Irrational choice and the value of information

Irrational decision making in humans and other species challenges the use of optimality in behavioural biology. Here we show that such observations are in fact powerful tools to understand the adaptive significance of behavioural mechanisms. We presented starlings choices between probabilistic alternatives, receiving or not information about forthcoming, delayed outcomes after their choices. Subjects could not use this information to alter the outcomes. Paradoxically, outcome information induced loss-causing preference for the lower probability option. The effect depended on time under uncertainty: information given just after each choice caused strong preference for lower probability, but information just before the outcome did not. A foraging analysis shows that these preferences would maximize gains if post-choice information were usable, as when predators abandon a chase when sure of the prey escaping. Our study illustrates how experimentally induced irrational behaviour supports rather than weakens the evolutionary optimality approach to animal behaviour.Financial support was received from the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council Grant BB/G007144/1 (to AK). MV was funded by the Investigator Grant IF/01624/2013 and Grant IF/01624/2013/CP1158/CT0012 both from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). TM was supported by a doctoral grant from FCT and a Pembroke College Graduate Scholarship. We are grateful to Eva Abraham and Vivien Ngo for their help conducting the experiments

Sex differences in the use of spatial cues in two avian brood parasites

Shiny and screaming cowbirds are avian interspecific brood parasites that locate and prospect host nests in daylight and return from one to several days later to lay an egg during the pre-dawn twilight. Thus, during nest location and prospecting, both location information and visual features are available, but the latter become less salient in the low-light conditions when the nests are visited for laying. This raises the question of how these different sources of information interact, and whether this reflects different behavioural specializations across sexes. Differences are expected, because in shiny cowbirds, females act alone, but in screaming cowbirds, both sexes make exploratory and laying nest visits together. We trained females and males of shiny and screaming cowbird to locate a food source signalled by both colour and position (cues associated), and evaluated performance after displacing the colour cue to make it misleading (cues dissociated). There were no sex or species differences in acquisition performance while the cues were associated. When the colour cue was relocated, individuals of both sexes and species located the food source making fewer visits to non-baited wells than expected by chance, indicating that they all retained the position as an informative cue. In this phase, however, shiny cowbird females, but not screaming, outperformed conspecific males, visiting fewer non-baited wells before finding the food location and making straighter paths in the search. These results are consistent with a greater reliance on spatial memory, as expected from the shiny cowbird female’s specialization on nest location behaviour.Fil: Lois Milevicich, Jimena. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Ecología, Genética y Evolución; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Ecología, Genética y Evolución de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Ecología, Genética y Evolución de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: Kacelnik, Alex. University of Oxford; Reino UnidoFil: Reboreda, Juan Carlos. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Ecología, Genética y Evolución; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Ecología, Genética y Evolución de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Ecología, Genética y Evolución de Buenos Aires; Argentin

Asymmetric visual input and route recapitulation in homing pigeons

Pigeons (Columba livia) display reliable homing behaviour, but their homing routes from familiar release points are individually idiosyncratic and tightly recapitulated, suggesting that learning plays a role in route establishment. In light of the fact that routes are learned, and that both ascending and des- cending visual pathways share visual inputs from each eye asymmetrically to the brain hemispheres, we investigated how information from each eye con- tributes to route establishment, and how information input is shared between left and right neural systems. Using on-board global positioning system loggers, we tested 12 pigeons’ route fidelity when switching from learning a route with one eye to homing with the other, and back, in an A-B-A design. Two groups of birds, trained first with the left or first with the right eye, formed new idiosyncratic routes after switching eyes, but those that flew first with the left eye formed these routes nearer to their original routes. This confirms that vision plays a major role in homing from familiar sites and exposes a behavioural consequence of neuroanatomical asymmetry whose ontogeny is better understood than its functional significance

Cognitive Processes Associated with Sequential Tool Use in New Caledonian Crows

Background: Using tools to act on non-food objects-for example, to make other tools-is considered to be a hallmark of human intelligence, and may have been a crucial step in our evolution. One form of this behaviour, 'sequential tool use', has been observed in a number of non-human primates and even in one bird, the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides). While sequential tool use has often been interpreted as evidence for advanced cognitive abilities, such as planning and analogical reasoning, the behaviour itself can be underpinned by a range of different cognitive mechanisms, which have never been explicitly examined. Here, we present experiments that not only demonstrate new tool-using capabilities in New Caledonian crows, but allow examination of the extent to which crows understand the physical interactions involved. Methodology/Principal Findings: In two experiments, we tested seven captive New Caledonian crows in six tasks requiring the use of up to three different tools in a sequence to retrieve food. Our study incorporated several novel features: (i) we tested crows on a three-tool problem (subjects were required to use a tool to retrieve a second tool, then use the second tool to retrieve a third one, and finally use the third one to reach for food); (ii) we presented tasks of different complexity in random rather than progressive order; (iii) we included a number of control conditions to test whether tool retrieval was goal-directed; and (iv) we manipulated the subjects' pre-testing experience. Five subjects successfully used tools in a sequence (four from their first trial), and four subjects repeatedly solved the three-tool condition. Sequential tool use did not require, but was enhanced by, pre-training on each element in the sequence ('chaining'), an explanation that could not be ruled out in earlier studies. By analyzing tool choice, tool swapping and improvement over time, we show that successful subjects did not use a random probing strategy. However, we find no firm evidence to support previous claims that sequential tool use demonstrates analogical reasoning or human-like planning. Conclusions/Significance: While the ability of subjects to use three tools in sequence reveals a competence beyond that observed in any other species, our study also emphasises the importance of parsimony in comparative cognitive science: seemingly intelligent behaviour can be achieved without the involvement of high-level mental faculties, and detailed analyses are necessary before accepting claims for complex cognitive abilities.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Social Interaction Effects on Reward and Cognitive Abilities in Monkeys

When given a choice between receiving $100 in 30 days and$110 in 31 days, most people wait for the larger, more delayed reward. However, when the choice is between $100 today and$110 tomorrow, many people shift their preferences to the smaller, immediate reward despite the same difference of $10 and one day. Reward properties—such as time to receipt—play a crucial role in our processing of rewards. However, reward processing does not only occur for individual decisions but also for social interactions; we must decide to either cooperate or compete with others for rewards. Humans stand out in the animal kingdom as exceptional cooperators, both in terms of the form that cooperation assumes as well as the nature of rewards attained. Regarding form, we are unique in the stability of our reciprocal interactions and in the scale of our cooperative coalitions, entailing multiple nation states in times of war. In terms of rewards, we are of course motivated, like all other animals, by the central survival payoffs such as food and water but also by abstract entities such as money, the promise of future support, and positions of power such as a king, president, or head of an academic department. To maintain these complicated interactions and evaluate the nature of reward, we must possess a number of prerequisite cognitive abilities. Here, we view this problem through the lens of evolutionary biology, asking which aspects of our cognitive machinery, and the social interactions it supports, are uniquely human and which are shared with other primates. Though we focus on lemurs, monkeys, and apes, we acknowledge that many of the processes we document are unlikely to be restricted to the primates, and in many cases, there is already comparable evidence from other mammals and birds. We begin by reviewing a suite of cognitive mechanisms that are involved in both human and nonhuman primate reward processing. Our review is particularly focused on the subset of situations with quantifiable rewards. We then describe the kinds of social interactions that are part and parcel of primate life, especially the highly social monkeys and apes. Lastly, we merge these two sections and consider how constraints on primate cognition may limit the complexity of primate social interactions

State-Dependent Decisions Cause Apparent Violations of Rationality in Animal Choice

Normative models of choice in economics and biology usually expect preferences to be consistent across contexts, or “rational” in economic language. Following a large body of literature reporting economically irrational behaviour in humans, breaches of rationality by animals have also been recently described. If proven systematic, these findings would challenge long-standing biological approaches to behavioural theorising, and suggest that cognitive processes similar to those claimed to cause irrationality in humans can also hinder optimality approaches to modelling animal preferences. Critical differences between human and animal experiments have not, however, been sufficiently acknowledged. While humans can be instructed conceptually about the choice problem, animals need to be trained by repeated exposure to all contingencies. This exposure often leads to differences in state between treatments, hence changing choices while preserving rationality. We report experiments with European starlings demonstrating that apparent breaches of rationality can result from state-dependence. We show that adding an inferior alternative to a choice set (a “decoy”) affects choices, an effect previously interpreted as indicating irrationality. However, these effects appear and disappear depending on whether state differences between choice contexts are present or not. These results open the possibility that some expressions of maladaptive behaviour are due to oversights in the migration of ideas between economics and biology, and suggest that key differences between human and nonhuman research must be recognised if ideas are to safely travel between these fields

Pro-sociality without empathy

Empathy, the capacity to recognize and share feelings experienced by another individual, is an important trait in humans, but is not the same as pro-sociality, the tendency to behave so as to benefit another individual. Given the importance of understanding empathy's evolutionary emergence, it is unsurprising that many studies attempt to find evidence for it in other species. To address the question of what should constitute evidence for empathy, we offer a critical comparison of two recent studies of rescuing behaviour that report similar phenomena but are interpreted very differently by their authors. In one of the studies, rescue behaviour in rats was interpreted as providing evidence for empathy, whereas in the other, rescue behaviour in ants was interpreted without reference to sharing of emotions. Evidence for empathy requires showing that actor individuals possess a representation of the receiver's emotional state and are driven by the psychological goal of improving its wellbeing. Proving psychological goal-directedness by current standards involves goal-devaluation and causal sensitivity protocols, which, in our view, have not been implemented in available publications. Empathy has profound significance not only for cognitive and behavioural sciences but also for philosophy and ethics and, in our view, remains unproven outside humans.M.V. was funded by a Post-doctoral Fellowship (SFRH/BPD/79311/2011) awarded by the Portuguese Foundationfor Science and Technolog

Compound tool construction by New Caledonian crows

The construction of novel compound tools through assemblage of otherwise non-functional elements involves anticipation of the affordances of the tools to be built. Except for few observations in captive great apes, compound tool construction is unknown outside humans, and tool innovation appears late in human ontogeny. We report that habitually tool-using New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) can combine objects to construct novel compound tools. We presented 8 naive crows with combinable elements too short to retrieve food targets. Four crows spontaneously combined elements to make functional tools, and did so conditionally on the position of food. One of them made 3- and 4-piece tools when required. In humans, individual innovation in compound tool construction is often claimed to be evolutionarily and mechanistically related to planning, complex task coordination, executive control, and even language. Our results are not accountable by direct reinforcement learning but corroborate that these crows possess highly flexible abilities that allow them to solve novel problems rapidly. The underlying cognitive processes however remain opaque for now. They probably include the species' typical propensity to use tools, their ability to judge affordances that make some objects usable as tools, and an ability to innovate perhaps through virtual, cognitive simulations