1,006 research outputs found
Pierre Broué: Trotzki. Eine politische Biographie. Bd. I: Vom ukrainischen Bauernsohn zum Verbannten Stalins. Bd. U: Der Kampf gegen Stalinismus und Faschismus. Köln:: Neuer ISP Verlag 2003, 1292 S.
Jörn Leonhard / Ulrike von Hirschhausen: Empires und Nationalstaaten im 19. Jahrhundert (= Freiburg Institute of Advanced Study, Rote Reihe, Bd. 1), Göttingen:: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2009, 128 S.
John Adamson (Hrsg.): The English Civil War. Conflict and Contexts, 1640–49 (= Problems in Focus Series), Palgrave Macmillan:: Basingstoke, 2009, 344 S.
Hans Joachim Meyer: „Ich bin eigentlich nach England gegangen, um deutsch schreiben zu lernen.“ Nachdenken mit Georg Christoph Lichtenberg über den Wert des Fremden (= Reden am Lichtenberg-Kolleg, Bd. 1), Göttingen:: Wallstein Verlag 2010, 48 S.
Anka Muhlstein: Die Gefahren der Ehe. Elisabeth von England und Maria Stuart. Aus dem Französischen von Ulrich Kunzmann, Frankfurt a.M.:: Insel Verlag 2005, 352 S. u. 16 S. Abb.
Ann Hughes: Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, 482 S.; Roland Hutton: Debates in Stuart History, Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrace Mcmilan 2004, 239 S.: Allan I. Macinnes: The British Revolution, 1629-1660 (= British Studies Series), Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrace Mcmillan 2005, 335 S.
Geoff Andrews: Endgames and New Times. The Final Years of British Communism 1964-1991, London:: Lawrence and Wishart 2004, 264 S.
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete contract framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default strategically. The optimal debt contract gives creditors claims that are jointly inconsistent in case of default. Bankruptcy rules, therefore, are a necessary part of the overall financing contract, to make claims consisitent and to prevent a value reducing run for the assets of the firm. Furthermore, a too unequal allocation of security rights is not optimal, and creditors are not treated asymmetrically in default under the optimal contract.bankruptcy; debt structure; contracts
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