Impact of land administration programs on agricultural productivity and rural development: existing evidence, challenges and new approaches

Investment in land administration projects is often considered key for agricultural productivity and rural development in developing countries. But the evidence on such interventions is remarkably mixed. This paper reviews the literature and discusses a number of challenges related to the analysis of the impacts of land administration programs, focusing on developing countries where the starting position is one of land administration systems based on the Napoleonic code, with existing individual rights that may be imperfect and insecure. We examine a set of conceptual and methodological challenges including : 1) a conceptual challenge related to the need to unbundle property rights and to establish the plausible causal chain for land administration interventions; 2) the existence of other binding constraints on productivity, implying the need to consider heterogeneities in policy impacts and the complementarity between property rights and other productive interventions; 3) the need to account for spillovers of land interventions on non-targeted households; and 4) methodological challenges related to the causal identification of the impacts of such interventions

Observation of the Production of Three Massive Gauge Bosons at root s=13 TeV

The first observation is reported of the combined production of three massive gauge bosons (VVV with V = W, Z) in proton-proton collisions at a center-of-mass energy of 13 TeV. The analysis is based on a data sample recorded by the CMS experiment at the CERN LHC corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 137 fb(-1). The searches for individualWWW, WWZ, WZZ, and ZZZ production are performed in final states with three, four, five, and six leptons (electrons or muons), or with two same-sign leptons plus one or two jets. The observed (expected) significance of the combinedVVV production signal is 5.7 (5.9) standard deviations and the corresponding measured cross section relative to the standard model prediction is 1.02(-0.23)(+0.26). The significances of the individual WWW and WWZ production are 3.3 and 3.4 standard deviations, respectively. Measured production cross sections for the individual triboson processes are also reported

Search for a light pseudoscalar Higgs boson in the boosted mu mu tau tau final state in proton-proton collisions at root s=13 TeV

A search for a light pseudoscalar Higgs boson (a) decaying from the 125 GeV (or a heavier) scalar Higgs boson (H) is performed using the 2016 LHC proton-proton collision data at root s = 13 TeV, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 35.9 fb(-1), collected by the CMS experiment. The analysis considers gluon fusion and vector boson fusion production of the H, followed by the decay H -> aa -> mu mu tau tau, and considers pseudoscalar masses in the range 3.6 aa -> mu mu tau tau, down to 1.5 (2.0)x10(-4) for m(H) = 125 (300) GeV. Model-dependent limits on B(H -> aa) are set within the context of two Higgs doublets plus singlet models, with the most stringent results obtained for Type-III models. These results extend current LHC searches for heavier a bosons that decay to resolved lepton pairs and provide the first such bounds for an H boson with a mass above 125 GeV.Peer reviewe

Effect of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor and angiotensin receptor blocker initiation on organ support-free days in patients hospitalized with COVID-19

IMPORTANCE Overactivation of the renin-angiotensin system (RAS) may contribute to poor clinical outcomes in patients with COVID-19. Objective To determine whether angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB) initiation improves outcomes in patients hospitalized for COVID-19. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In an ongoing, adaptive platform randomized clinical trial, 721 critically ill and 58 non–critically ill hospitalized adults were randomized to receive an RAS inhibitor or control between March 16, 2021, and February 25, 2022, at 69 sites in 7 countries (final follow-up on June 1, 2022). INTERVENTIONS Patients were randomized to receive open-label initiation of an ACE inhibitor (n = 257), ARB (n = 248), ARB in combination with DMX-200 (a chemokine receptor-2 inhibitor; n = 10), or no RAS inhibitor (control; n = 264) for up to 10 days. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was organ support–free days, a composite of hospital survival and days alive without cardiovascular or respiratory organ support through 21 days. The primary analysis was a bayesian cumulative logistic model. Odds ratios (ORs) greater than 1 represent improved outcomes. RESULTS On February 25, 2022, enrollment was discontinued due to safety concerns. Among 679 critically ill patients with available primary outcome data, the median age was 56 years and 239 participants (35.2%) were women. Median (IQR) organ support–free days among critically ill patients was 10 (–1 to 16) in the ACE inhibitor group (n = 231), 8 (–1 to 17) in the ARB group (n = 217), and 12 (0 to 17) in the control group (n = 231) (median adjusted odds ratios of 0.77 [95% bayesian credible interval, 0.58-1.06] for improvement for ACE inhibitor and 0.76 [95% credible interval, 0.56-1.05] for ARB compared with control). The posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitors and ARBs worsened organ support–free days compared with control were 94.9% and 95.4%, respectively. Hospital survival occurred in 166 of 231 critically ill participants (71.9%) in the ACE inhibitor group, 152 of 217 (70.0%) in the ARB group, and 182 of 231 (78.8%) in the control group (posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitor and ARB worsened hospital survival compared with control were 95.3% and 98.1%, respectively). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE In this trial, among critically ill adults with COVID-19, initiation of an ACE inhibitor or ARB did not improve, and likely worsened, clinical outcomes. TRIAL REGISTRATION ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT0273570

Réduire la corruption dans le secteur réglementé des infrastructures

L’éthique est, indubitablement, la pierre angulaire de l’action publique. Son enracinement dans la conscience et la pratique des agents publics conditionne le respect et la confiance que les citoyens accordent à leur administration.Quels que soient le niveau d’instruction et de développement des peuples ou leur culture administrative et politique, l’exigence d’une gestion publique rigoureuse, soucieuse du bon usage de l’impôt et de l’intérêt général, se répand dans le monde en accompagnement de la globalisation de l’information et de la transparence accrue qu’elle implique.C’est ainsi que l’éthique, en tant que concept, tend à se diffuser et à être plus fortement visible dans les agendas politiques. Mais sa mise en œuvre au quotidien demeure difficile. La conciliation entre bonnes intentions, cadre législatif et pratique effective est au centre du présent ouvrage, issu des 12e Rencontres internationales de la gestion publique. Il confronte les résultats de recherches scientifiques sur la nature, les causes et les techniques d’éradication de la corruption, et les témoignages de praticiens issus d’administrations d’État et d’organisations internationales sur les stratégies globales et sectorielles de prévention et de lutte contre ce fléau. Une attention particulière est portée aux marchés publics, qui constituent autant une source de difficultés qu’un élément de solution.Le présent ouvrage est issu des 12e Rencontres internationales de la gestion publique organisées le 12 juin 2013 sur le thème « L'éthique de la gestion publique ». De nombreux intervenants, venus de différents pays, ont apporté leur témoignage et leur contribution, dont l’on retrouve ici l’essentiel. La publication de cet ouvrage se donne pour but de mieux faire connaître l’état des réflexions et des démarches en cours dans les administrations

La politique anti-corruption dans la réglementation et les marchés : le rôle des acteurs internationaux

Chapitre 5International audienceCorruption is a major problem when governments regulate industries and procure goods and services. Most regulated industries make large, costly investments and sign long maintenance contracts. Many also deal with politically sensitive sectors subject to price controls and/ or creative tariff structures. Procurement contracts often have a large quality component that is difficult to measure and that can deteriorate under non- competitive bidding. Together, these factors create opportunities for large and costly forms of corruption. International organizations are increasingly recognizing corruption as a problem that undermines goals in infrastructure sectors. However, the role of these organizations is unclear. Most of the theoretical literature on anticorruption policy assumes a benevolent domestic government managing a corruptible agent. In such contexts, it is not immediately clear why international actors should get involved. What’s more if the domestic government is nonbenevolent, the government will resist the initiatives of international actors. This chapter is a first attempt to systematically characterize and describe the role of international actors in promoting anti- corruption policy in regulation and procurement. Drawing upon a variety of economic theories of corruption in these sectors, I analyze how international actors may play a role, develop specific policy applications, and consider empirical evidence. This chapter builds on the framework set out in Estache and Wren- Lewis (2011) that surveys economic theories of anti- corruption in regulation. That article considers how these theories have been applied and the evidence for- or-against the theoretical predictions. The chapter also draws on analyses of survey data on: anti- corruption policy in procurement by Piga (2011), privatization by Auriol and Straub (2011) and regulation by Boehm (2007). Each of these works focuses on anti- corruption policy implemented domestically, reflecting the lack of scholarship on the role of international actors in this area. My main contribution is, therefore, to consider theories of anti- corruption in light of the properties of international organizations. Thus, my objective is to systematically define ways that international organizations might be able to reduce corruption in regulation and procurement. I simultaneously highlight areas where international actors may in fact harm anti- corruption efforts. A deeper understanding of the negative consequences of international involvement in anti- corruption programs provides a useful framework for policy and highlights where further research might be useful. Section I begins by outlining the main economic theories of corruption in regulation and procurement. Three broad theoretical approaches are identified based on: (1) interest- groups, (2) information, and (3) cost- benefit analysis. Section II considers the role of international actors, with a special focus on what they can bring to the table: (1) greater resources and technology, (2) a different set of priorities, and (3) additional actors. The effect of each of these three properties on corruption is analyzed with respect to the three theoretical approaches. The chapter concludes with general lessons and the way forward.Ce chapitre est une première tentative pour caractériser systématiquement et décrire le rôle des acteurs internationaux dans la promotion de la politique anti-corruption dans la réglementation et les marchés. S'appuyant sur une variété de théories économiques de la corruption dans ces secteurs, l'auteur analyse comment les acteurs internationaux peuvent jouer un rôle, de développer des applications de politiques spécifiques et d'envisager des preuves empiriques

Essais sur la construction et les conséquences de la confiance

A large share of important economicinteractions take place in a non-simultaneous fashion– i.e. one party takes an action in the expectation thatanother actor will behave as promised in the future.Such transactions occur between individuals, firms,and states. For these transactions to be undertaken,participants must believe that the counterparty willbehave as promised – i.e. they need trust. The centralquestion running through my work is “how shouldpolicy respond to a lack of trust?” Part of the answerto this question is clearly “build more trust”, andhence an important sub-theme of my work isexamining which policies may be conducive to trustbuilding. In many circumstances, however, there arefundamental constraints on the extent to whichparties may trust one another. In these cases therelevant question therefore becomes “how can policymitigate the negative consequences of lack of trust?Une grande partie des interactionséconomiques importantes ont lieu de manière nonsimultanée, c'est-à-dire qu'une partie entreprendune action dans l'espoir qu'un autre acteur secomportera comme promis dans le futur. Cestransactions ont lieu entre des individus, desentreprises et des États. Pour que ces transactionssoient entreprises, les participants doivent croire quela contrepartie se comportera comme promis - c'està-dire qu'ils ont besoin de confiance. La questioncentrale qui traverse mes travaux est la suivante :"Comment les politiques doivent-elles répondre à unmanque de confiance ?".Une partie de la réponse à cette question estclairement "construire plus de confiance", et doncun sous-thème important de mon travail consiste àexaminer quelles politiques peuvent être propicesà la construction de la confiance. Dans denombreuses circonstances, cependant, il existe descontraintes fondamentales sur la mesure danslaquelle les parties peuvent se faire confiance. Dansces cas, la question pertinente devient donc"comment les politiques peuvent-elles atténuer lesconséquences négatives du manque de confiance?"

Essais sur la construction et les conséquences de la confiance

A large share of important economicinteractions take place in a non-simultaneous fashion– i.e. one party takes an action in the expectation thatanother actor will behave as promised in the future.Such transactions occur between individuals, firms,and states. For these transactions to be undertaken,participants must believe that the counterparty willbehave as promised – i.e. they need trust. The centralquestion running through my work is “how shouldpolicy respond to a lack of trust?” Part of the answerto this question is clearly “build more trust”, andhence an important sub-theme of my work isexamining which policies may be conducive to trustbuilding. In many circumstances, however, there arefundamental constraints on the extent to whichparties may trust one another. In these cases therelevant question therefore becomes “how can policymitigate the negative consequences of lack of trust?Une grande partie des interactionséconomiques importantes ont lieu de manière nonsimultanée, c'est-à-dire qu'une partie entreprendune action dans l'espoir qu'un autre acteur secomportera comme promis dans le futur. Cestransactions ont lieu entre des individus, desentreprises et des États. Pour que ces transactionssoient entreprises, les participants doivent croire quela contrepartie se comportera comme promis - c'està-dire qu'ils ont besoin de confiance. La questioncentrale qui traverse mes travaux est la suivante :"Comment les politiques doivent-elles répondre à unmanque de confiance ?".Une partie de la réponse à cette question estclairement "construire plus de confiance", et doncun sous-thème important de mon travail consiste àexaminer quelles politiques peuvent être propicesà la construction de la confiance. Dans denombreuses circonstances, cependant, il existe descontraintes fondamentales sur la mesure danslaquelle les parties peuvent se faire confiance. Dansces cas, la question pertinente devient donc"comment les politiques peuvent-elles atténuer lesconséquences négatives du manque de confiance?"