Liking but devaluing animals: emotional and deliberative paths to speciesism

We explore whether priming emotion versus deliberation affects speciesism—the tendency to prioritize certain individuals over others on the basis of their species-membership (three main and two supplementary studies; four pre-registered; N = 3,288). We find that the tendency to prioritize humans over animals (anthropocentric speciesism) decreases when participants were asked to think emotionally compared to deliberately. In contrast, the tendency to prioritize dogs over other animals (pet speciesism) increases when participants were asked to think emotionally compared to deliberately. We hypothesize that, emotionally, people like animals in general, and dogs in particular; however, deliberatively, people attribute higher moral status to humans than animals, and roughly equal status to dogs, chimpanzees, elephants and pigs. In support of this explanation, participants tended to discriminate between animals based on likability when thinking emotionally and based on moral status when thinking deliberately. These findings shed light on the psychological underpinnings of speciesism

The psychology of existential risk: Moral judgments about human extinction

This is the final version. Available on open access from Nature Research via the DOI in this recordData and materials availability: Reports of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, and all data, analysis code, and experimental materials for all studies are available for download at: https://osf.io/pd9ca/?view_only=4e9c55459b4746a4bc9dac2baa7c5ab4The 21st century will likely see growing risks of human extinction, but currently, relatively small resources are invested in reducing such existential risks. Using three samples (UK general public, US general public, and UK students; total N = 2,507), we study how laypeople reason about human extinction. We find that people think that human extinction needs to be prevented. Strikingly, however, they do not think that an extinction catastrophe would be uniquely bad relative to near-extinction catastrophes, which allow for recovery. More people find extinction uniquely bad when a) asked to consider the extinction of an animal species rather than humans, b) asked to consider a case where human extinction is associated with less direct harm, and c) they are explicitly prompted to consider long-term consequences of the catastrophes. We conclude that an important reason why people do not find extinction uniquely bad is that they focus on the immediate death and suffering that the catastrophes cause for fellow humans, rather than on the long-term consequences. Finally, we find that d) laypeople—in line with prominent philosophical arguments—think that the quality of the future is relevant: they do find extinction uniquely bad when this means forgoing a utopian future.Berkeley Existential Risk InitiativeCentre for Effective AltruismJanggen-Poehn StiftungSwiss Study FoundationOxford Martin School (Oxford Martin Programme on Collective Responsibility for Infectious Disease

Doing good by doing nothing? The role of social norms in explaining default effects in altruistic contexts

We explore whether the known preference for default options in choice contexts—default effects—occur in altruistic contexts and the extent to which this can be explained through appeal to social norms. In four experiments, we found that (i) participants were more likely to donate money to charity when this was the default option in an altruistic choice context; (ii) participants perceived the default option to be the socially normative option; (iii) perceptions of social norms mediated the relationship between default status and charitable donations; and (iv) a transfer effect, whereby participants translated social norms they inferred from the default option in one domain into behavior in a second, related domain. Theoretically, our analysis situates default effects within a comprehensive body of social psychological research concerning social norms and the attitude‐behavior relationship, providing novel empirical predictions. Practically, these findings highlight that the way donation policies are framed can have an important impact on donation behavior: in our third study, we found that 81% donated half of their earnings for taking part in the experiment to charity when this was the default option, compared with only 19% when keeping the money was the default. Our work suggests that making use of default effects could be an effective tool to increase altruistic behavior without compromising freedo

Donors vastly underestimate differences in charities’ effectiveness

This is the final version. Available on open access from the Society for Judgment and Decision Making via the link in this recordSome charities are much more cost-effective than other charities, which means that they can save many more lives with the same amount of money. Yet most donations do not go to the most effective charities. Why is that? We hypothesized that part of the reason is that people underestimate how much more effective the most effective charities are compared with the average charity. Thus, they do not know how much more good they could do if they donated to the most effective charities. We studied this hypothesis using samples of the general population, students, experts, and effective altruists in six studies. We found that lay people estimated that among charities helping the global poor, the most effective charities are 1.5 times more effective than the average charity (Studies 1 and 2). Effective altruists, in contrast, estimated the difference to be factor 30 (Study 3) and experts estimated the factor to be 100 (Study 4). We found that participants donated more to the most effective charity, and less to an average charity, when informed about the large difference in cost-effectiveness (Study 5). In conclusion, misconceptions about the difference in effectiveness between charities is thus likely one reason, among many, why people donate ineffectively

Melatonin and the cardiovascular system in animals: systematic review and meta-analysis

Melatonin, a hormone released by the pineal gland, demonstrates several effects on the cardiovascular system. Herein, we performed a systematic review and meta-analysis to verify the effects of melatonin in an experimental model of myocardial infarction. We performed a systematic review according to PRISMA recommendations and reviewed MEDLINE, Embase, and Cochrane databases. Only articles in English were considered. A systematic review of the literature published between November 2008 and June 2019 was performed. The meta-analysis was conducted using the RevMan 5.3 program provided by the Cochrane Collaboration. In total, 858 articles were identified, of which 13 were included in this review. The main results of this study revealed that melatonin benefits the cardiovascular system by reducing infarct size, improving cardiac function according to echocardiographic and hemodynamic analyses, affords antioxidant effects, improves the rate of apoptosis, decreases lactate dehydrogenase activity, enhances biometric analyses, and improves protein levels, as analyzed by western blotting and quantitative PCR. In the meta-analysis, we observed a statistically significant decrease in infarct size (mean difference [MD], -20.37 [-23.56, -17.18]), no statistical difference in systolic pressure (MD, -1.75 [-5.47, 1.97]), a statistically significant decrease in lactate dehydrogenase in animals in the melatonin group (MD, -4.61 [-6.83, -2.40]), and a statistically significant improvement in the cardiac ejection fraction (MD, -8.12 [-9.56, -6.69]). On analyzing potential bias, we observed that most studies presented a low risk of bias; two parameters were not included in the analysis, and one parameter had a high risk of bias. Melatonin exerts several effects on the cardiovascular system and could be a useful therapeutic target to combat various cardiovascular diseases

Hair Strengthening Evaluation of Anisotropic Osmolite Solutions (Inositol + Arginine): Cross-Talk between Dermal Papilla Fibroblast and Keratinocytes of the Outer Root Sheath Using a µHair Follicle 3D Model

The hair follicle (HF) is a dynamic \u201cmini-organ\u201d which undergoes bi-continuous cycles of growth, destruction and rest. The molecular mechanisms underlying the HF cycle are complex yet not fully understood. Anyhow, it is clear that the epithelial\u2013mesenchymal interactions, and in particular the cross-talk between dermal papilla fibroblast (DPF) and the keratinocytes of the outer root sheath (ORSK) play a pivotal role. Aim of this study is the evaluation of the biological activity of anisotropic osmolyte solutions on the HF cycle. As reported in recent studies, dermal papilla cells deeply modify their gene expression profile when cultured as monolayers, but their transcriptional pattern can be partially restored when they are cultured as 3-dimensional spheroids. This draws our attention to the discovery that the spatial distribution of cells in the growth medium is fundamental in order to produce a verisimilar model. Therefore, we used the hanging drop technology to produce a scaffold-free micro-tissue model applied to a DPF-ORSK co-culture in order to create a \u3bcHF 3-dimensional model. As a result, this system was capable of evaluating the efficacy of the anisotropic osmolyte solutions on the progressive increase of the follicle turnover and \u2018health\u2019. Moreover, an in silico model was used in order to screen the most promising combination of osmolyte molecules. In vivo objective evaluations were finally carried out on volunteers having hair disorders

Impediments to effective altruism: the role of subjective preferences in charitable giving

Charity could do the most good if every dollar donated went to causes that produced the greatest welfare gains. In line with this proposition, the “Effective Altruism” movement seeks to provide individuals with information regarding the effectiveness of charities in hopes that they will donate to organizations that maximize the social return of their donation. This paper investigates the extent to which presenting effectiveness information leads people to choose more effective charities. We find that even when effectiveness information is made easily comparable across options, it has a limited impact on choice. Specifically, people frequently choose less effective charity options when those options represent more subjectively preferred causes. In contrast to making a personal donation decision, outcome metrics are used to a much greater extent when choosing financial investments and when allocating aid resources as an agent of an organization. Implications for Effective Altruism are discussed

Pills or push-ups? Effectiveness and public perception of pharmacological and non-pharmacological cognitive enhancement.

We review work on the effectiveness of different forms of cognitive enhancement, both pharmacological and non-pharmacological. We consider caffeine, methylphenidate, and modafinil for pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) and computer training, physical exercise, and sleep for non-pharmacological cognitive enhancement (NPCE). We find that all of the techniques described can produce significant beneficial effects on cognitive performance. However, effect sizes are moderate, and consistently dependent on individual and situational factors as well as the cognitive domain in question. Although meta-analyses allowing a quantitative comparison of effectiveness across techniques are lacking to date, we can conclude that PCE is not more effective than NPCE. We discuss the physiological reasons for this limited effectiveness. We then propose that even though their actual effectiveness seems similar, in the general public PCE is perceived as fundamentally different from NPCE, in terms of effectiveness, but also in terms of acceptability. We illustrate the potential consequences such a misperception of PCE can have

How stress influences our morality

All of us are stressed every now and then. There are phenomena we usually associate with stress, like health risks and feelings like fear, panic, or insecurity. But stress might also have effects we normally don’t think of; recent studies suggest it can dramatically influence our decision-making in a number of—perhaps unexpected—ways. This becomes particularly relevant in the moral context: people who are put under stress behave more compassionately in some situations, yet the opposite can be true in other situations. Why is this and what does this tell us about our morality? Maybe the comedian Tim Allen was right, when he said: “You don't know what people are really like until they’re under a lot of stress.

How stress influences our morality

All of us are stressed every now and then. There are phenomena we usually associate with stress, like health risks and feelings like fear, panic, or insecurity. But stress might also have effects we normally don’t think of; recent studies suggest it can dramatically influence our decision-making in a number of—perhaps unexpected—ways. This becomes particularly relevant in the moral context: people who are put under stress behave more compassionately in some situations, yet the opposite can be true in other situations. Why is this and what does this tell us about our morality? Maybe the comedian Tim Allen was right, when he said: “You don't know what people are really like until they’re under a lot of stress.