Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality

Pakistan is passing through an extremely delicate phase in its history. Recent instability in Pakistan, including the Taliban's advance into settled areas, prompted the Pakistani military to undertake large-scale military operations in the Swat Valley. As military and Taliban forces fight in the rugged tribal terrain, several Western analysts have raised concerns about the future of nuclear Pakistan

Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan; Strategic Insights: v.2, issue 1 (January 2003)

This article appeared in Strategic Insights (January 2003), v.2 no.1Focus on South Asia over the past fifty years has primarily remained on the India-Pakistan rivalry and tensions over Kashmir. This dimension overshadowed the effect of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations on the security dynamics of the South-Central Asian region. The historical and cultural dimension of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relation has been and will remain critical in the evolving regional dynamics. Since the events of September 11, 2001 the political landscape of the region has transformed dramatically. Pakistan made a strategic about-face over the Taliban, when her decade old forward policy in Afghanistan became counterproductive to her own national security. A year after the historic Bonn Agreement on December 6, 2001, Afghanistan has now embarked on a journey towards peace and reconstruction after being ravaged by war, bloody coups, and displacement of the society. In June 2002, the Loya Jirga endorsed the leadership of President Hamid Karzai. The interim administration and coalition in Kabul however remains fragile and the potential danger for a return to civil war still remains as Afghanistan undergoes a delicate transition period until 2003. For the past year Afghanistan and Pakistan have been enjoying an unprecedented level of cooperative relations. Will both countries remain on track and for how long? Will Afghanistan and Pakistan destabilize each other this decade? What major changes have now taken place and what steps might be taken to sustain this healthy trend in the future of their relations? This essay analyzes the security dynamics of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations in their historical framework and within the context of the ongoing war on terrorism, with an eye to the future of the region

Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures

The regional dynamic in South Asia is both extravagant and complicated. For centuries various empires have risen, thrived, and fallen, as numerous wars and clashes for control over resources spread across the geography. South Asian history writ large has seen hypothetical borders redrawn several times, leaving in question the viability of state control and perpetuating ethnic tensions. Though the great partition of India in 1947 ought to have politically resolved communal disharmony, the haste of British withdrawal created a geopolitical quagmire that has resulted in an “enduring rivalry” between the nations of India and Pakistan, one that has lasted for more than sixty years

The independence-dependence paradox: stability dilemmas in south

Has a new era of detente and stability emerged in South Asia five years after India and Pakistan first openly tested nuclear weapons? In the process, have India and Pakistan effectively demonstrated the value of nuclear weapons in deterring war? Deterrence optimists claim that fear of the ultimate weapon has restrained the otherwise rough actors who have been at each others' throats more often than any other nuclear neighbors in the nuclear age. Empirical evidance also suggests that the region has been spared from major wars, despite recurrent crises during the past two decades. Deterrence pessimists, however, dispute that nuclear weaons have had a stabilizing impact in the region. Indeed, the advent of nuclear weapons has witnessed increased tensions, a growing arms race, and a half-dozen crises nearing war. The region has come close to full blows at least twice since the open 1998 nuclear weapons tests -- in 1999 and 22001/2002--and thrice earlier in the covert nuclear period--in 1984, 1986-1987, and 1989-1990. In fact, the three most recent crises--in 1990, 1999 and 2001-2002--only avoided escalation into a full-scale war because of intense U.S. diplomacy. In fact, it could be argued that the deterrence equation in South Asia now implicitly depends on U.S. intevention. In essence, India's and Pakistan's nuclear politics involve what might be called the "independence-dependence paradox". These two proud countries have attempted to wean themselves from outside support by using nuclear weapons. But this strategy has ironically served to make them more dependent on other powers who are forced to mitigate the consequences of this arms race. No other country has played a more crucial role than the United States

Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan; Strategic Insights, v. 3 issue 10 (October 2004)

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.3 issue 10 (October 2004)PROBLEM BITSTREA

READ @your library Hassan Feroz Khan (bookmark)

A project of the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School

A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia

India and Pakistan have created sizeable ballistic missile forces and are continuing to developand enlarge them. These forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Missile forces will be a factor in bilateral relations for the foreseeable future, so restraint is necessary to curtail their destabilizing effects. Such restraint, however, must develop within an atmosphere of low trust. This report presents a set of political and operational options, both unilateral and bilateral,that decreases tensions, helps rebuild the bilateral relationship, and prepares the ground for future steps in structural arms control. Significant steps, which build on precedents and do not require extensive cooperation, are possible despite strained relations. The approach is made up of three distinct phases: 1) tension reduction measures, 2) confidence building measures, and 3) arms control agreements. The goal of the first phase is to initiate unilateral stepsthat are substantive and decrease tensions, establish missiles as a security topic for bilateral discussion, and set precedents for limited bilateral cooperation. The second phase would build confidence by expanding current bilateral security agreements, formalizing bilateral understandings, and beginning discussion of monitoring procedures. The third phase could include bilateral agreements limiting some characteristics of national missile forces including the cooperative incorporation of monitoring and verification

CMC occasional papers : a missile stability regime for South Asia.

India and Pakistan have created sizeable ballistic missile forces and are continuing to develop and enlarge them. These forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Missile forces will be a factor in bilateral relations for the foreseeable future, so restraint is necessary to curtail their destabilizing effects. Such restraint, however, must develop within an atmosphere of low trust. This report presents a set of political and operational options, both unilateral and bilateral, that decreases tensions, helps rebuild the bilateral relationship, and prepares the ground for future steps in structural arms control. Significant steps, which build on precedents and do not require extensive cooperation, are possible despite strained relations. The approach is made up of three distinct phases: (1) tension reduction measures, (2) confidence building measures, and (3) arms control agreements. The goal of the first phase is to initiate unilateral steps that are substantive and decrease tensions, establish missiles as a security topic for bilateral discussion, and set precedents for limited bilateral cooperation. The second phase would build confidence by expanding current bilateral security agreements, formalizing bilateral understandings, and beginning discussion of monitoring procedures. The third phase could include bilateral agreements limiting some characteristics of national missile forces including the cooperative incorporation of monitoring and verification

May Measurement Month 2018: a pragmatic global screening campaign to raise awareness of blood pressure by the International Society of Hypertension

Aims Raised blood pressure (BP) is the biggest contributor to mortality and disease burden worldwide and fewer than half of those with hypertension are aware of it. May Measurement Month (MMM) is a global campaign set up in 2017, to raise awareness of high BP and as a pragmatic solution to a lack of formal screening worldwide. The 2018 campaign was expanded, aiming to include more participants and countries. Methods and results Eighty-nine countries participated in MMM 2018. Volunteers (≥18 years) were recruited through opportunistic sampling at a variety of screening sites. Each participant had three BP measurements and completed a questionnaire on demographic, lifestyle, and environmental factors. Hypertension was defined as a systolic BP ≥140 mmHg or diastolic BP ≥90 mmHg, or taking antihypertensive medication. In total, 74.9% of screenees provided three BP readings. Multiple imputation using chained equations was used to impute missing readings. 1 504 963 individuals (mean age 45.3 years; 52.4% female) were screened. After multiple imputation, 502 079 (33.4%) individuals had hypertension, of whom 59.5% were aware of their diagnosis and 55.3% were taking antihypertensive medication. Of those on medication, 60.0% were controlled and of all hypertensives, 33.2% were controlled. We detected 224 285 individuals with untreated hypertension and 111 214 individuals with inadequately treated (systolic BP ≥ 140 mmHg or diastolic BP ≥ 90 mmHg) hypertension. Conclusion May Measurement Month expanded significantly compared with 2017, including more participants in more countries. The campaign identified over 335 000 adults with untreated or inadequately treated hypertension. In the absence of systematic screening programmes, MMM was effective at raising awareness at least among these individuals at risk

Pakistan's Challenges and the Need for a Balanced Solution ; Strategic Insights, V. 1, issue 6 (August 2002)

It appeared with a companion piece, Emerging Reconciliation Amidst Continuing Military Impasse by Surinder Rana. Both pieces appeared under a header: India and Pakistan at the Precipice: Two ViewsThe CCC is pleased to present alternative views on the India-Pakistan standoff in Kashmir from two experienced and distinguished analysts, Surinder Rana and Brigadier Hassan Feroz Khan. Brigadier Khan is a Flag Level Officer in the Pakistan Army with 29 years of service. He has seen combat and command on several fronts. With an extensive background in arms control, disarmament and international treaties, he formulated Pakistan's security policy on nuclear war arms control and strategic stability in South Asia. He is currently an analyst with the Brookings Institution