No father required? The welfare assessment in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008

Of all the changes to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 that were introduced in 2008 by legislation of the same name, foremost to excite media attention and popular controversy was the amendment of the so-called welfare clause. This clause forms part of the licensing conditions which must be met by any clinic before offering those treatment services covered by the legislation. The 2008 Act deleted the statutory requirement that clinicians consider the need for a father of any potential child before offering a woman treatment, substituting for it a requirement that clinicians must henceforth consider the child’s need for “supportive parenting”. In this paper, we first briefly recall the history of the introduction of s 13(5) in the 1990 Act, before going on to track discussion of its amendment through the lengthy reform process that preceded the introduction of the 2008 Act. We then discuss the meaning of the phrase “supportive parenting” with reference to guidance regarding its interpretation offered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. While the changes to s 13(5) have been represented as suggesting a major change in the law, we suggest that the reworded section does not represent a significant break from the previous law as it had been interpreted in practice. This raises the question of why it was that an amendment that is likely to make very little difference to clinical practice tended to excite such attention (and with such polarising force). To this end, we locate debates regarding s 13(5) within a broader context of popular anxieties regarding the use of reproductive technologies and, specifically, what they mean for the position of men within the family

Throwing baby out with the bath water : some reflections on the evolution of reproductive technology.

This article discusses section 156 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which prohibits the use of eggs from aborted female foetuses for the purposes of reproduction. I argue that the pre-legislative debates focus only on the biological relationship between the aborted foetus and any ensuing child and foreclose the possibility of useful discussion about the potential merits of such technology. Kristeva's theory of abjection has been used in order to elucidate the strength of feeling about the use of eggs from the expelled foetus. I suggest that the ‘yuk’ factor stems from the potential for the blurring of the boundaries between life and death. In addition, I suggest that the stress placed on the biological link means that the foetus is ascribed special properties not given to live donors. Woman's very crucial role in reproductive technologies is therefore erased. The article argues that there are very good reasons why the debate on the subject should remain open. At present women donors have to undergo highly intrusive procedures in order to give eggs and the process is not without its health risks. The use of eggs from aborted foetuses certainly raises important consent issues but these could be addressed by placing women at the centre of the decision making process, starting with the recognition that it is women and not foetuses who have the remit and responsibility for giving consent for the use of their genetic material. Moreover, there should be an acknowledgement that women are perfectly capable of making informed decisions about donation and of considering the potential implications of participating in egg donation

Minors' Capacity to Refuse Treatment: A Reply to Gilmore and Herring

Re R and Re W allow a parent to consent to treatment a competent minor refuses, but the cases have not been tested post-Human Rights Act 1998. Gilmore and Herring offer a means by which they might be distinguished or sidelined. They interpret Gillick to say that in order to consent a minor need only have a full understanding of the particular treatment. They argue that the minors in Re R and Re W were refusing all treatment which requires a separate assessment of capacity—an assessment which was not made. We fear that this distinction would not be workable in clinical practice and argue that their interpretation of Gillick is flawed. From a clinician's point of view, competence cannot always be judged in relation to a specific treatment, but instead must relate to the decision. We show that a decision can incorporate more than one treatment, and more than one decision might be made about one treatment. A minor's understanding of a specific treatment is not always sufficient to demonstrate competence to make a decision. The result is that whilst there might be situations when a parent and a minor both have the power to consent to a particular treatment, they will not share concurrent powers in relation to the same decision. Consequently, a challenge to Re R and Re W, if forthcoming, would need to take a different form. We emphasise the necessity to minimise the dichotomy between legal consent and how consent works in medical practice

The Lore of Sexual Difference in Social & Legal Discourse on 'Date Rape'.

Using a framework informed by Foucauldian discourse theory and feminist accounts of sexual difference, this paper investigates the process of attrition in cases initially recorded as rape and in which complainant and suspect are known to each other. Having particular regard to police and prosecutor decision-making in the processing of such cases, the authors consider discourses that utilise conceptions of sexual difference, which work to normalise and privilege cultural assumptions about male desires and conduct in sexual relations. In illuminating the manner in which the traditional binary categories of sexual difference is put to work, the authors argue that socio-legal debates over the phenomenon commonly described as ‘date rape’ have over-simplistically inverted these categories. The authors further argue that this inversion operates to women's detriment and fails to advance a sufficiently nuanced understanding of complex issues implicated in rapes committed against women by men they know

Exploring the use of social media by occupational therapy students.

This poster will disseminate the findings from a Student as Co- Researcher (SCoRe) project, which aimed to investigate; knowledge, attitudes of professionalism, ethical practice and the use of social media by occupational therapy students. A mixed methods design was used, comprising of a survey, focus group and scoping review. The scoping review captured and summarised literature concerning the use of social media by regulated health care professionals. The scope of the search was broadened due to the lacked of literature on occupational therapists. A cross-sectional, descriptive survey, using an online tool, with a convenience sample recruiting from occupational therapy students at York St John University. Survey questions were adapted from a study with pharmacy students (Hall et al 2013). Also, a semi-structured group interview (focus group) using photo elicitation explored images shared on social media platforms and themes of professional behaviour. Data is still being analysed but initial findings include: ● Twitter is not widely used and but the potential for its use for academic or professional use is growing ● Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat are the most popular social networking platforms ● Awareness of professionalism and use of social media had grown over the course of the degree and resulted in reviewing privacy settings on Facebook In conclusion, when analysis of all of the data has been completed, the authors aim to make recommendations to the University and the profession regarding how social media can be utilized by students in a safe but effective way

The mysterious case of disappearing family law and the shrinking vulnerable subject: The shifting sands of family law’s jurisdiction

This article seeks to critically examine the implications that the new eligibility requirements for legal aid as implemented by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 are having on the ways in which private family law governs families. It makes use of a theoretical lens drawn from the work of Valverde (2009, 2014a, 2014b) on ‘jurisdiction’ to map the shift that has taken place within family law as a result of the political boundary that the act has drawn between ‘vulnerable’ litigants eligible for legal aid and the rest of families engaging with private family law, for whom self-sufficiency and responsibility is encouraged and expected. It argues that in reserving legal aid for a narrow group of vulnerable litigants, the formal scale of family law has shrunk, there being at the same time an increased reliance on more informal sources of law such as advice-based resources. This has led to a diversification of formal and informal scales of governance which operate according to different ‘logics’, which impact negatively on access to family justice for families from various backgrounds and circumstances. The article concludes with a call for family law researchers to be mindful of the need to look at both formal and more informal sources of family law in order to fully appreciate developments within the jurisdiction, particularly pernicious ones, and to be able to respond to them appropriately