Beyond-brand effect of television food advertisements on food choice in children: The effects of weight status

Copyright © The Authors 2007.Objective - To investigate the effect of television food advertising on children’s food intake, specifically whether childhood obesity is related to a greater susceptibility to food promotion. Design - The study was a within-subject, counterbalanced design. The children were tested on two occasions separated by two weeks. One condition involved the children viewing food advertisements followed by a cartoon, in the other condition the children viewed non-food adverts followed by the same cartoon. Following the cartoon, their food intake and choice was assessed in a standard paradigm. Setting - The study was conducted in Liverpool, UK. Subjects - Fifty-nine children (32 male, 27 female) aged 9–11 years were recruited from a UK school to participate in the study. Thirty-three children were normal-weight (NW), 15 overweight (OW) and 11 obese (OB). Results - Exposure to food adverts produced substantial and significant increases in energy intake in all children (P < 0·001). The increase in intake was largest in the obese children (P = 0·04). All children increased their consumption of high-fat and/or sweet energy-dense snacks in response to the adverts (P < 0·001). In the food advert condition, total intake and the intake of these specific snack items correlated with the children’s modified age- and gender-specific body mass index score. Conclusions - These data suggest that obese and overweight children are indeed more responsive to food promotion, which specifically stimulates the intake of energy-dense snacks.University of Liverpoo

Modifying memory for a museum tour in older adults: reactivation-related updating that enhances and distorts memory is reduced in ageing

Memory reactivation, the activation of a latent memory trace when we are reminded of a past experience, strengthens memory but can also contribute to distortions if new information present during reactivation is integrated with existing memory. In a previous study in young adults (St. Jacques & Schacter, 2013; Psychological Science) we found that the quality of memory reactivation, manipulated using the principle of encoding specificity and indexed by recollection ratings, modulated subsequent true and false memories for events experienced during a museum tour. Here, we examined age-related changes in the quality of memory reactivation on subsequent memory. Young and older adults reactivated memories for museum stops immediately followed by the presentation of a novel lure photo from an alternate tour version (i.e., reactivation plus new information). There was an increase in subsequent true memories for reactivated targets and for subsequent false memories for lures that followed reactivated targets, when compared to baseline target and lure photos. However, the influence of reactivation on subsequent memories was reduced in older adults. These data reveal that aging alters reactivation-related updating processes that allow memories to be strengthened and updated with new information- consequently reducing memory distortions in older compared to young adults

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects

Positivity bias in past and future episodic thinking: Relationship with anxiety, depression, and retrieval-induced forgetting

Positivity biases in autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking are considered important in mental wellbeing and are reduced in anxiety and depression. The inhibitory processes underlying retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) have been proposed to contribute to these biases. This investigation found reduced positivity in past and future thinking to be associated with reduced memory specificity alongside greater levels of anxiety, depression, and rumination. Most notably, however, RIF was found to significantly predict memory valence. This indicates that RIF may be important in maintaining such biases, facilitating the forgetting of negative memories when a positive item is actively retrieved

Self, memory, and imagining the future in a case of psychogenic amnesia

We report a case of psychogenic amnesia and examine the relationships between autobiographical memory impairment, the self, and ability to imagine the future. Case study JH, a 60 year old male, experienced a 6 year period of pervasive psychogenic amnesia covering all life events from childhood to the age of 53. JH was tested during his amnesic period and again following hypnotherapy and the recovery of his memories. JH’s amnesia corresponded with deficits in self-knowledge and imagining the future. Results are discussed with reference to models of self and memory and processes involving remembering and imagining

Neural Correlates of True Memory, False Memory, and Deception

We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether neural activity can differentiate between true memory, false memory, and deception. Subjects heard a series of semantically related words and were later asked to make a recognition judgment of old words, semantically related nonstudied words (lures for false recognition), and unrelated new words. They were also asked to make a deceptive response to half of the old and unrelated new words. There were 3 main findings. First, consistent with the notion that executive function supports deception, 2 types of deception (pretending to know and pretending not to know) recruited prefrontal activity. Second, consistent with the sensory reactivation hypothesis, the difference between true recognition and false recognition was found in the left temporoparietal regions probably engaged in the encoding of auditorily presented words. Third, the left prefrontal cortex was activated during pretending to know relative to correct rejection and false recognition, whereas the right anterior hippocampus was activated during false recognition relative to correct rejection and pretending to know. These findings indicate that fMRI can detect the difference in brain activity between deception and false memory despite the fact that subjects respond with “I know” to novel events in both processes

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis

Deese-roediger-McDermott paradigm: Effect of previous recall and type of memory task

Pretendeu-se averiguar se a activação dos itens críticos no paradigma de Deese-Roediger-McDermott também ocorreria numa tarefa de completamento. Para analisar a contaminação explícita explorámos a existência de resultados dissociados em função da manipulação do nível de processamento. Na tarefa de completamento, a primação semântica foi estatisticamente superior à primação directa. A ausência do efeito do nível de processamento demonstra que o teste foi de memória implícita. Também avaliámos o impacto de uma tarefa de evocação numa tarefa de memória posterior. Verificámos que a evocação prévia anulou o efeito do nível de processamento na tarefa de reconhecimento. Na tarefa de completamento de inícios de palavras, o incremento de inícios de palavras completados com associados só foi expressivo quando as palavras foram codificadas superficialmente.This study aimed to verifj whether lhe activation ofcritical items in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm ofproducing false memories could also occur in the word stem completion task. The finding that lhe levei ofprocessing did not seem to have any effect on the word stem completion task supported lhe conclusion that the stem completion task was in fact an irnplicit memory test. The impact of a previous recali in a followng memory task was also evaluated. The results indicated that lhe previous recall inhibited the effect ofthe processing levei in lhe recognition task. In the word stem completion task lhe increase ofstems completed with associates was only relevam when words were encoded superficialiy.(undefined

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard