79 research outputs found
Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system
Unconditional security proofs of various quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols are built on idealized assumptions. One key assumption is: the sender
(Alice) can prepare the required quantum states without errors. However, such
an assumption may be violated in a practical QKD system. In this paper, we
experimentally demonstrate a technically feasible "intercept-and-resend" attack
that exploits such a security loophole in a commercial "plug & play" QKD
system. The resulting quantum bit error rate is 19.7%, which is below the
proven secure bound of 20.0% for the BB84 protocol. The attack we utilize is
the phase-remapping attack (C.-H. F. Fung, et al., Phys. Rev. A, 75, 32314,
2007) proposed by our group.Comment: 16 pages, 6 figure
Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light
Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can
be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a
nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key
distribution system containing such detectors. In this regime, all single
photon detectors in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous
illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain
detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies polarization (or other
parameter used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such
that the target detector stops receiving light while the other detector(s)
continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon
sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single
click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can do a successful
intercept-resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, 3 different
models of passively-quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I
have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real
quantum key distribution system under attack. Control parameters and side
effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically
possible.Comment: Experimental results from a third detector model added. Minor
corrections and edits made. 11 pages, 10 figure
Quantum Eavesdropping without Interception: An Attack Exploiting the Dead Time of Single Photon Detectors
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the
eavesdropper can utilize technical imperfections of the actual implementation.
Here we describe and experimentally demonstrate a very simple but highly
effective attack which even does not need to intercept the quantum channel at
all. Only by exploiting the dead time effect of single photon detectors the
eavesdropper is able to gain (asymptotically) full information about the
generated keys without being detected by state-of-the-art QKD protocols. In our
experiment, the eavesdropper inferred up to 98.8% of the key correctly, without
increasing the bit error rate between Alice and Bob significantly. Yet, we find
an evenly simple and effective countermeasure to inhibit this and similar
attacks
Discovery of the Binary Pulsar PSR B1259-63 in Very-High-Energy Gamma Rays around Periastron with H.E.S.S
We report the discovery of very-high-energy (VHE) gamma-ray emission of the
binary system PSR B1259-63/SS 2883 of a radio pulsar orbiting a massive,
luminous Be star in a highly eccentric orbit. The observations around the 2004
periastron passage of the pulsar were performed with the four 13 m Cherenkov
telescopes of the H.E.S.S. experiment, recently installed in Namibia and in
full operation since December 2003. Between February and June 2004, a gamma-ray
signal from the binary system was detected with a total significance above 13
sigma. The flux was found to vary significantly on timescales of days which
makes PSR B1259-63 the first variable galactic source of VHE gamma-rays
observed so far. Strong emission signals were observed in pre- and
post-periastron phases with a flux minimum around periastron, followed by a
gradual flux decrease in the months after. The measured time-averaged energy
spectrum above a mean threshold energy of 380 GeV can be fitted by a simple
power law F_0(E/1 TeV)^-Gamma with a photon index Gamma =
2.7+-0.2_stat+-0.2_sys and flux normalisation F_0 = (1.3+-0.1_stat+-0.3_sys)
10^-12 TeV^-1 cm^-2 s^-1. This detection of VHE gamma-rays provides unambiguous
evidence for particle acceleration to multi-TeV energies in the binary system.
In combination with coeval observations of the X-ray synchrotron emission by
the RXTE and INTEGRAL instruments, and assuming the VHE gamma-ray emission to
be produced by the inverse Compton mechanism, the magnetic field strength can
be directly estimated to be of the order of 1 G.Comment: 10 pages, 8 figures, accepted in Astronomy and Astrophysics on 2 June
2005, replace: document unchanged, replaced author field in astro-ph entry -
authors are all members of the H.E.S.S. collaboration and three additional
authors (99+3, see document
Information theoretic security by the laws of classical physics
It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with
enhanced Johnson-noise and a Kirchhoff-loop-i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise
(KLJN) protocol-for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic
security levels superior to those of a quantum key distribution, including a
natural immunity against a man-in-the-middle attack. This issue is becoming
particularly timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum
communicators, as shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. This
presentation first briefly surveys the KLJN system and then discusses related,
essential questions such as: what are perfect and imperfect security
characteristics of key distribution, and how can these two types of securities
be unconditional (or information theoretical)? Finally the presentation
contains a live demonstration.Comment: Featured in MIT Technology Review
http://www.technologyreview.com/view/428202/quantum-cryptography-outperformed-by-classical/
; Plenary talk at the 5th IEEE Workshop on Soft Computing Applications,
August 22-24, 2012, (SOFA 2012). Typos correcte
Heavy Metal Tolerance in Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia is an aerobic, non-fermentative Gram-negative bacterium widespread in the environment. S. maltophilia Sm777 exhibits innate resistance to multiple antimicrobial agents. Furthermore, this bacterium tolerates high levels (0.1 to 50 mM) of various toxic metals, such as Cd, Pb, Co, Zn, Hg, Ag, selenite, tellurite and uranyl. S. maltophilia Sm777 was able to grow in the presence of 50 mM selenite and 25 mM tellurite and to reduce them to elemental selenium (Se0) and tellurium (Te0) respectively. Transmission electron microscopy and energy dispersive X-ray analysis showed cytoplasmic nanometer-sized electron-dense Se0 granules and Te0 crystals. Moreover, this bacterium can withstand up to 2 mM CdCl2 and accumulate this metal up to 4% of its biomass. The analysis of soluble thiols in response to ten different metals showed eightfold increase of the intracellular pool of cysteine only in response to cadmium. Measurements by Cd K-edge EXAFS spectroscopy indicated the formation of Cd-S clusters in strain Sm777. Cysteine is likely to be involved in Cd tolerance and in CdS-clusters formation. Our data suggest that besides high tolerance to antibiotics by efflux mechanisms, S. maltophilia Sm777 has developed at least two different mechanisms to overcome metal toxicity, reduction of oxyanions to non-toxic elemental ions and detoxification of Cd into CdS
Determining the duration of Aphis glycines (Hemiptera: Aphididae) induced susceptibility effect in soybean
Evolutionary community ecology of plant-associated arthropods in terrestrial ecosystems
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