Informal Credit Transactions of Micro?Credit Borrowers in Rural Bangladesh

summary Through a detailed study of informal credit transactions in a village in northern Bangladesh, the research empirically establishes that increased access to credit from micro?finance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh has been unable to substitute for the higher?cost informal credit sources. The reason for this is that MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations in household conditions. Most MFIs put all households on a treadmill of continuously increasing loan size and insist on a fixed repayment schedule. While an easily accessible loan may seem attractive to a cash?starved poor household, its resource profile and the wider economic and policy environment impose limits on the marginal return to capital. Credit escalation under these circumstances increases the likelihood of cross?financing to sustain the MFI's line of credit. Target?group households, in particular, resort to extensive cross?financing of their loans. It is argued that cross?financing can have a deleterious effect on the household economy in the long?run if households continuously manage loan repayment without having the ability to repay. It is suggested that MFI lending technology be redesigned to be sensitive to household initial conditions. Only then can MFIs seriously compete with the informal lenders

Mis?Targeting by the Grameen Bank: A Possible Explanation

summary There has been an increased emphasis on the targeting efficiency of micro?credit programmes. In general, recent studies find a much higher incidence of mis?targeting (around 25?30 per cent) than previous studies (3?5 per cent). Household survey data from four villages in Madhupur Thana is used to test the hypothesis that rapid progressive lending in the study area since 1992 has affected the selection and participation incentives and worsened both the incidence and severity of mis?targeting. The implication of this finding, if found to hold across other settings, is that loan size and the pace of progressive lending can be used as an indirect targeting instrument. In broader terms, experiments with contract design and service diversification could be useful in covering and benefiting a broader spectrum of the poor

Finance for the poor: from microcredit to microfinancial services,

Abstract: This paper reviews the achievements of the 'microfinance revolution', through reference to the now extensive literature. It finds that there are many opportunities to improve and innovate. To illustrate this finding, the paper concentrates on examining what we need to know to design and deliver better financial products to the poor, especially the poorest. It argues that financial services for the poor are essentially a matter of helping the poor turn their savings into sums large enough to satisfy a wide range of business, consumption, personal, social and asset-building needs. The range of such 'swaps' should be wide enough to cater for short, medium and long-term needs, and they must be delivered in ways which are convenient, appropriate, safe and affordable. Providing poor people with effective financial services helps them deal with vulnerability and can thereby help reduce poverty. However, the relationship is driven by complex livelihood imperatives and is not simple. Microfinance is not a magic sky-hook that reaches down to pluck the poor out of poverty. It can, however, be a strategically vital platform that the poor can use to raise their own prospects for an escape from poverty

Long-term strategies to control COVID-19 in low and middle-income countries: an options overview of community-based, non-pharmacological interventions

Abstract: In low and middle-income countries (LMICs), strict social distancing measures (e.g., nationwide lockdown) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are unsustainable in the long-term due to knock-on socioeconomic and psychological effects. However, an optimal epidemiology-focused strategy for ‘safe-reopening’ (i.e., balancing between the economic and health consequences) remain unclear, particularly given the suboptimal disease surveillance and diagnostic infrastructure in these settings. As the lockdown is now being relaxed in many LMICs, in this paper, we have (1) conducted an epidemiology-based “options appraisal” of various available non-pharmacological intervention options that can be employed to safely lift the lockdowns (namely, sustained mitigation, zonal lockdown and rolling lockdown strategies), and (2) propose suitable application, pre-requisites, and inherent limitations for each measure. Among these, a sustained mitigation-only approach (adopted in many high-income countries) may not be feasible in most LMIC settings given the absence of nationwide population surveillance, generalised testing, contact tracing and critical care infrastructure needed to tackle the likely resurgence of infections. By contrast, zonal or local lockdowns may be suitable for some countries where systematic identification of new outbreak clusters in real-time would be feasible. This requires a generalised testing and surveillance structure, and a well-thought out (and executed) zone management plan. Finally, an intermittent, rolling lockdown strategy has recently been suggested by the World Health Organization as a potential strategy to get the epidemic under control in some LMI settings, where generalised mitigation and zonal containment is unfeasible. This strategy, however, needs to be carefully considered for economic costs and necessary supply chain reforms. In conclusion, while we propose three community-based, non-pharmacological options for LMICs, a suitable measure should be context-specific and based on: (1) epidemiological considerations, (2) social and economic costs, (3) existing health systems capabilities and (4) future-proof plans to implement and sustain the strategy

Population and fertility by age and sex for 195 countries and territories, 1950–2017: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017

Background: Population estimates underpin demographic and epidemiological research and are used to track progress on numerous international indicators of health and development. To date, internationally available estimates of population and fertility, although useful, have not been produced with transparent and replicable methods and do not use standardised estimates of mortality. We present single-calendar year and single-year of age estimates of fertility and population by sex with standardised and replicable methods. Methods: We estimated population in 195 locations by single year of age and single calendar year from 1950 to 2017 with standardised and replicable methods. We based the estimates on the demographic balancing equation, with inputs of fertility, mortality, population, and migration data. Fertility data came from 7817 location-years of vital registration data, 429 surveys reporting complete birth histories, and 977 surveys and censuses reporting summary birth histories. We estimated age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs; the annual number of livebirths to women of a specified age group per 1000 women in that age group) by use of spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression and used the ASFRs to estimate total fertility rates (TFRs; the average number of children a woman would bear if she survived through the end of the reproductive age span [age 10–54 years] and experienced at each age a particular set of ASFRs observed in the year of interest). Because of sparse data, fertility at ages 10–14 years and 50–54 years was estimated from data on fertility in women aged 15–19 years and 45–49 years, through use of linear regression. Age-specific mortality data came from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2017 estimates. Data on population came from 1257 censuses and 761 population registry location-years and were adjusted for underenumeration and age misreporting with standard demographic methods. Migration was estimated with the GBD Bayesian demographic balancing model, after incorporating information about refugee migration into the model prior. Final population estimates used the cohort-component method of population projection, with inputs of fertility, mortality, and migration data. Population uncertainty was estimated by use of out-of-sample predictive validity testing. With these data, we estimated the trends in population by age and sex and in fertility by age between 1950 and 2017 in 195 countries and territories. Findings: From 1950 to 2017, TFRs decreased by 49\ub74% (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 46\ub74–52\ub70). The TFR decreased from 4\ub77 livebirths (4\ub75–4\ub79) to 2\ub74 livebirths (2\ub72–2\ub75), and the ASFR of mothers aged 10–19 years decreased from 37 livebirths (34–40) to 22 livebirths (19–24) per 1000 women. Despite reductions in the TFR, the global population has been increasing by an average of 83\ub78 million people per year since 1985. The global population increased by 197\ub72% (193\ub73–200\ub78) since 1950, from 2\ub76 billion (2\ub75–2\ub76) to 7\ub76 billion (7\ub74–7\ub79) people in 2017; much of this increase was in the proportion of the global population in south Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The global annual rate of population growth increased between 1950 and 1964, when it peaked at 2\ub70%; this rate then remained nearly constant until 1970 and then decreased to 1\ub71% in 2017. Population growth rates in the southeast Asia, east Asia, and Oceania GBD super-region decreased from 2\ub75% in 1963 to 0\ub77% in 2017, whereas in sub-Saharan Africa, population growth rates were almost at the highest reported levels ever in 2017, when they were at 2\ub77%. The global average age increased from 26\ub76 years in 1950 to 32\ub71 years in 2017, and the proportion of the population that is of working age (age 15–64 years) increased from 59\ub79% to 65\ub73%. At the national level, the TFR decreased in all countries and territories between 1950 and 2017; in 2017, TFRs ranged from a low of 1\ub70 livebirths (95% UI 0\ub79–1\ub72) in Cyprus to a high of 7\ub71 livebirths (6\ub78–7\ub74) in Niger. The TFR under age 25 years (TFU25; number of livebirths expected by age 25 years for a hypothetical woman who survived the age group and was exposed to current ASFRs) in 2017 ranged from 0\ub708 livebirths (0\ub707–0\ub709) in South Korea to 2\ub74 livebirths (2\ub72–2\ub76) in Niger, and the TFR over age 30 years (TFO30; number of livebirths expected for a hypothetical woman ageing from 30 to 54 years who survived the age group and was exposed to current ASFRs) ranged from a low of 0\ub73 livebirths (0\ub73–0\ub74) in Puerto Rico to a high of 3\ub71 livebirths (3\ub70–3\ub72) in Niger. TFO30 was higher than TFU25 in 145 countries and territories in 2017. 33 countries had a negative population growth rate from 2010 to 2017, most of which were located in central, eastern, and western Europe, whereas population growth rates of more than 2\ub70% were seen in 33 of 46 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2017, less than 65% of the national population was of working age in 12 of 34 high-income countries, and less than 50% of the national population was of working age in Mali, Chad, and Niger. Interpretation: Population trends create demographic dividends and headwinds (ie, economic benefits and detriments) that affect national economies and determine national planning needs. Although TFRs are decreasing, the global population continues to grow as mortality declines, with diverse patterns at the national level and across age groups. To our knowledge, this is the first study to provide transparent and replicable estimates of population and fertility, which can be used to inform decision making and to monitor progress. Funding: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation