Hypervelocity impact survivability experiments for carbonaceous impactors

We performed a series of hypervelocity impact experiments using carbon-bearing impactors (diamond, graphite, fullerenes, phthalic acid crystals, and Murchison meteorite) into Al plate at velocities between 4.2 and 6.1 km/s. These tests were made to do the following: (1) determine the survivability of carbon forms and organize molecules in low hypervelocity impact; (2) characterize carbonaceous impactor residues; and (3) determine whether or not fullerenes could form from carbonaceous impactors, under our experimental conditions, or survive as impactors. An analytical protocol of field emission SEM imagery, SEM-EDX, laser Raman spectroscopy, single and 2-stage laser mass spectrometry, and laser induced fluorescence (LIF) found the following: (1) diamonds did not survive impact at 4.8 km/s, but were transformed into various forms of disordered graphite; (2) intact, well-ordered graphite impactors did survive impact at 5.9 km/sec, but were only found in the crater bottom centers; the degree of impact-induced disorder in the graphite increases outward (walls, rims, ejecta); (3) phthalic acid crystals were destroyed on impact (at 4.2 km/s, although a large proportion of phthalic acid molecules did survive impact); (4) fullerenes did not form as products of carbonaceous impactors (5.9 - 6.1 km/s, fullerene impactor molecules mostly survived impact at 5.9 km/s; and (5) two Murchison meteorite samples (launched at 4.8 and 5.9 km/s) show preservation of some higher mass polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) compared with the non-impacted sample. Each impactor type shows unique impactor residue morphologies produced at a given impact velocity. An expanded methodology is presented to announce relatively new analytical techniques together with innovative modifications to other methods that can be used to characterize small impact residues in LDEF craters, in addition to other acquired extraterrestrial samples

Creating a Culture for Leading and Performing in the Extreme

By early 2008 in the Iraq War, the positive effects of the U.S. surge had started to become visible in the streets of Baghdad, as shops began to reopen and people again filled the streets.1 Despite these outwardly positive appearances, a sinister undercurrent flowed through the population. Rumors ran rampant in Iraqi military and government circles that the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr\u27s Mahdi Army was about to launch an offensive against the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a fellow Shiite, because of Sadr\u27s unhappiness with his waning political influence. In the neighborhood of Zafaraniyah, in Baghdad\u27s southeastern quadrant, Sadrist fighters started to make trouble. The unit responsible for Zafaraniyah had been trained by its commander to act with a great deal of restraint in order to avoid unnecessary civilian deaths. This was in keeping with guidance issued by General David Petraeus, commanding general of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. The success or failure of Petraeus\u27 strategy of limiting civilian deaths depended solely on the support of the Iraqi people and their perceptions of American and Iraqi forces. What Petraeus was attempting to do on a large scale was to change the organizational culture of both forces. The events of February and March 2008 would put Petraeus\u27 vision and strategy to the test and offer evidence of what happens when old ways of doing business compete with the new. On the second night of what would come to be called the uprising, a fight erupted between a dozen young Sadrist fighters and a platoon of American and Iraqi soldiers in the most troubled neighborhood in Zafaraniyah. The engaged platoon was well trained, had the situation well in hand, and acted with restraint. What unfolded was a textbook example of the tendency of higher headquarters to use available technological innovations regardless of the logic (or illogic) of doing so and in contravention of a subordinate commander\u27s wishes. The battalion watch officer, or battle captain, ran from the tactical operations center (TOC) to the battalion commander\u27s office to notify him of the firefight. The battle captain explained that the brigade headquarters wanted to drop a SOD-pound bomb from an F/A-18 Super Hornet onto the house where it was believed that twelve or so fighters had gone to make a last stand. The brigade TOC was watching the house from several miles away via a live camera feed from an aerial drone. Rushing to the TOC the battalion commander attempted to call off the strike. For God\u27s sake-our job here is to protect the Iraqi people! It\u27s the first sentence in our f--g mission statement! And you want to drop a damned bomb on someone\u27s house?! Every soldier in the TOC broke eye contact. They knew they were wrong. Their error: they got caught up in viewing the action as nothing more than a video game. They failed to assess whether dropping a bomb on an Iraqi house was consistent with the commander\u27s intent to exercise restraint and minimize civilian casualties. Within minutes, the battalion commander was on his way to the scene of the fighting to assess the situation. Almost immediately, he heard the boom of a Hellfire missile striking its target to the east of the commander\u27s location, followed by the staccato report of a string of 30mm shells from the helicopter\u27s main gun. Several minutes later, the commander found the platoon. The two small units and the Iraqi soldiers began fighting their way deep into the neighborhood to find the target house. It appeared that the missile strike had taken the spirit out of the enemy fighters, and friendly forces surrounded the house. They found surprisingly little damage. Fortunately, the Apache helicopter had fired a newly developed missile, specifically designed to limit destruction in urban terrain. Nonetheless, there was still collateral damage to other houses and pools of blood on the ground, along with bloody Iraqi National Police uniforms

Creating a Culture for Leading and Performing in the Extreme

By early 2008 in the Iraq War, the positive effects of the U.S. surge had started to become visible in the streets of Baghdad, as shops began to reopen and people again filled the streets.1 Despite these outwardly positive appearances, a sinister undercurrent flowed through the population. Rumors ran rampant in Iraqi military and government circles that the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr\u27s Mahdi Army was about to launch an offensive against the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a fellow Shiite, because of Sadr\u27s unhappiness with his waning political influence. In the neighborhood of Zafaraniyah, in Baghdad\u27s southeastern quadrant, Sadrist fighters started to make trouble. The unit responsible for Zafaraniyah had been trained by its commander to act with a great deal of restraint in order to avoid unnecessary civilian deaths. This was in keeping with guidance issued by General David Petraeus, commanding general of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. The success or failure of Petraeus\u27 strategy of limiting civilian deaths depended solely on the support of the Iraqi people and their perceptions of American and Iraqi forces. What Petraeus was attempting to do on a large scale was to change the organizational culture of both forces. The events of February and March 2008 would put Petraeus\u27 vision and strategy to the test and offer evidence of what happens when old ways of doing business compete with the new. On the second night of what would come to be called the uprising, a fight erupted between a dozen young Sadrist fighters and a platoon of American and Iraqi soldiers in the most troubled neighborhood in Zafaraniyah. The engaged platoon was well trained, had the situation well in hand, and acted with restraint. What unfolded was a textbook example of the tendency of higher headquarters to use available technological innovations regardless of the logic (or illogic) of doing so and in contravention of a subordinate commander\u27s wishes. The battalion watch officer, or battle captain, ran from the tactical operations center (TOC) to the battalion commander\u27s office to notify him of the firefight. The battle captain explained that the brigade headquarters wanted to drop a SOD-pound bomb from an F/A-18 Super Hornet onto the house where it was believed that twelve or so fighters had gone to make a last stand. The brigade TOC was watching the house from several miles away via a live camera feed from an aerial drone. Rushing to the TOC the battalion commander attempted to call off the strike. For God\u27s sake-our job here is to protect the Iraqi people! It\u27s the first sentence in our f--g mission statement! And you want to drop a damned bomb on someone\u27s house?! Every soldier in the TOC broke eye contact. They knew they were wrong. Their error: they got caught up in viewing the action as nothing more than a video game. They failed to assess whether dropping a bomb on an Iraqi house was consistent with the commander\u27s intent to exercise restraint and minimize civilian casualties. Within minutes, the battalion commander was on his way to the scene of the fighting to assess the situation. Almost immediately, he heard the boom of a Hellfire missile striking its target to the east of the commander\u27s location, followed by the staccato report of a string of 30mm shells from the helicopter\u27s main gun. Several minutes later, the commander found the platoon. The two small units and the Iraqi soldiers began fighting their way deep into the neighborhood to find the target house. It appeared that the missile strike had taken the spirit out of the enemy fighters, and friendly forces surrounded the house. They found surprisingly little damage. Fortunately, the Apache helicopter had fired a newly developed missile, specifically designed to limit destruction in urban terrain. Nonetheless, there was still collateral damage to other houses and pools of blood on the ground, along with bloody Iraqi National Police uniforms

Concluding comments.

New directions for teaching and learning; no. 68;

Soil Application Effects of Metarhizium anisopliae on Japanese Beetle (Coleoptera: Scarabaeidae) Behavior and Survival in Turfgrass Microcosms

The effect of mycelial and conidial formulations of the insect pathogenic fungi, M. anisopliae, on the survival and behavior Japanese beetle, Popillia japonica Newman, larvae and ovipositing adults in turfgrass-soil microcosms was explored. Changes in Japanese beetle grub feeding site selection on sod roots, movement patterns, and survival in Metarhizium anisopliae inoculated soil were examined in greenhouse studies and through the use of radiographic analysis in the laboratory. Our studies indicate that the application of mycelial particles in soil affected the behavior of both larval and adult Japanese beetles. Japanese beetle grubs avoided soil that contained high concentrations of pathogen for up to 20 d after application. Conversely, the incorporation of mycelial particles increased oviposition in both choice and no choice studies. Our findings on scarab response to inundative applications of M. anisopliae mycelium may help explain some of the inconsistency in results that often occur when fungal pathogens are used to control insects in the fiel

Student-Athletes with Learning Disabilities: Unique Problems, Unique Solutions

This paper explored the issues/acing student-athletes with learning disabilities and their academic counselors. Understanding the nature of learning disabilities and their effects can enhance the counselor's ability to address the complex needs of the student-athlete with a learning disability. The increasing numbers of college student-athletes who have diagnosed learning disabilities demands notice. This paper provided an explanation of the problems of diagnosis and treatment. Suggestions for academic counselors were provided, as well

Capacity building for evidence-based decision making in local health departments: Scaling up an effective training approach

Abstract Background There are few studies describing how to scale up effective capacity-building approaches for public health practitioners. This study tested local-level evidence-based decision making (EBDM) capacity-building efforts in four U.S. states (Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington) with a quasi-experimental design. Methods Partners within the four states delivered a previously established Evidence-Based Public Health (EBPH) training curriculum to local health department (LHD) staff. They worked with the research team to modify the curriculum with local data and examples while remaining attentive to course fidelity. Pre- and post-assessments of course participants (n = 82) and an external control group (n = 214) measured importance, availability (i.e., how available a skill is when needed, either within the skillset of the respondent or among others in the agency), and gaps in ten EBDM competencies. Simple and multiple linear regression models assessed the differences between pre- and post-assessment scores. Course participants also assessed the impact of the course on their work. Results Course participants reported greater increases in the availability, and decreases in the gaps, in EBDM competencies at post-test, relative to the control group. In adjusted models, significant differences (p < 0.05) were found in ‘action planning,’ ‘evaluation design,’ ‘communicating research to policymakers,’ ‘quantifying issues (using descriptive epidemiology),’ and ‘economic evaluation.’ Nearly 45% of participants indicated that EBDM increased within their agency since the training. Course benefits included becoming better leaders and making scientifically informed decisions. Conclusions This study demonstrates the potential for improving EBDM capacity among LHD practitioners using a train-the-trainer approach involving diverse partners. This approach allowed for local tailoring of strategies and extended the reach of the EBPH course.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109528/1/13012_2014_Article_124.pd

Association of Adverse Pregnancy Outcomes With Hypertension 2 to 7 Years Postpartum

Background Identifying pregnancy-associated risk factors before the development of major cardiovascular disease events could provide opportunities for prevention. The objective of this study was to determine the association between outcomes in first pregnancies and subsequent cardiovascular health. Methods and Results The Nulliparous Pregnancy Outcomes Study Monitoring Mothers-to-be Heart Health Study is a prospective observational cohort that followed 4484 women 2 to 7 years (mean 3.2 years) after their first pregnancy. Adverse pregnancy outcomes (defined as hypertensive disorders of pregnancy, small-for-gestational-age birth, preterm birth, and stillbirth) were identified prospectively in 1017 of the women (22.7%) during this pregnancy. The primary outcome was incident hypertension (HTN). Women without adverse pregnancy outcomes served as controls. Risk ratios (RR) and 95% CIs were adjusted for age, smoking, body mass index, insurance type, and race/ethnicity at enrollment during pregnancy. The overall incidence of HTN was 5.4% (95% CI 4.7% to 6.1%). Women with adverse pregnancy outcomes had higher adjusted risk of HTN at follow-up compared with controls (RR 2.4, 95% CI 1.8-3.1). The association held for individual adverse pregnancy outcomes: any hypertensive disorders of pregnancy (RR 2.7, 95% CI 2.0-3.6), preeclampsia (RR 2.8, 95% CI 2.0-4.0), and preterm birth (RR 2.7, 95% CI 1.9-3.8). Women who had an indicated preterm birth and hypertensive disorders of pregnancy had the highest risk of HTN (RR 4.3, 95% CI 2.7-6.7). Conclusions Several pregnancy complications in the first pregnancy are associated with development of HTN 2 to 7 years later. Preventive care for women should include a detailed pregnancy history to aid in counseling about HTN risk