this paper explores the potential for innovating modes of urban mapping and representation. Specifically, the digital re-envisioning of the historical mapping practice of ‘chorography’ is positioned within Fredric Jameson’s challenge for a new aesthetic of cognitive mapping that enables the situational representation of the individual within the vaster totality. In doing so, the paper contributes to the wider adaptation of urban discourse to digitally propelled shifts in urban life

    Philosophy and simulation: the emergence of synthetic reason

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    Emergència, causalitat i realisme

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    L'origen del concepte modern d'emergència es remunta a la meitat del segle xix, quan els filòsofs realistes es van començar a plantejar per primera vegada les profundes similituds que hi havia en els camps de la física i la química entorn de la qüestió de la causalitat. L'exemple clàssic de causalitat que ofereix la física és el d'una col·lisió entre dues molècules o altres objectes rígids en la qual l'efecte global és una simple suma. Però quan dues molècules interactuen químicament, emergeix un ens completament nou, com quan l'hidrogen i l'oxigen interactuen i formen l'aigua. Hi havia la creença que el fet que emergissin propietats i capacitats noves a partir d'una interacció causal tenia importants implicacions filosòfiques per a la naturalesa de l'explicació científica. Concretament, l'absència de la novetat en les interaccions físiques significava que l'explicació dels seus efectes es podia reduir a una deducció a partir de lleis o principis generals. Tanmateix, la síntesi de l'aigua sí que produeix una cosa nova, una cosa que emergeix a partir d'ens que interactuen com a causes. Això va portar alguns filòsofs a l'errònia conclusió que els efectes emergents no es poden explicar, o, cosa que és el mateix, que un efecte només serà emergent mentre no s'hagi trobat la llei de la qual es dedueix. Aquesta línia de pensament va passar a convertir-se, a començaments del segle xx, en una filosofia completament desenvolupada, una filosofia basada en la idea que l'emergència era intrínsecament inexplicable. Aquest article afirma que, encara que la primera onada de filòsofs emergentistes va aconseguir veure que el concepte d'emergència era una poderosa manera de bloquejar el reduccionisme i , per tant, d'atorgar a altres camps diferents de la física el respecte que es mereixien, es van equivocar pel que fa a la seva inexplicabilitat inherent: les propietats emergents d'un tot sorgeixen a partir de les interaccions causals entre les seves parts, interaccions que constitueixen un mecanisme explicatiu d'aquestes propietats

    A New Philosophy of Society. : Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity.

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    Londonv, 142 p, 20 cm
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