Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both, the spontaneous emergence of punishment, as well as its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation either through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or through the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. Presented results indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Correlation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity Fails to Confer an Evolutionary Advantage: Phase Transitions to Elementary Strategies

Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments

Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Evolutionary game dynamics in phenotype space

Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of space to evolutionary game dynamics: phenotype space. The population is well-mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but the behavioral strategies depend on distance in phenotype space. Individuals might behave differently towards those who look similar or dissimilar. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes. We study the `phenotypic space walk' of populations. We present analytic calculations that bring together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. As a particular example, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in phenotype space. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors: for a one-dimensional phenotype space and large population size the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c=1+2/sqrt{3}. We derive the fundamental condition for any evolutionary game and explore higher dimensional phenotype spaces.Comment: version 2: minor changes; equivalent to final published versio

Anion-Dependent Construction of Two Hexanuclear 3D-4F Complexes with a Flexible Schiff Base Ligand

Two hexanuclear 3d-4f Ni-Eu and Cu-Eu complexes [Eu4Ni2L2(OAc)(12)(EtOH)(2)] (1) and [Eu4Cu2L2(OAc)(12)]center dot 2H(2)O (2) are reported which are formed from the salen type Schiff-base ligand H2L (H2L = N,N'-bis(3-methoxysalicylidene)butane-1,4-diamine). In both complexes, four Eu3+ cations are bridged by eight OAc- groups and the chain is terminated at each end by two ML (M = Ni and Cu) units. The structures of 1 and 2 were determined by single crystal X-ray crystallographic studies and the luminescence properties of the free ligand and metal complexes in solution were measured.HHMI Undergraduate Science Education Award 52005907National Science Foundation CHE-0629136, CHE-0741973, CHE-0847763Welch Foundation F-1631, F-816Hong Kong Baptist University FRG/06-07/II-16Hong Kong Research Grants Council HKBU 202407Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (PAPD)Open Foundation of Jiangsu Province Key Laboratory of Fine Petrochemical Technology KF1005UT-CNM and UT-AustinChemistr

If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation

Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Reports [related work available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1205.0541

Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite

While empirical evidence highlights the importance of punishment for cooperation in collective action, it remains disputed how responsible sanctions targeted predominantly at uncooperative subjects can evolve. Punishment is costly; in order to spread it typically requires local interactions, voluntary participation, or rewards. Moreover, theory and experiments indicate that some subjects abuse sanctioning opportunities by engaging in antisocial punishment (which harms cooperators), spiteful acts (harming everyone) or revenge (as a response to being punished). These arguments have led to the conclusion that punishment is maladaptive. Here, we use evolutionary game theory to show that this conclusion is premature: If interactions are non-anonymous, cooperation and punishment evolve even if initially rare, and sanctions are directed towards non-cooperators only. Thus, our willingness to punish free riders is ultimately a selfish decision rather than an altruistic act; punishment serves as a warning, showing that one is not willing to accept unfair treatments

Quercetin prevents progression of disease in elastase/LPS-exposed mice by negatively regulating MMP expression

Abstract Background Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) is characterized by chronic bronchitis, emphysema and irreversible airflow limitation. These changes are thought to be due to oxidative stress and an imbalance of proteases and antiproteases. Quercetin, a plant flavonoid, is a potent antioxidant and anti-inflammatory agent. We hypothesized that quercetin reduces lung inflammation and improves lung function in elastase/lipopolysaccharide (LPS)-exposed mice which show typical features of COPD, including airways inflammation, goblet cell metaplasia, and emphysema. Methods Mice treated with elastase and LPS once a week for 4 weeks were subsequently administered 0.5 mg of quercetin dihydrate or 50% propylene glycol (vehicle) by gavage for 10 days. Lungs were examined for elastance, oxidative stress, inflammation, and matrix metalloproteinase (MMP) activity. Effects of quercetin on MMP transcription and activity were examined in LPS-exposed murine macrophages. Results Quercetin-treated, elastase/LPS-exposed mice showed improved elastic recoil and decreased alveolar chord length compared to vehicle-treated controls. Quercetin-treated mice showed decreased levels of thiobarbituric acid reactive substances, a measure of lipid peroxidation caused by oxidative stress. Quercetin also reduced lung inflammation, goblet cell metaplasia, and mRNA expression of pro-inflammatory cytokines and muc5AC. Quercetin treatment decreased the expression and activity of MMP9 and MMP12 in vivo and in vitro, while increasing expression of the histone deacetylase Sirt-1 and suppressing MMP promoter H4 acetylation. Finally, co-treatment with the Sirt-1 inhibitor sirtinol blocked the effects of quercetin on the lung phenotype. Conclusions Quercetin prevents progression of emphysema in elastase/LPS-treated mice by reducing oxidative stress, lung inflammation and expression of MMP9 and MMP12.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78260/1/1465-9921-11-131.xmlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78260/2/1465-9921-11-131.pdfPeer Reviewe

A synergy of costly punishment and commitment in cooperation dilemmas

To ensure cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, individuals may require prior commitments from others, subject to compensations when agreements to cooperate are violated. Alternatively, individuals may prefer to behave reactively, without arranging prior commitments, by simply punishing those who misbehave. These two mechanisms have been shown to promote the emergence of cooperation, yet are complementary in the way they aim to promote cooperation. Although both mechanisms have their specific limitations, either one of them can overcome the problems of the other. On one hand, costly punishment requires an excessive effect-to-cost ratio to be successful, and this ratio can be significantly reduced by arranging a prior commitment with a more limited compensation. On the other hand, commitment-proposing strategies can be suppressed by free-riding strategies that commit only when someone else is paying the cost to arrange the deal, whom in turn can be dealt with more effectively by reactive punishers. Using methods from Evolutionary Game Theory, we present here an analytical model showing that there is a wide range of settings for which the combined strategy outperforms either strategy by itself, leading to significantly higher levels of cooperation. Interestingly, the improvement is most significant when the cost of arranging commitments is sufficiently high and the penalty reaches a certain threshold, thereby overcoming the weaknesses of both mechanisms.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe