Investor reactions to company disclosure of high CEO pay and high CEO-to-employee pay ratio: An experimental investigation

Ministry of Education, Singapore under its Academic Research Funding Tier

Research note: Investor perceptions of comparable-to-industry versus higher-than-industry pay ratio disclosures

The usefulness of the CEO-to-employee pay ratio disclosure to investors is subject to significant debate. Our experiment examines participant responses to higher-than-industry and comparable-to-industry pay ratio disclosures in a company. A prior experiment by Kelly and Seow (2016) (hereafter KS) found that incrementally disclosing a higher-than-industry pay ratio on top of higher-than-industry CEO pay had indirect negative effects on the company\u27s perceived investment potential, via negative perceptions about the fairness of the CEO pay and workplace climate. We find that the negative indirect effects of pay ratio disclosures on perceived investment potential in KS are replicable in our study, and for a less extreme comparable-to-industry pay ratio. We do not find evidence that the effects of incremental pay ratio disclosure on investor perceptions are stronger when the pay ratio is higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-industry. Our study suggests that the ability of pay ratio disclosures to impact investor perceptions extends across a range of pay ratios

WASp-deficient B cells play a critical, cell-intrinsic role in triggering autoimmunity

In a manner dependent on CD4 T cell help and Toll-like receptor signals, B cells lacking WASp induce autoantibody production and autoimmune disease in mice

Discutindo a educação ambiental no cotidiano escolar: desenvolvimento de projetos na escola formação inicial e continuada de professores

A presente pesquisa buscou discutir como a Educação Ambiental (EA) vem sendo trabalhada, no Ensino Fundamental e como os docentes desta escola compreendem e vem inserindo a EA no cotidiano escolar., em uma escola estadual do município de Tangará da Serra/MT, Brasil. Para tanto, realizou-se entrevistas com os professores que fazem parte de um projeto interdisciplinar de EA na escola pesquisada. Verificou-se que o projeto da escola não vem conseguindo alcançar os objetivos propostos por: desconhecimento do mesmo, pelos professores; formação deficiente dos professores, não entendimento da EA como processo de ensino-aprendizagem, falta de recursos didáticos, planejamento inadequado das atividades. A partir dessa constatação, procurou-se debater a impossibilidade de tratar do tema fora do trabalho interdisciplinar, bem como, e principalmente, a importância de um estudo mais aprofundado de EA, vinculando teoria e prática, tanto na formação docente, como em projetos escolares, a fim de fugir do tradicional vínculo “EA e ecologia, lixo e horta”.Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educació

Effects of accuracy of incentive weights when rewarding non-financial value drivers.

I use an experiment to examine how the accuracy of relative incentive weights on non-financial value drivers in incentive contracts affect managerial performance in firms where intangible assets are more important than tangible assets for future financial performance. Rewarding non-financial value drivers with a summary financial measure improves performance over time regardless of the accuracy of the relative incentive weights on the non-financial value drivers. However, when only non-financial value drivers are rewarded, performance improves over time if they are accurately-weighted but decreases over time if they are inaccurately-weighted. When non-financial value drivers are accurately-weighted, managerial performance is better rewarding only the non-financial value drivers than rewarding both the non-financial value drivers and the summary financial measure. Conversely, when non-financial value drivers are inaccurately-weighted, managerial performance in the long run is better rewarding both the non-financial value drivers and the summary financial measure than rewarding only the non-financial value drivers. These results suggest that continuing to reward a summary financial measure may prevent performance decline when the relative incentive weights on non-financial value drivers are inaccurate. Keywords: value driver; non-financial performance measure; incentive weights

Adding nonfinancial value drivers to a summary financial measure : effects on learning and performance of managers.

44 p.This study examines the effects on the learning and performance of managers of adding leading nonfinancial value drivers (NVDs) to a lagging summary financial measure. An experiment separates the effects from information on the performance of NVDs (NVD information), information on the relative importance of different NVDs (NVD weights), and rewarding the performance of NVDs (NVD rewards). The study also investigates whether NVDs improve managerial learning and performance to a greater extent in firms where intangible assets are more important than tangible assets for future financial performance as compared to firms where the converse is true. The experimental setting involves a dynamic multi-period decision-making environment where NVDs are leading indicators of financial performance. The results indicate that only NVD rewards improve managerial performance in firms where intangible assets are more important than tangible assets, and not in firms where the converse is true. NVD information and NVD weights do not improve managerial performance. NVD information, NVD weights, or NVD rewards do not improve managerial learning

Tournament Group Identity And Performance: The Moderating Effect Of Winner Proportion

Tournament incentives are common in organizations, and how characteristics of the tournament group (e.g., tournament group identity) and the tournament incentives (e.g., winner proportion) affect tournament performance are of both practical and theoretical importance. We conduct two experiments in which participants compete for tournament rewards against others in their group. In both experiments, we manipulate the strength of participants\u27 identity with their fellow group members and whether the tournament has a small winner proportion with a single reward or a large winner proportion with multiple rewards. In Experiment 1, we find increasing tournament group identity leads to higher other-regarding preference. We also find other-regarding preference decreases competitiveness more in a large winner proportion tournament compared to a small winner proportion tournament. In Experiment 2, we find increasing tournament group identity decreases performance in a real-effort task under a large winner proportion tournament, but it has no effect on performance under a small winner proportion tournament. Together, the two experiments suggest that increasing tournament group identity increases other-regarding preference, and other-regarding preference has a larger negative impact on competitiveness and hence, tournament performance when the winner proportion is large than when it is small. Our results highlight for managers the importance of considering group identity when determining tournament winner proportions

Mandatory management disclosure and mandatory independent audit of internal controls : evidence of configural information processing by investors

We conduct an experiment where alumni participants from a Canadian accounting and finance undergraduate program assume they are in one of four regulatory regimes (manipulated between-subjects) and make investment potential evaluations for two firms (manipulated within-subjects): a firm disclosing no material weaknesses (No-MW disclosure firm) and a firm disclosing material weaknesses (MW disclosure firm) in internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). We find evidence of configural information processing. For the No-MW disclosure firm, mandatory (versus voluntary) disclosure of ICFR material weaknesses and mandatory (versus voluntary) independent ICFR audit are substitutes in enhancing investment potential evaluations. However, for the MW disclosure firm, neither mandatory disclosure nor mandatory audit has any effect on investment potential evaluations. Supplementary experiments with undergraduate participants suggest that the pattern of configural information processing is a function of participants' knowledge of company disclosure incentives and the assurance value of an audit, wherein undergraduates with lower levels of knowledge are less able to perceive the effects of mandatory disclosure and mandatory audit on investment potential evaluations. Our findings have implications for regulators who are concerned about balancing the costs and benefits of different regulatory mechanisms.MOE (Min. of Education, S’pore)Accepted versio