45 research outputs found

    Memory for expectation-violating concepts:The effects of agents and cultural familiarity

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    Previous research has shown that ideas which violate our expectations, such as schema-inconsistent concepts, enjoy privileged status in terms of memorability. In our study, memory for concepts that violate cultural (cultural schema-level) expectations (e.g., "illiterate teacher", "wooden bottle", or "thorny grass") versus domain-level (ontological) expectations (e.g., "speaking cat", "jumping maple", or "melting teacher") was examined. Concepts that violate cultural expectations, or counter-schematic, were remembered to a greater extent compared with concepts that violate ontological expectations and with intuitive concepts (e.g., "galloping pony", "drying orchid", or "convertible car"), in both immediate recall, and delayed recognition tests. Importantly, concepts related to agents showed a memory advantage over concepts not pertaining to agents, but this was true only for expectation-violating concepts. Our results imply that intuitive, everyday concepts are equally attractive and memorable regardless of the presence or absence of agents. However, concepts that violate our expectations (cultural-schema or domain-level) are more memorable when pertaining to agents (humans and animals) than to non-agents (plants or objects/artifacts). We conclude that due to their evolutionary salience, cultural ideas which combine expectancy violations and the involvement of an agent are especially memorable and thus have an enhanced probability of being successfully propagated. © 2014 Porubanova et al

    Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts

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    Abstract The cultural transmission of theological con-cepts remains an underexplored topic in the cognitive sci-ence of religion (CSR). In this paper, I examine whether approaches from CSR, especially the study of content biases in the transmission of beliefs, can help explain the cultural success of some theological concepts. This approach reveals that there is more continuity between theological beliefs and ordinary religious beliefs than CSR authors have hitherto recognized: the cultural transmission of theological concepts is influenced by content biases that also underlie the reception of ordinary religious concepts

    Chromo- and Fluorogenic Organometallic Sensors

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    Compounds that change their absorption and/or emission properties in the presence of a target ion or molecule have been studied for many years as the basis for optical sensing. Within this group of compounds, a variety of organometallic complexes have been proposed for the detection of a wide range of analytes such as cations (including H+), anions, gases (e.g. O 2, SO2, organic vapours), small organic molecules, and large biomolecules (e.g. proteins, DNA). This chapter focuses on work reported within the last few years in the area of organometallic sensors. Some of the most extensively studied systems incorporate metal moieties with intense long-lived metal-to-ligand charge transfer (MLCT) excited states as the reporter or indicator unit, such as fac-tricarbonyl Re(I) complexes, cyclometallated Ir(III) species, and diimine Ru(II) or Os(II) derivatives. Other commonly used organometallic sensors are based on Pt-alkynyls and ferrocene fragments. To these reporters, an appropriate recognition or analyte-binding unit is usually attached so that a detectable modification on the colour and/or the emission of the complex occurs upon binding of the analyte. Examples of recognition sites include macrocycles for the binding of cations, H-bonding units selective to specific anions, and DNA intercalating fragments. A different approach is used for the detection of some gases or vapours, where the sensor's response is associated with changes in the crystal packing of the complex on absorption of the gas, or to direct coordination of the analyte to the metal centre

    What is counterintuitive? Religious cognition and natural expectation

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    What is ‘counterintuitive’? There is general agreement that it refers to a violation of previously held knowledge, but the precise definition seems to vary with every author and study. The aim of this paper is to deconstruct the notion of 'counterintuitive’ and provide a more philosophically rigorous definition congruent with the history of psychology, recent experimental work in ‘minimally counterintuitive’ concepts, the science vs. religion debate, and the developmental and evolutionary background of human beings. We conclude that previous definitions of counterintuitiveness have been flawed and did not resolve the conflict between a believer’s conception of the supernatural entity (an atypical “real kind”) and the non-believer’s conception (empty name/fictional). Furthermore, too much emphasis has been placed on the universality and (presumed) innateness of intuitive concepts (and hence the criteria for what is counterintuitive)—and far too little attention paid to learning and expertise. We argue that many putatively universal concepts are not innate, but mostly learned and defeasible—part of a religious believer’s repertoire of expert knowledge. Nonetheless, the results from empirical studies about the memorability of counterintuitive concepts have been convincing and it is difficult to improve on existing designs and methodologies. However, future studies in counterintuitive concepts need to embed their work in research about context effects, typicality, the psychology of learning and expertise (for example, the formation of expert templates and range defaults), with more attention to the sources of knowledge (direct and indirect knowledge) and a better idea of what ‘default’ knowledge really is
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