Supported Hybrid Enzyme-Organocatalysts for Upgrading the Carbon Content of Alcohols

A bicatalytic system was prepared by the immobilization of alcohol oxidase enzyme and an alkylamine organocatalyst in distinct locations of mesoporous nanoparticles. The resulting nanocomposites were able to perform a sequence of oxidation and aldol coupling reactions, which transformed short chain alcohols into longer chain molecules. The process takes place at low temperatures, but requires additional enzyme (catalase) to prevent inactivation of the catalyst. This qualitative study introduces a model of a hybrid multicomponent nanomaterial that resembles the behavior of multienzymatic systems within confined spaces

Plant-made vaccines in support of the Millennium Development Goals

Vaccines are one of the most successful public health achievements of the last century. Systematic immunisation programs have reduced the burden of infectious diseases on a global scale. However, there are limitations to the current technology, which often requires costly infrastructure and long lead times for production. Furthermore, the requirement to keep vaccines within the cold-chain throughout manufacture, transport and storage is often impractical and prohibitively expensive in developing countries—the very regions where vaccines are most needed. In contrast, plant-made vaccines (PMVs) can be produced at a lower cost using basic greenhouse agricultural methods, and do not need to be kept within such narrow temperature ranges. This increases the feasibility of developing countries producing vaccines locally at a small-scale to target the specific needs of the region. Additionally, the ability of plant-production technologies to rapidly produce large quantities of strain-specific vaccine demonstrates their potential use in combating pandemics. PMVs are a proven technology that has the potential to play an important role in increasing global health, both in the context of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals and beyond

Sales promotions and channel coordination

Consumer sales promotions are usually the result of the decisions of two marketing channel parties, the manufacturer and the retailer. In making these decisions, each party normally follows its own interest: i.e. maximizes its own profit. Unfortunately, this results in a suboptimal outcome for the channel as a whole. Independent profit maximization by channel parties leads to a lack of channel coordination with the implication of leaving money on the table. This may well contribute to the notoriously low profitability of sales promotions. This paper first shows analytically why the suboptimality occurs, and then presents an empirical demonstration, using a unique dataset from an Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) project; ECR is a movement in which parties work together to optimize the distribution channel). In this dataset, actual profit is only a small fraction of potential profit, implying that there is a large degree of suboptimality. It is important that (1) channel parties are aware of this suboptimality; and (2) that they have tools to deal with it. Solutions to the channel coordination problem should ensure that the goals of the individual channel parties are aligned with the goals of the channel as a whole. The paper proposes one particular agreement for this purpose, called proportional discount sharing. Application to the ECR data shows a win-win result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Recognition of the channel coordination problem by the manufacturer and the retailer is the necessary starting point for agreeing on a way of solving it in a win-win fashion

What Factors Determine the Number of Trading Partners?

The purpose of the paper is to provide a simple model explaining buyer-supplier relationships and show what factors determine the number of trading partners. We show that when the supplier is able to determine the number of trading partners, the optimal number is small if the supplier's bargaining power with them is weak, the economy of scope in the supplier's variable costs is significant, and that in its sunk investment is weak. Investment may be greater when the number of trading partners is small. The results may be consistent with the formation of Japanese buyer-supplier relations

One-Off Subsidies and Long-Run Adoption Experimental Evidence on Improved Cooking Stoves in Senegal

Free technology distribution can be an effective development policy instrument if adoption is socially inefficient and hampered by affordability constraints. Yet, policy makers often oppose free distribution, arguing that reference dependence spoils the willingness to pay and thus market potentials in the long run. For improved cookstoves, this paper studies the willingness to pay six years after a randomized one-time free distribution. Using a real-purchase offer procedure, we find that households who received a free stove in the past do not reveal a lower willingness to pay to repurchase the stove. Furthermore, we provide exploratory evidence that learning and reference-dependence effects do not spill over from the treatment to the control group. The policy implication is that one-time free distribution does not disturb future market establishment and might even facilitate it.JEL Codes: D03, D12, O12, O13, Q4