Personhood, consciousness, and god : how to be a proper pantheist

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Implicit and explicit body representations

Several forms of perception require that sensory information be referenced to representations of the size and shape of the body. This requirement is especially acute in somatosensation in which the main receptor surface (i.e., the skin) is itself coextensive with the body. In this paper I will review recent research investigating the body representations underlying somatosensory information processing, including abilities such as tactile localisation, tactile size perception, and position sense. These representations show remarkably large and stereotyped distortions of represented body size and shape. Intriguingly, these distortions appear to mirror distortions characteristic of somatosensory maps, though in attenuated form. In contrast, when asked to make overt judgments about perceived body form, participants are generally quite accurate. This pattern of results suggests that higher-level somatosensory processing relies on a class of implicit body representation, distinct from the conscious body image. I discuss the implications of these results for understanding the nature of body representation and the factors which influence it

Blink and shrink: The effect of the attentional blink on spatial processing.

The detection or discrimination of the second of 2 targets in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task is often temporarily impaired - a phenomenon termed the attentional blink. This study demonstrated that the attentional blink also affects localization performance. Spatial cues pointed out the possible target positions in a subsequent visual search display. When cues were presented inside an attentional blink (as induced by an RSVP task), the observers' capacity to use them was reduced. This effect was not due to attention being highly focused, to general task switching costs, or to complete unawareness of the cues. Instead, the blink induced a systematic localization bias toward the fovea, reflecting what appears to be spatial compression

Sensory Attenuation Assessed by Sensory Evoked Potentials in Functional Movement Disorders.

BACKGROUND: Functional (psychogenic) movement disorders (FMD) have features associated with voluntary movement (e.g. distractibility) but patients report movements to be out of their control. One explanation for this phenomenon is that sense of agency for movement is impaired. The phenomenon of reduction in the intensity of sensory experience when movement is self-generated and a reduction in sensory evoked potentials (SEPs) amplitude at the onset of self-paced movement (sensory attenuation) have been linked to sense of agency for movement. METHODS: We compared amplitude of SEPs from median nerve stimulation at rest and at the onset of a self-paced movement of the thumb in 17 patients with FMD and 17 healthy controls. RESULTS: Patients showed lack of attenuation of SEPs at the onset of movement compared to reduction in amplitude of SEPs in controls. FMD patients had significantly different ratios of movement onset to rest SEPs than did healthy controls at each electrode: 0.79 in healthy controls and 1.35 in patients at F3 (t = -4.22, p<0.001), 0.78 in healthy controls and 1.12 at patients C3 (t = -3.15, p = 0.004) and 0.77 in healthy controls and 1.05 at patients P3 (t = -2.88, p = 0.007). CONCLUSIONS: Patients with FMD have reduced sensory attenuation as measured by SEPs at onset of self-paced movement. This finding can be plausibly linked to impairment of sense of agency for movement in these patients

Amygdala circuitry mediating reversible and bidirectional control of anxiety

Anxiety—a sustained state of heightened apprehension in the absence of immediate threat—becomes severely debilitating in disease states. Anxiety disorders represent the most common of psychiatric diseases (28% lifetime prevalence) and contribute to the aetiology of major depression and substance abuse. Although it has been proposed that the amygdala, a brain region important for emotional processing, has a role in anxiety, the neural mechanisms that control anxiety remain unclear. Here we explore the neural circuits underlying anxiety-related behaviours by using optogenetics with two-photon microscopy, anxiety assays in freely moving mice, and electrophysiology. With the capability of optogenetics to control not only cell types but also specific connections between cells, we observed that temporally precise optogenetic stimulation of basolateral amygdala (BLA) terminals in the central nucleus of the amygdala (CeA)—achieved by viral transduction of the BLA with a codon-optimized channelrhodopsin followed by restricted illumination in the downstream CeA—exerted an acute, reversible anxiolytic effect. Conversely, selective optogenetic inhibition of the same projection with a third-generation halorhodopsin (eNpHR3.0) increased anxiety-related behaviours. Importantly, these effects were not observed with direct optogenetic control of BLA somata, possibly owing to recruitment of antagonistic downstream structures. Together, these results implicate specific BLA–CeA projections as critical circuit elements for acute anxiety control in the mammalian brain, and demonstrate the importance of optogenetically targeting defined projections, beyond simply targeting cell types, in the study of circuit function relevant to neuropsychiatric disease

A morphological study of retinal changes in unilateral amblyopia using optical coherence tomography image segmentation.

OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this study was to evaluate the possible structural changes of the macula in patients with unilateral amblyopia using optical coherence tomography (OCT) image segmentation. PATIENTS AND METHODS: 38 consecutive patients (16 male; mean age 32.4+/-17.6 years; range 6-67 years) with unilateral amblyopia were involved in this study. OCT examinations were performed with a time-domain OCT device, and a custom-built OCT image analysis software (OCTRIMA) was used for OCT image segmentation. The axial length (AL) was measured by a LenStar LS 900 device. Macular layer thickness, AL and manifest spherical equivalent refraction (MRSE) of the amblyopic eye were compared to that of the fellow eye. We studied if the type of amblyopia (strabismus without anisometropia, anisometropia without strabismus, strabismus with anisometropia) had any influence on macular layer thickness values. RESULTS: There was significant difference between the amblyopic and fellow eyes in MRSE and AL in all subgroups. Comparing the amblyopic and fellow eyes, we found a statistically significant difference only in the thickness of the outer nuclear layer in the central region using linear mixed model analysis keeping AL and age under control (p = 0.032). There was no significant difference in interocular difference in the thickness of any macular layers between the subgroups with one-way between-groups ANCOVA while statistically controlling for interocular difference in AL and age. CONCLUSIONS: According to our results there are subtle changes in amblyopic eyes affecting the outer nuclear layer of the fovea suggesting the possible involvement of the photoreceptors. However, further studies are warranted to support this hypothesis

Seeing without Seeing? Degraded Conscious Vision in a Blindsight Patient

Blindsight patients, whose primary visual cortex is lesioned, exhibit preserved ability to discriminate visual stimuli presented in their “blind” field, yet report no visual awareness hereof. Blindsight is generally studied in experimental investigations of single patients, as very few patients have been given this “diagnosis”. In our single case study of patient GR, we ask whether blindsight is best described as unconscious vision, or rather as conscious, yet severely degraded vision. In experiment 1 and 2, we successfully replicate the typical findings of previous studies on blindsight. The third experiment, however, suggests that GR's ability to discriminate amongst visual stimuli does not reflect unconscious vision, but rather degraded, yet conscious vision. As our finding results from using a method for obtaining subjective reports that has not previously used in blindsight studies (but validated in studies of healthy subjects and other patients with brain injury), our results call for a reconsideration of blindsight, and, arguably also of many previous studies of unconscious perception in healthy subjects